

JOURNAL for the STUDY of RELIGIONS & IDEOLOGIES

• No. 12 • winter 2005

Edited by S.C.I.R.I. & SACRI
<http://www.sacri.ro>

ISSN: 1583-0039

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Creating National Identity through a Legend —The Case of the Wandering Jew

In this paper I propose to examine a mythical character that has a tremendous influence on the debate over the new Israeli-Jewish identity. The paper argues that the Wandering/Eternal Jew, aside from its intrinsic importance for Jewish History, functions as a mechanism through which the opposition with the Sabra is maintained in Israeli society. Present time history textbooks try to capture only those aspects of Israeli history relevant for modern contemporary society and culture, for the great majority of scholars the myth of the Eternal Jew being a grotesque falsification. Despite this though, the character of the Eternal relates to different aspects of the identity-problems raised by the opposition Jewish versus Israeli and can be absolutely relevant in this sense.

The idea of social construction of reality presupposes both imagery and concepts, but the social reconstruction of reality in a mythological as well as scientific context still primarily consists of concepts based on interpretations of written “evidences”. However, these reflect only a part of the psychosocial construct through which a person perceives, thinks and acts. The significance of imagery for every person’s worldview and for his way of relating to the outer world is often disregarded. This is why the fundamental task for every postmodern scholar ought to be that of *giving*, *appreciating* and *interpreting* meanings rather than explaining, predicting and controlling what happens in the world. It is the goal of this study to search for new manifestations of the old myth of the Eternal/Wandering Jew and to reveal how past realities contemporary Israeli reality.

For centuries scholars of literature, theology and history have examined the relationship between the

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Key words:

eternal Jew, Jewish identity, Israeli identity, myth, Zionism, Wandering Jew

mythical portrayal of the Jew and its tie to the fate of Jews all over the world. The legend of Ahasuerus who was cursed for rejecting Jesus on the road to Calvary, has, over the years, spread the belief that the Wandering Jew was fated to adopt a nomadic existence as penance for past wrongdoing. Thus, the Jew was forced to leave every country so that its inhabitants would forget his political, religious, economic and social foibles. This destiny, it is said, is related to Jesus Christ's cursing of the Jews to wander around the world until Judgment Day.

The myth of the Wandering or Eternal Jew is a constitutive part of Christian mythology. As in the case of all major myths, it carries with it several fundamental assumptions:

Firstly - the label *Jew*, *Judah* and the essence *Judaism* are inextricably bond with each other

Secondly – the label or name - *Wandering Jew* - does not merely denote, but actually depicts the essence of its object

Thirdly - the potency of the real thing (i.e. a neighbor or a fellow Jew) is contained in the name (*Eternal/Wandering Jew*).

The story of the Eternal Jew first gained popularity in the 17th Century when a in Leyden appeared a printed pamphlet saying that the bishop of Schleswig had met the Wandering Jew in Hamburg in 1542 and the Jew's name was Ahasuerus. Henceforth, in later European versions the doorkeeper became the cobbler *Abasuerus* or *Ananias* at whose door Jesus rested his cross. In the 16th and 17th century these versions of popularization of the narrative of crucifixion were connected to actual sightings of wandering Jew and spread throughout Europe. The Eternal Jew, who appeared for hundreds of years without aging gained in this way a truly singular status. He was considered to have connections with the supernatural for among all human being it seemed to be

the only one immortal. What is the secret of this immortality?

Through referring to the stereotype of the *Wandering* or *Eternal Jew*, the mythical consciousness sustains the illusion that its subject reflects reality. What later on will be known as idealization (the result of misconception and falsification), in these times takes on mythic dimensions and so the Jew becomes not a persona but an incarnation of evil, his facial and corporal features being a stamp of his character.

The character of the Eternal Jew was not described only by his image as moneylender or malicious usurers who flourishes under Christian generous hospitality, but as a symbol of all the evil on earth. The figure of the Jew has been portrayed on every stage, in every poem or every story in European Middle Ages as a diabolic, grotesque and antisocial creature, so that the everyday Jew did not exist as a normal human being. The vilification of the Jewish character turned the Jew into a negative symbol, and thus the Jew next-door became the Eternal Jew, i.e. the “cursed Jew”, the “malicious Jew” or the “traitor Jew”. Jewish identity was dominated by these images of the Jew and through the ages confronted itself with them.

Exposure of the nature of this mythological conception is important not only because of its ramifications, but also in order to grasp the dynamics or underlying principle behind its crystallization. The formation of a myth presupposes certain properties that are transplanted and spread to other phenomena in order to form a “systematic unity” that bolsters the image of the Wandering Jew. The challenging of the established order and of Christian faith all over the world are central components within this myth of the Wandering Jew. The myth is all-pervasive, deeply embodied in European culture – it is epitomized by the fact that the Wandering Jew has invaded even the natural sciences where the

plant *Tradescantia fluminensis* (an easy-to-grow creeping plant, whose cuttings are passed along like a rootless wanderer from gardener to gardener, able to thrive even in plain water) translates from Latin as “Wandering Jew”.

The myth of the “Eternal Jew” is best known in the 20th Century through its revival in the NSDAP propaganda film “*Der ewige Jude*”. This film was a Nazi interpretation of the powerful age-old legend of the Eternal or Wandering Jew (Göttingen, 1995). The revival of the *Eternal Jew Myth* was a powerful tool used by National-Socialist propaganda to justify the persecution of the Jews and prepare the masses for the forthcoming Holocaust. Nazi propaganda filmmakers offered a portrayal of world’s Jewry, so that no viewer would fail to shudder at the sneaking servility and dirty bartering of the Jews.

The Jewish heritage of the Christian tradition as well as the legendary figure of the Wandering Jew, Ahasuerus, was completely changed in the film. In *Der ewige Jude* the punishment 2000 years in Diaspora became **2000 Years of Rat Migration**. According to the film, even in ancient times the Jews harbored each and every criminal trait that they were said to display in the 20th century. Throughout history, they had been enemies of every “normal”, hard-working, honest and creative people. The Jews were purported to be ugly, corrupt, filthy, lazy and perverse. They had migrated from their Promised Land to flood the entire Mediterranean Region, penetrate Spain, France and Germany and move to Eastern European countries. According to the Nazified version of the myth, the Jews of those days carried a heritage of eternal parasites - haggling and cheating, while conspiring to take over the world through their control of banking, commerce, the media and politics.

The Jew in this NSDAP propaganda film was presented as a disgusting individual since his very appearance on the stage of human history. No one would fail to shudder at the Jew’s sneaking servility and underhanded bartering, his inborn perfidy and seditiousness and the vulgarity of his tactics - a brutish and all-devouring hatred that he was held to exhibit, in the pursuit of his selfish goals and greed to control finance. *The Jew* was not merely an individual or a singular person: he was portrayed as a mythical symbol, and an eternal entity. The Eternal Jew was an alien who lies in wait for the nations of Europe, at once an outsider and an insider, foreign and familiar, preaching a system of universal values – the primacy of pure reason, pure and universal morality or the unity of mankind – and scoring the voice of the blood and of primordial instincts. The battle against Evil becomes, therefore, a total war against the Eternal Jew – master of immense powers capable of undermining the economy, polluting culture and the media, influencing education and swaying politics. Every Jew in the world has emerged from the same genetic stock, and therefore even the Jewish leaders and academics – members of the upper class in the Weimar Era - carried the mark of their origins in the filthy ghettos of Eastern Europe.

The NSDAP’s demonic figure of the Eternal Jew is rooted not so much in Christian medieval stories like the image of the Eternal Jew as he reappeared in 19th Century literature. The Eternal Jew had been empowered less than a century before the Holocaust by the infamous figures of *The Elders of Zion* (Poliakov, 1974) more than any other major myths. From the mid 19th century, this tract had been whole-heartedly adopted and disseminated by all professional Jew-haters and propagators of anti-Semitism – in France, where it originated, in Russia, where it was used to incite

pogroms, in Germany and United States and many other countries throughout the world as the ground of every social-economic and cultural disease.

The circumstances of the origins and the evidence of a Jewish world conspiracy were grounded in the powerful myth of the Eternal Jew who, towards his re-emergence on the stage of modern times assumed the character of Jacob, the founder of the Israelite dynasty. Jacob was transformed into the lead figure in this “new” legend, together with his twelve sons – the forefathers of the Twelve Tribes. At this juncture in modern world history, the origin of the story of the Eternal Jew was retraced back to a twisted version of its original Biblical source. The Eternal Jew appeared in different places at different times, but always bearing the same demonic character that empowered the myth, perpetuating and propelling it forward from generation to generation.

Being a rebel and a conspirator, the Wandering Jew was said to have a glorious relationship with Satan. Crime and punishment, rebellious actions and a mysterious appearance linked the Wandering Jew to Lucifer or Satan, as his sinister road companion. Thus, the Eternal Jew was endowed with supernatural powers. This tie can be found in Hermann Gödsche novel *Biarritz* published in the Prussian newspaper “*Kreuzzeitung*” (1868) under the pseudonym Sir John Retscliffe (Bernstein, 1971).

In Gödsche’s novel, the Eternal Jew conducts a nocturnal secret meeting at the Jewish Cemetery in Prague, the capital of Central Europe. At midnight, the cemetery gates creak open and a white figure makes its way toward one of the tombstones. It kneels, touches the tombstone three times with its forehead, and begins to pray. Gradually it is joined by twelve other figures, all of whom perform the same ritual. By midnight, thirteen figures have assembled. Satan, speaking from the depths

of the surrounding graves, blesses the heads of the Twelve Tribes of Israel (Poliakov, 1974).

The Israelites report their activities since their last meeting with Satan. The head of the tribe of Levi is pleased to announce that Israel is now able to raise its head again thanks to the accumulation of gold. Rueben indicates that through manipulation of stock exchanges, all the princes and governments of Europe are now in the debt of the Jews. Judah states that owing to Jewish mass-production methods, all independent craftsmen have been reduced to the status of factory workers. Simon plans to divide the lands in order to transform their inhabitants in slaves. Aaron is the specialist in undermining the work of the Christian Church by spreading freethinking and skepticism. Issachar assumes as target the vilification of the military class and the shattering of the patriotism it personifies through infiltrating the patriotic forces of each country so that they will become passive lackeys of the Jews who, of course, hold no territorial allegiances themselves. Zebulon asserts that the Jews must always appear to be on the side of the forces of radicalism because in this manner, the Jews can use revolution as a front to cover their real goals: to amass more and more power and wealth. Manasseh speaks most persuasively of the necessity to capture the press in each country so that news could be manipulated by the Jews.

The meeting closes with the decision to meet again, as is their custom, past one hundred years by which time the grandchildren of the assembled tribal heads will have enjoyed the benefits that they would accrue as a result of the activities of their Jewish brethren in the intervening century. Wherever the established order was challenged, the sources could be traced to the words of one or another of these heads of the Tribes of Israel. This anti-Semitic version of Jewish life as “unnatural” phenomena

and “unhealthy” heritage was deeply rooted in European soil. The Oriental spirits of the ancient Israelite spread throughout Europe, nurtured within local legends that spoke of individual eternal wanderers who allegedly appeared over hundreds years, without aging.

Many versions of the Wandering Jew’s legend may have circulated in the Christian oral as well as written tradition:

A written record appears in *The Chronicles of St. Albans* (1228) (Anderson, 1965, Poliakov, 1974). The story of the St. Albans monks reflect other versions, yet all have a common theme: all recount how *Kartaphilos* - doorkeeper of the Judgment Hall and a servant of Pontius Pilate, struck Jesus as he was led forth, prodding him with the words “Go on faster, Jesus!” to which Jesus was said to have replied, “I am going, but thou shalt tarry till I come again.”

The story of the Wandering Jew was also told by Roger of Wendover in *Flores Historiarum* (1228) and Matthew Paris copied this version in his *Cronica Majora*:

When as in faire Jerusalem
Our Saviour Christ did live,
And for the sins of all the worlde
His own dear life did give;

The wicked Jews with scoffs and scornes
Did dailye him molest,
That never till he left his life
Our Saviour could not rest;

.....

Being wearye thus, he sought to rest,
To ease his burthened soule
Upon a stone; the which a wretch
Did churlishly contoule.

And sayd, “Awaye, thou king of Jews,
Thou shalt not rest thee here;
Pass on; thy execution place
Thou seest, now draweth neare.”

And thereupon, he thrust him thence;
And which our Saviour sayd:

“I sure will rest, but thou shalt walk
And have no journey stayed...” (Modder, 1961, p.

14)

This episode never appears in the New Testament; the carrying of the cross is dealt with in a single subordinate clause - John 19:17. Sometimes the legend is linked with a Jew who was cursed by Jesus - Matthew 16:23-28. The myth’s popularity, however, was fueled by the image of the Wandering Jew as embodied within the Jewish People as a whole, who for having mocked Jesus, were driven from their homeland and destined to wander on the face of the earth, and who, despite their persecution, still enjoyed prosperity and a good life.

Yet, the legend itself expresses a vital and painful fact: the Jews had been condemned to long years of waiting and suffering on earth until the Messiah ultimately redeemed them. The Wandering Jew paid the penalty and suffered tortures that no man could understand. There is one version of this legend that perceives Jesus as surrounded by a host of spirits during the crucifixion - all striving to sustain him and listen to his words. The spirits also hear Kartaphilos’ words, and they oversee that the sentence should be carried out in full and never end: The Eternal Jew would travel the weary road of suffering until Jesus reappeared and became known to mortals, at which point the Jew would be liberated from his fate of eternal wandering. This

version of the legend says that the spirits accompanied the Wandering Jew, sustaining him in his physical life while striving to sway him to open up his soul to accept Jesus Christ as his Messiah. The Wandering Jew was doomed to suffer, evaded by death until he embraced Jesus. Should such an eternal figure exist, he would constitute proof of the supernatural foundations of Christianity and its strong ties to Judaism.

The Eternal Jew as a Literary Negative Figure

During Middle-Ages in Europe, the myth of the Wandering Jew was used as a justification for persecution of real-life Jews. Even during Renaissance, Jews were portrayed in literature as evil. In fact, Jews were perceived as the incarnation of the devil – the most outstanding example being Geoffrey Chaucer's *The Canterbury Tales* (1387-1400). This perception is reflected in the words of the Prioress who tells a sad tale of the "littel clergeoun" giving a widely accepted perception of the Jew, in 14th century England:

"Oure firste foe, the serpent Sathanas,

That hath in Jewes herte his waspes nest" (Modder, 1961, p.13)

The Enlightenment fought both legal prejudices against the Jews and deeply entrenched unconscious perceptions but did not change Jew's popular demonic figure. Christopher Marlowe (1564-1593) and William Shakespeare (1564-1616) used the same stereotypes in his famous portrait of a "typical" Jewish figure in the 16th Century in *The Jew of Malta* and *The Merchant of Venice* consequently. The protagonist is very similar to that of Marlowe and Shakespeare's predecessor -

Chaucer. As Shylock the Jew enters, Shakespeare exposed the general view of the Jew in the words of Salanio:

"Let me say 'amen' betimes, lest the devil cross my prayer,

for here he comes in the likeness of a Jew."

(Shakespeare, 1974, p. 203)

Yet, Shylock the Jew, characterized by typical Jewish physical and intellectual qualities, seeks to arise compassion among the members of the audience. Indeed, Shylock was portrayed as a brutal, cruel, greedy and fanatic individual, yet his soliloquy reaches out to the audience to reveal a being who was very human and akin to them – an entity who was neither demonic nor satanic.

"I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that"

(Shakespeare, 1974, p. 203-204)

This deeply emotional imaginary of the Jew Shylock has not, however, improved the general image of the living Jew and his mythological qualities and existence. The evil deeds of the Jew in *The Merchant of Venice* have only enhanced his mythical status: Shylock is not a normal Jew – commonly described as pragmatic and materialistic, weak and humiliated, but not looking for revenge. Shylock, as a Jew, made his appearance of the stage scheming to get the Christian into his clutches and shouting aloud for his "pound of flesh" (Modder, 1961, pp. 25-30). The image of Judas and Shylock, the crafty

and deceitful Jew, of the heretic harboring eternal hatred for the faithful are so deeply ingrained that it is impossible for Christians to believe that Jewish achievements have been attained honestly and are proper rewards for their talent and hard work.

The Tragedy of the Wandering Jew

It was only the processes that took place at the beginning of the 19th century - hallmarked by changes in the physical appearance of Jews and their enhanced social and economical status - that triggered a more positive attitude towards Jews and the way they were typified in the mind of Christians. The myth of the Wandering Jew underwent a metamorphosis in Western literature at the hands of some English, German, and later American Romanticists - perhaps for the first time assuming an almost sympathetic mantle.

Romantic though did not seek to solve the Wandering Jew's plight by integrating him into community through the willingness on the part of Jews to assimilate and conform to the culture and values of the civilization within which they dwelled. On the contrary, the Romantics, far more open to the esoteric and dissident through the renewed interest into Greek mythology, accepted the Wandering Jew only because of his similarities with the character of Prometheus. And so, the "Jewish Fate" – the state of the Eternal Jew sparked by Ahasuerus' mockery of Jesus – was approached from a new perspective. Employed by many poets and novelists as a metaphor, the Romantics writers patronized the Jewish destiny, painting it in romantic terms – "promotion" that, ironically, served to reinforce and

amplify the Jews' "rebellious role" in the course of world history.

Shelley's famous analysis in his preface to *Prometheus Unbound* (1819), (Shelley, 1965) reflected the fresh voice of the Romantic Age: "Poets... are, in one sense, the creators, and in another [sense] the creation of the age". In a similar vein, the new aura of the Wandering Jew as the myth had been transformed and passed on as part and parcel of the Romantic heritage - but glorified with a romantic glow and "reborn" as a non-conformist, rebellious and authentic persona.

Influenced by German philosophers and writers such as Lessing, Schiller and Wieland, as well as by Andrew Franklin's play *The Wandering Jew*, or *Love's Masquerade* (1797), the English romantic poet Coleridge in his work *Table Talk* explains how the Wandering Jew is to be found in his *Rime of the Ancient Mariner* (1798):

"It is an enormous blunder in these engravings of De Serte, brought here by Dr. Aitken, to represent the Ancient Mariner as an old man on board ship. He was in my mind the everlasting wandering Jew - had told his story ten thousand times since the voyage, which was in his early youth and 50 years before." (Coleridge, 1957, p. 45).

In his criticism, Coleridge attempted to provide the Romantic worldview with a rational perspective. By citing Burnet in the prologue to *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, Coleridge was evidently pointing to Romantic images and poetical inspirations that established reality: *Facile credo, plures esse Naturas quam visibiles in rerum universitate* - ("I readily believe that the totality of things there are more invisible than visible natures") (Coleridge, 1992, p. 5). In a similar manner, the Wandering Jew was symbolized as the image of the changeless character, treading in circles in a changing

revolutionary world. Coleridge described the Eternal Jew as in the traditional legend - with the mark of a cross on his brow that "God has set his seal upon him". Throughout his wandering and his wishes for deliverance by death, the ancient Mariner represents the Eternal Jew:

"Alone, alone, all all alone Alone on a wide wide sea!

And never a saint took pity on
My soul in agony."

"An orphan's curse would drag to hell

A spirit from on high; But oh! more horrible than that
Is the curse of a dead man's eye! Seven days, seven
nights I saw that curse, And yet I could not die"
(Coleridge, 1992, p. 12-13).

Coleridge's adaptation of the myth of the Wandering Jew in *The Ancient Mariner*, as an interpretation of the myth of Prometheus, is similar to Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*. In exile or Diaspora, wandering as an eternal Cain, spreading his tale of human tragedy and praying for God's forgiveness, the Eternal Jew was condemned to unjust persecution as an "ancient mariner":

"I pass, like night, from land to land; I have strange
power of speech;

The moment that his face I see I know the man that
must hear me; To him my tale I teach" (Coleridge, 1992,
p. 22)

Another Romantic voice that brought about a sympathetic reinterpretation of the figure of the Wandering Jew is Thomas De Quincey. In *The Avenger* and *Suspina de Profundis* (1987, p.107) De Quincey seeks to explore the life of a man marked by a restless personality and wandering lifestyle who fights his own fate. Of all possible tragic mythological figures, he chooses as a model for his hero the Wandering Jew. By

doing this De Quincey exposed English literature to the dark side of human consciousness, rift with a grotesque strangeness, deep anxiety and pervasive sense of guilt and alienation. Pointing to the fate of the Wandering Jew, De Quincey describes Jews' life as an "endless pilgrimage of woe, vainly yearning to leave the pursuing curse behind" as a "doom of sorrow", declaring that no one has suffered as much as them and that their suffering stretches the limits of normal human endurance.

The identification of the Wandering Jew with a heroic figure appears also in Wordsworth's *Song for the Wandering Jew* and thus the myth gained much popularity among the Romantics as the symbol of human tragedy on earth. But this myth became a distinctive mark of Romantic literature for also another reason: the Romantic poets, cast themselves in the role of wandering exiles caught up in an endless life journey, have seen a parallel between their existential situation and the legend of the Wandering Jew. Here is what Wordsworth writes:

"Day and night my toils redouble Never nearer to
the goal, Night and day, I feel the trouble Of the
Wanderer in my soul" (Wordsworth, 1986, p. 237)

Later, Byron's *Cain: A Mystery* (1821) described the suffering of the Wanderer in similar terms:

"May the grass wither from thy feet! thy woods
Deny thee shelter! Earth a home! the dust A
grave! the sun his light! and heaven her God!" (Byron,
1951, vol. 2, pp. 431-479)

Poets like Byron and Shelly, like all Christians, believed that Jesus had infinite love for them, but hatred and punishment were, in fact, also an inherent part of their destiny. So we understand that the Romantics adopted the old legend of Jewish repudiation of Christ and applied it to their own religious, political and social

goals. Aware of the fact that the legend itself was a religious, anti-Semitic manipulation of the New Testament, the Romantics reinterpreted it and thus giving the Wandering Jew a new status which situated him alongside Prometheus, Adam or Cain.

Shelley went one step further. In his poem *Queen Mab* (1812), the Spirit called up Ahasuerus himself to answer the question: Does God exist? This was a ironic scene, for the Wandering Jew's destiny itself was proof of God's tyranny. For his mere presence at the crucifixion, Ahasuerus had been punished, cursed, humiliated, deported and sentenced to death generation-after-generation, cast in the role of witness to the whole eternal human tragedy:

“Is there a God! —ay, an almighty God, And vengeful
as almighty. ...millions shall live and die,

Who ne'er shall call upon their Saviour's name,

But, unredeemed, go to the gaping grave.

Thousands shall deem it an old woman's tale,

Such as nurses frighten babes withal: These in a
gulf of anguish and of flame Shall curse their
reprobation endlessly...”

(Shelley, 1921, 'Queen Mab',

Canto VII, 84-86 and 143-9, p. 780)

Further on, Shelley's Ahasuerus is transformed into a man, a human being whose suffering has turned him into a fanatic and bitter individual who uncontrollably lashes out. Shelley completes the metamorphosis of the Wandering Jew and thus he ceases to be an exotic, tragic figure, a rebel against God, being depicted as a philosopher following a abstract ideal.

These early 19th century versions of the Wandering Jew rejected the narrative cliché of the old legend. The Romantic poets' portrayals, in essence, served as “antidotes” to the Wandering Jew myth. However, the positive attitude brought about by the myth did not

change the demonic stature of the Jew in the eyes of Christian beholders: their works engendered, at most, a slight shift in attitudes from a totally negative conception to one embodying a few positive elements. Despite his central status for the poetic imagination and despite his metamorphosis and emergence as a philosophical ideal, the old image of the Wandering Jew remained unchallenged up until mid 19th century.

Such romantic ideas flourished in American culture as well. Herman Melville, for example, has found in the Wandering Jew a very useful means for expressing his anti-Christian worldview. Melville held that the natural world was incomprehensible to men and evil, but ordained by God. In his view, in one-way or another, human beings were governed by an unconscious, irrational mind, in contrast to the rational consciousness that formulated religious laws and the laws of Christian Civilization. Melville's world reflects tragic incongruities between God, nature and man. His protagonists do not reject the human condition; they suffer, striving to comprehend it.

In *Clarel: A Poem and a Pilgrimage in the Holy Land* (1876, 1960), Melville condemned “the preaching of the cross” and the “promises...to destroy the wisdom of the wise.” (Paul, Corinthians, 1:18-19). The Jews did not accept the consequence of Christianity – that reason must be crucified in order to increase faith in God. Similarly to Byron's *Prometheus, the Wandering Jew* in Melville's poem alters his cosmic solitude and metaphysical orphanhood to make it a blessing rather than a curse, for the Wandering Jew is presented at peace with his solitude, punishment and fate in the Diaspora:

“Just let him live, just let him rove....

My fate!

Cut off I am, made separate...

...Hence solitude
Elect I; in waste places brood
More lonely than an only god” (Melville, 1960, pp. 24-25)

The Jews were ready to accept the consequences of their tragic fate and disassociate themselves from God so that man could step out into the center stage:

“What say these in effect to God?
How profits it? And who art Thou
That we should serve Thee? Of Thy ways
No knowledge we desire; new ways
We have found out, and better. Go-
Depart from us...
Depart from us!” – And if He do?
(And that He may, the Scripture says)
Is aught betwixt ye and the hells?
And if, in satire of the heaven,
A world, a new world have been given
For stage, whereon to deploy the event;
If such a people be-well, well;
One hears the kettledrums of hell!
Exemplary act awaits in place
In drama of the human race...
God is - man,
The human nature, the divine-...” (Melville, 1960, pp. 38-41)

In Melville’s poem the Wandering Jew is portrayed as a very realistic person and so is his attitude towards the world. The Eternal Jew is the first post-Christian realist, and so his freedom of speech seems infernal to his older contemporaries. When he opens his mouth to say how the world really is, the old Christian metaphysics and theology are swept away. He shows us that the way one should really live is not by following Christian Scripture and the dictates of the Church. As a result of the

pilgrimage, men should not fear the tragedy of falling from grace.

Melville ascribed magical, mystical, god-like qualities to the desert - the place where the Biblical legends found their roots. In the pilgrimage – *a Voyage of a Soul* - Melville grappled with the question of fate vs. freewill: the Wandering Jew’s rebellious provocation was a praiseworthy deed because he rejected Christian righteousness and justification of worldly evil by faith. The existence of the Jew - who for centuries conducted a bitter struggle against the external world - became the focal point of religious spiritual ferment. These romantic views upon the Wandering Jew marked the beginning of a new era - a radical shift towards a revolutionary religious consciousness, which manifested itself in mythical language.

The Metamorphosis through Repatriation of the Wandering Jew

The myth of the Eternal or Wandering Jew has always been interpreted and reinterpreted in accordance with different Christian religious and secular anti-Semitic ideologies. In all these cases, his figure and persona were identified with that of the Diaspora Jew and his characteristics remained fundamentally the same. The Wandering Jew reaches religious, politic, racist and poetic heights – endowing him with the power to break with his roots. Even if the myth is nothing but a “story”, a subjective falsification, it is bond to reality within the psyche. Fulfilling psychological and ideological needs, myth has become an important part of Western culture. Religious and ideological processes can never reproduce and reflect the true nature of things; myths, however,

can frame and give substance to the essence of reality as it is perceived within a given culture.

The ethnological roots of the legendary Wandering Jew are the patriarch of Judah – an anthropological (tribal) label and geographical definition for the district of Jerusalem and its surroundings. The inhabitants of Judah and the members of the tribe of Judah were labeled “*Judabites*” or in short - “*Jews*”. Historically, Jews have continued to regard themselves as direct followers of the ancient Israelite national-religious community. This is the common ground of both Judaism and Christianity and the source of their myths.

The emergence of secular Jews in the 19th and 20th century – a development appearing as a reaction to a weaknesses in Jewish religious and traditional life in Diaspora – marked a fundamentally new phase in Jewish history, prompting secular Jews to champion a new reference for Jewish identity. Swept into a vortex of change opened by the advent of modern times Jews were directed towards major changes based on old messianic yearnings. The same messianic longings that had propelled Jews into exile in the Diaspora in the wake of the Revolt now served to draw Jews out of Diaspora and provided them with a renewed sense of belonging and concrete longing for their homeland. Yet, transposed within a secular context, messianic hopes have always had a universal as well as a particular Jewish significance. The Zionist movement was not only a manifestation of Jewish nationalism; it represented the idea that the only Jewish community that could preserve its unique character and would survive would be the Zionist community. Therefore, every Jew must take upon himself the “holy” mission of becoming a Zionist and to struggle to realize the Zionist ideology of a Jewish homeland.

From the outset, the Zionist movement had been accused of harboring dangerous national, religious, messianic and cultural ideas that threaten the world as a whole. Zionism had been perceived as a new rebellious and powerful movement, an *avant-garde* that threatens to disturb the prevailing world order. The Wandering Jew, imbued with a vision of Ingathering of the Exiles and determined to settle in the Land of Israel without waiting for the Messiah, constituted a challenge. On one hand, for many Christians, Zionism was understood as the first step towards the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Thus, from the outset, such a radical shift in Jewish history was interpreted as if the Eternal Jew has received certain cosmic unseen messages from the Divine - the true reasons underlying his historical decisions. On the other hand, the Zionist idea - the prospects of a Return to Zion - was regarded with suspicion, being unacceptable even for the Christians with positive attitudes towards Judaism. The prospect of a powerful repatriated Eternal Jew was in fact the fiercest. The myth of the cosmic energy possessed by the Eternal Jew masked completely 19th century realities, for the Jews were in fact humiliated, persecuted and murdered.

An explicit example of such an attitude towards modern Jewish repatriation (namely Zionism) can be found in Mark Twain’s article *Concerning the Jews* (1898), published in *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine*. The article clearly reflects such notions along with the fear of a monstrously powerful Jew:

“... speaking of concentration, Dr. Herzl has a clear insight into the value of that. Have you heard of his plan? He wishes to gather the Jews of the world together in Palestine, with a government of their own - under the suzerainty of the Sultan, I suppose. At the convention of Berne last year, there were delegates from everywhere, and the proposal was received with decided favor. I am

not the Sultan, and I am not objecting; but if that concentration of the cunningest brain in the world was going to be made in a free country (bar Scotland), I think it would be politic to stop it. It will not be well to let that *race* find out its strength....”

“Properly, the Jew ought hardly to be heard of, but he is heard of, has always been heard of. He is as prominent on the planet as any other people, and his commercial importance is extravagantly out of proportion to the smallness of his bulk. His contributions to the world’s list of great names in literature, science, art, music, finance, medicine, and abstruse learning are also away out of proportion to the weakness of his numbers. He has made a marvelous fight in this world, in all the ages; and had done it with his hands tied behind him. He could be vain of himself, and be excused for it. The Egyptian, the Babylonian, and the Roman followed, and made a vast noise, and they are gone. Other peoples have strung up and held their torch high for a time, but it burned out, and they sit in twilight now, or have vanished. The Jew saw them all, beat them all, and is now what he always was, exhibiting no decadence, no infirmities of age, no weakening of his parts, no slowing of his energies, no dulling of his alert and aggressive mind. All things are mortal but the Jew; all other forces pass, but he remains. What is the secret of his immortality?” (Twain, 1989)

Jewish history and tradition affirms a universal socio-political truth: it affirms the ephemeral character of all ancient and modern empires, their inextricable decay. From the perspective of Jewish tradition, history is nothing but the story of the downfall of all other traditions and of its own miraculous survival. The new Jewish Renaissance reveals the subconscious fears of the Eternal Jew whose revival and metamorphosis seems to be far more powerful than any war of liberation or any

movement of liberation movement in modern history. For, with the secret of self-preservation, Ahasuerus is not allowed to live or to die. During the whole history in the Diaspora, the Jews were forced to lead a life that was survival on the defensive. Zionism was perceived as a global spiritual revolution and evolution - a transition from the Diaspora to the Holy Land, from the old Jew to the new. Although the Zionist movement had typical Romantic elements and produced its own utopian reality linked to a distant mythological past, its origins and concepts were, nevertheless, well-grounded in European nationalism of the day - namely the revival of Greek, Italian, and other Slavic nations. However, the Zionist revival paralleled the emergence of modern anti-Semitism, which would manifest itself with a brutality unparalleled in Jewish history.

The terminology employed to describe the new path taken by the Eternal Jew includes many messianic concepts such as “rebirth”, “renewal”, “breaking with the past”, “rebuilding the Temple”, “Days of Redemption”, “Time of Return”, and so forth. These terms have become part of modern Jewish nationalism. The revival of Judaism within the modern Holy Land has a religious interpretation. It is legitimated by the promise of the *Holy Land* to the *chosen people* and closely linked to strict observance of religious obligations. The symbolism of returning to the *Holy Land* was interpreted at both the level of the tangible (the Holy Land refers to a precise physical site in the world) and at that of the intelligible. The most important function of the Zionist reunion, however, was to foster and strengthen a collective religious consciousness cloaked in a shared and considerably more focused ideological terminology. The Zionist movement took upon itself the mission of transforming the Jewish People from a People in Exile to a People rooted in their own homeland – a move that

clearly challenged Jewish history in the Diaspora, even if the definitions of the essence of the Judaism and Jewish history remained unsettled.

The Degradation of the Wandering Jew by the New Hebrew

The City of Slaughter, one of the most famous poems of Israel's national poet laureate, Haim Nachman Bialik, was written in the wake of the 1903 pogrom in Kishinev, Russia. In a very vivid and sardonic manner, Bialik described the unbearable state of the Jews in the Diaspora, their humiliation and the murderous attacks upon them. The only Jewish response to such an unbearable situation was to hide or to flee. Christians had invented the myth of the Wandering Jew and given it the mantle of a predestinated fate; Jews, on the other hand, have integrated this mythological character into their own psyche and thus assuming passively in their own lives the pains and sufferings of the Wandering Jew. In his acrid and highly descriptive poem, Bialik assumed the character of the Wandering Jew in such a manner that they came to survive by "making a business of their tribulations", that is by seeking to gain small advantages from their depressing situation in the Diaspora rather than seeking a proactive response that would extricate them from their tragic state. The Jews were the first to discover the power of weakness, patience and sighing.

The Wandering Jew, in this bitter and biting poem, puts his fathers' bones in a sack and as a wandering beggar goes about selling his wounds, his pains and his broken heart to the emancipated nations of Europe and their Christian leaders:

"For since they have met pain with resignation

And have made peace with shame,
What shall avail thy consolation?
They are too wretched to evoke thy scorn.
They are too lost thy pity to evoke
So let them go, then men to sorrow horn,
Mournful and slinking, crushed beneath their yoke
Go to their homes, and to their hearth depart –
Rot in the bones, corruption in the heart.
And go upon the highway,
Thou shalt then meet these men destroyed by
sorrow,
Sighing and groaning, at the doors of wealthy
Proclaiming their sores, like so many peddlers'
wares,
The one his battered head, to other limbs unhealthy,
One shows a wounded arm, and one a fracture
bears.
And all have eyes that are the eyes of slaves,
Slaves flogged before their masters;
And each one begs, and catches one craves:
Reward me, Master, for that my skull is broken,
Reward me for my father who was martyred!
The rich ones, all compassion, for the pleas so
bartered
Extend them staff and bandage, say good riddance,
and
The paupers are consoled
Avaunt ye, beggars, to the charnel house!
The bones of your father disinter!
Cram them within your knapsacks, bear
Them on your shoulders, and go forth
To do your business with these precious wares
At all the country fairs!
Stop on the highways, near some populous city,
And spread on your filthy rags
Those martyred bones that issue from your bags,

And sing, with raucous voice, your pauper's ditty!
So will you conjure up the pity of the nations,
And so their sympathy implore
For you are now as you have been of yore
And as you stretched your hand
So will you stretch it,
And as you have been wretched
So are you wretched!

What is thy business here, O so of man?
Rise, to the desert flee!" (Bialik, 1948, pp. 258-264)

Bialik exhorts his brothers to transform anti-Semitism into a positive spiritual force, an impetus for revival and national renaissance. The anti-Semitic legend of the Wandering Jew, his image and his actions, were adopted by the Zionist movement as a genuine description of the plight of the Diaspora Jew. And for this reason, it was said, Jews must forge a new life in a Jewish homeland, for in Diaspora death would always be a constant companion. Whereas the Wandering Jew previously found solace in passively ignoring and detesting his tormentors, Bialik calls for a revolution in thought and action – that must Jews take their fate into their own hands. In this poem, Bialik raises the characterization of Diaspora life as a negative form of existence to almost a mythical level. The Diaspora is a cursed and defiled land of mythical dimensions, full with existential and religious meanings. A new collective myth of that experience must be forged.

The Zionist Movement substituted the myth of the Wandering Jew with a new myth: the myth of a New Hebrew. This move called for a renewed bond between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, including revitalization of Hebrew as living language and revival of old Israelite traditions. The Zionist ideology sought to

bracket 2000 years of Jewish history and tradition in the Diaspora and to create a utopian reality *ex nihilo*; it wanted connect the 1st and the 20th Century as a continuum. This “new Zionist reality” demanded a new symbolic figure and a new legend to personify the Zionist revolution and replace the character of the Wandering Jew. The realization of this new ideology demanded a clear-cut cleavage between what constituted the “old” Jewish people and a “new” autonomous Jewish people.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, forging a new national identity was a popular concept worldwide. The modern Jewish national movement, although arising in a secular world, almost an antireligious one, came into being in connection with religious faith. For, the core elements of the new Zionist myth of *Ha'Ivri He'Chadash* that is of the *New Hebrew* are clearly counterpoints of the myth of the Wandering Jew - forever in Exile, without hope of redemption. Zionism's ethos of rebirth, renaissance and affirmation of self-redemption was, in fact, not only a negation of Diaspora life, but also and equally a refusal to accept the role of the Eternal or Wandering Jew.

Thus, Zionist national identity glorified the concept of “normalization” of the Jewish people, expressing scorn for Diaspora life, which was deemed as an unhealthy anomaly, a parasitic existence and pathological state. The roots of the Jewish malady were to be found in the nature of life in the Diaspora's life: constant wandering and always the unbidden guest subject to harsh socio-economic straights and subject to hostile treatment.

Zionist education, consequently, was based on two suppositions: rejection of the Diaspora and a positive attitude toward the Jewish People's ancient historical heritage. Zionism triumphed because it was a movement

of the youth in which strong romantic elements inevitably played a significant role. The romantic ideas of Zionism are very similar to those of Europeans and Americans - rebellious ideas and emotions that challenge the status quo of the older generation, drawing inspiration as much from the primordial and still vibrant call of the prophets of Israel, as from socialist ideologies.

Realization of Zionist goals involved replacement of the Jewish identity, founded upon the Diaspora Jew, with an old-new Israelite entity. Such a metamorphosis included the adoption of Hebrew as a spoken language (not Yiddish - the language of the Jewish masses in Europe) and as the basis for forging a New Hebrew culture, the restructuring of the socio-economic context of the Jewish community in order to build a New Hebrews' nation. Zionist-motivated immigrants to the Land of Israel really adopted the ethos of the new national identity, thus actually forming a new society. This new society served as a core element linking the disintegrating life of the Diaspora with all its contradictions to the new society being crystallized in the old-new homeland of the Jews.

Aspirations to become a “non-Jew” – that is, one who did not bear any resemblance to the traditional image of a Jew, was woven into the fabric of the prevailing Zionist ideology as part of the individual's and the collective's cultural identity and way of life. Disassociation from the image of the Wandering Jew was the mark of the rejection of the Diaspora. The act of wandering was assigned a negative connotation, while the act of **settlement** became a positive attribute.

The same opposition - positive-negative – was also the one to regulate the use of the words **aliyah** and **yeridah** – immigration or “going up” to the Land of Israel and emigration, termed “going down” from the Land of Israel. Biblical terminology was further

reinforced, for, if a person immigrated to the Land of Israel, it was said, he or she aspired to high ideals, seeking a sense of belonging and a homeland, but if one left the Land of Israel to live in the Diaspora, he would become a **yored** – a term that clearly became a stigma –, a pejorative label that tainted the bearer as a deserter, a weak person or simply a looser. The Wandering Jew was perceived as an “other” - a person of the past who ought to be replaced by another designation coined by Zionist ideology – of **Ha'Yebudi He'Chadash** (the New Jew) – a figure who would fight the “otherness” of the Wandering Jew through a search for self-recognition and adoption of a new identity that would make him normal or equal of all other citizens of all other nations – in essence, a battle against the otherness of the Jew.

To adopt this new pseudo-historical idealization of Jewish life, the defenders of the **New Hebrew People** had to put aside old Jewish culture: Diaspora culture and its Romantic inheritance of sorrow, suffering and passive hope was doomed. The tension between an immutable destiny of the Jewish People on one hand, and a break or transformation on the other, manifested as constant components within cultural and religious life in the Land of Israel. Jewish sources were employed by the writers of an emerging body of Hebrew literature as symbols, and sarcastically reinterpreted. The fate of old myths was the same.

In Haim Hazaz's well-known Hebrew story **Ha-Derashah** (*The Sermon*) (1970, pp. 219-238), the history teacher Yudke (Judah), disputed the very notion of a “Jewish history” arguing sardonically that Diaspora Jews had never had a history of their own in the Diaspora; they had been the subjects of the actions undertaken by others and thus Jewish fate was not in their hands. Therefore, in the Land of Israel there was nothing worthy of being taught about Jewish history

which consisted only of suffering, expulsions and pogroms. Such an abnormal history was uninteresting for children who had been born free in the Land of Israel. "It would be far better to let them play freely, outside in the schoolyard," he argued. So, the children had been endowed with a totally new Hebrew identity and a free spirit and other positive, healthy attributes.

It was easier, almost self-evident, that Zionist pioneers – the champions of the figure of a New Hebrew who sought redemption through a return to the soil of the Land of Israel, would prefer to identify themselves with two local figures: the first - the *fellah*, the local equivalent of the Eastern European peasant admired for his productive role and roots in the soil; the second - the heroic Bedouin robber, the local version of the Russian Cossack (Even-Zohar, 1981, pp. 167-184). These are the antithesis of the passive Jew and so, admiration of the new figures on a socio-psychological level was, in fact, a form of the anti-Jewish syndrome in which the tormented New Hebrew identifies himself with his gentile tormentor. These new entities had an enormous impact on the formation of those living in the Land of Israel, but they first required the creation of a new legend - the only original myth to be born on Israeli soil.

Diaspora Jews, who settled in the Land of Israel in order to end Jewish wandering, denied the resemblance between them and the despised Wandering Jew, rejecting even a likeness between themselves and their own offspring. Children were deemed to be a new breed, so to speak, a departure anchored in the creation of the myth of *benei* or *yalidei ha'Aretz* (the native sons). Their own children who were born in the Land of Israel were set apart, being labeled *sabras*. The choice of the prickly pear cactus native to Israel or *sabra* as a fitting appellation for this new socio-cultural entity is revealing. It is noteworthy to observe that the name

chosen was a new fruit in the Holy Land. It was not one of the generic fruits mentioned in the Bible – the Seven Fruits so deeply rooted in Jewish religious symbolism and entwined in Jewish ritual and artistic motifs, and thus, perhaps associated with a Diaspora mentality. The *sabra* should be the contra-point to *Tradescantia fluminensis* (Wandering Jew) because it characterizes the New Jew, rooted deeply in the desert and not an easy-to-grow creeping plant whose cuttings are passed along like a rootless wanderer from gardener to gardener. The new Jew identifies himself with a new reality and a new plant. Moreover, the *sabra's* rough exterior and sweet fruit made it an ideal symbol of the robust and healthy New Hebrew whose pure and organic existence crystallized around romantic stereotypes so fashionable in 19th Century Europe. In fact, in his upbringing as a New Hebrew, the *sabra* was mandated to belittle and even despise Diaspora and everything that symbolized it. He was a master of his own destiny – *Adon Haaretz* (Lord of the Land) - filled with high ideals and determination epitomized by Theodore Herzl's simplistic slogan, "If you will it, it will not be a legend."

As a revolution in the life of the Jewish people, as a rebellion against existence in Diaspora, Zionism was motivated to portray the son of this revolution as a fundamental departure from his parents and grandparents. Thus, the *New Hebrew* or *New Jew*, as fathers sought to name their own sons and daughters, were seen to be completely different both physically and mentally from Jews living in the Diaspora...and the archetype coined by the gentile world – the Eternal Jew. Not only was he rooted in his own homeland, but also the spirituality of the New Hebrew arose from closeness with nature, rather than closeness with the Creator. And unlike the greedy self-serving stereotype of the

Wandering Jew, the New Hebrew was endowed with an altruistic spirit, placing group identity over individual growth where the interests of self and other were synonymous.

Ironically, at this juncture in Jewish history, the Zionist movement, in essence, embraced the despicable description of the Eternal Jew, his features and his qualities, as true reality, in order to then disassociate the New Jew from these very characteristics. In order to distance themselves from the past, *sabras* shunned any physical and emotional relationship with Diaspora Jews until they would change and become people of the Land of Israel. The physical attributes and character of the Diaspora Jew in the eyes of the *sabra* – conceived as a deformed human being, a living body void of honor or beauty with a warped intellect - was as much a caricature as the grotesque figure of the Wandering Jew. The New Hebrews were thought to be an avant-garde of *balutzim* or pioneers who “awaited huge reinforcements of the masses in order to achieve realization of their versions of the future” (Scholem, 1965, p. 249).

Zionist ideology identified the Eternal Jew as either a *talmid bacham*, a Jew who believed completely in the authority of Scriptures and was tied to be the master and keeper of the tradition, or a merchant, i.e. an eternal broker. But, on the other hand, such a persona was free of any tie to the Land of Israel and could fulfill all his religious duties in the Diaspora, perhaps even living a full religious life there. Yet Zionism held that one could not really be a Jew in the authentic sense of the word outside Israel, for being a Jew meant more than respecting the religious rituals. The Wandering Jew’s alter ego, the *sabra* or New Hebrew, had taken upon himself to forge and establish a new form of Jewish life in the land of his forefathers – assuming an active role, that is not only by “taking the Jew out of the Diaspora,

but taking the Diaspora out of the Jew”. The essence of the Zionist movement was “the desire to help to bring the world a better, nobler Jew with fewer of the flaws of the ghetto and more of the virtues of Biblical times” (Jabotinsky, 1980, pp. 332-337).

The malaise of the Diaspora was considered to be like a curse on the Jew keeping him out of touch with reality. The “therapeutic” treatment adopted by Zionism was to forcefully open the eyes of Diaspora Jewry. One should not feel sorry for their miserable state, for self-pity is nothing but prolonging the malady. What was needed was self-emancipation: the Eternal Jew must transform himself and take ownership of his plight and change from a cowardly, morally and spiritually downtrodden individual to a proud son of the *Chosen People*. To do so, the Jew must squarely face different realities, respond realistically and with steadfastness.

The myth of the new rebirth of the *Chosen People* appears to be both a new ideological position as well as an operative program. The Talmudic affirmation that “ever since the destruction of the Temple not a day passes without a curse” (Talmud Babli, 1990, p. 221) was adopted by the Zionist movement as a mirror of reality. The Zionist movement was not merely an answer to the physical and social adversities imposed on Jews, but a remedy to “mend the soul”. It was said that a Return to Zion would restore the *crown of the nation* to its former pristine splendor and the schism in the House of Israel would finally be suppressed. The New Hebrew aspired to return to the Hebrew way of life of ancient days - to the original Judaism of the Bible founded on justice, integrity and ethical conduct.

But, as fate would have it, even in the Land of Israel not all-Jewish immigrants have embraced the Zionist ethos of the *New Jew* as it was set forth in the mutually exclusive dichotomy between negative Eternal Jew and

positive New Hebrew. Many have remained steadfast in their traditional traits, character, habits, moral attitudes and general world outlook. Patently refusing to adopt a wholesale rejection of Diaspora life and lifestyle dictated by Zionism dogma as “abnormal”, they viewed redemption of the Diaspora in terms of redemption or freedom from its heritage of suffering – emotional, social and intellectual. Thus, the majority of the Jews who immigrated to the Holy Land have not undergone the metamorphosis Zionism sought to bring about, i.e. a nation who seeks and is able to create an all-embracing national culture from the foundations up, independent of its Diaspora past and a remedy for the soul.

To this day, the yardstick of New Jew ideology remains vibrant, espoused by countless secular Israelis whose outlook has been forged within the Zionist crucible; those who have not espoused Zionist ideology are viewed as despicable, perceived to be lacking vision, dignity, enlightenment or a sense of mission and living an unworthy life. To the eyes of the Zionist’s, and despite the hegemony of secular Israeli society, the normative lifestyles of certain communities in Israel, the ultra-orthodox segment of the population in particular, are viewed as an unwelcome, even menacing manifestation of what Zionist dogma labeled “the decadence of the Diaspora” – supposedly the upshot of mass immigration without 40 years in the desert. The existence and even the spreading of such enclaves of dissident behavior who patently refuse to forsake their Diaspora mentality have not provoked any reexamination of orthodox Zionist dogma. Masking their disappointment, the same optimism that sustained the Prophet Moses – that a new generation “that knew not Pharaoh” would spring forth - has been adopted by modern-day Zionist ideologists who assume that a future

generation will forsake its Diaspora mentality and join the ranks of New Hebrew entity.

The eminent Hebrew poet Uri Zwi Greenberg epitomized and gave voice to these “Anti-Diaspora undercurrents” when he empowered the coming Messiah with new “tools”: The Messiah seems to look like the Eternal Jew but was armed with a sword and flew like an eagle. In Greenberg’s epic poem, *Beoznei Yeled Esaper, (I will speak unto the ears of a child)* (Greenberg, 1991) the *Messiah* arrived in the Land of Israel as a new immigrant, disembarking in the port of Jaffa. His return to the Land of Israel was meant to bring about a full redemption from Diaspora and he arrived filled with great expectations from the people in the Holy Land who should have a direct relationship with the Infinite, the source of holiness.

Unfortunately, the Jewish People did not immediately adapt to the Land of Israel, nor did Jews in Israel turn the entire content of their lives into a function of life in their own land. Issues such as personal choice of lifestyle, including a normal (i.e. bourgeois) lifestyle is no longer viewed as a core element for national existence. It seems that the Wandering Jew, who settled in the Holy Land, could not possibly have absorbed all the divine and spiritual forces that cascaded upon him from heaven. On the other hand, the New Hebrew was, ironically, metamorphosed into the new man of faith and a believer in miracles. This was epitomized in David Ben-Gurion’s comment that “in the reality of the Land of Israel, to believe in miracles *is* reality...”

The Revival of the Eternal Jew in the Land of Israel

The ongoing struggle against the Diaspora was perceived by the Zionist movement as a permanent task, as an essential element in the preservation of the nation and part of an ongoing Zionist revolution in Jewish life, with which the younger generation in the Land of Israel should grow up. Yet, only a small percentage of the Jews who settled in the Land of Israel accepted the ideology of a New Hebrew People and even fewer identified and followed it as a personal creed. In fact, many opposed such cultural indoctrination outwardly. Uri Zwi Greenberg claimed that if the *Messiah* did not reveal himself, it was because of the lamentable existence of large enclaves of passive citizens, peddlers, merchants and middlemen among the immigrants who were enslaved by a narrow mentality of the bourgeoisie who was dominated by the concern for private property.

Thus, in his poem, *I Will Speak Unto the Ears of a Child*. Uri Zwi Greenberg paints the conduct of the Jewish middle class in the Holy Land as a life of depravity that has prevented the coming of the Messiah to Mount Moriah and the dawn of a new era in Hebrew history. Greenberg explains to the untainted *sabra*-child how the *Messiah* came and subsequently departed due to the hegemony of Diaspora merchant culture he encountered. The object of his lament, a *sabra*-tot, was not accidental: only a child born in the Land of Israel has a chance to start a new life in the new-old Land, to understand and identify himself with the essence of the Zionist revolution.

“Hebrew boy, in my house in disgraced Zion.
Evening. Twilight. I converse- and you are on my knees.

Go, beloved, I’ll unfold the tale of the good Messiah
that did not come.

To those older than you I will not tell, beloved. The
elders do not have such eyes and such passion as is in
thine eyes.

.....
He did not come, the Messiah...like an eagle he soars
above the blood-chasms.

Both day and night I heard the flapping of his wings.

Up to the beach of Jaffa he came in the figure of a
man with a sack upon his shoulder: meek and wretched
possessing with a vision and a sword—

And I recognized him later on I’m the ploughman
who sauntered under the scorching sun in the furrow.

And in the quarrymen shattering Jerusalem flint

He was so close... he was *here*.

.....
But to *Mount Moriah* he did not ascend: that is the
only mount upon which his feet he did not step.

He only reached the entrance, just to the threshold
of the kingdom- and there the peddlers found him: in
blazing glory as the moth and around his skull a halo,

And in his hand the key of flame to the gates of the
temple,

Like the Messiah’s rule,

And he was received there... in mockery and in
denial of their Hebrew tongue—

The Peddlers!

What did they say to him then- I have heard what
they spoke:

You are wrong, wanderer. In every generation there
is one who is wrong, who sees false vision: the Kingdom
of Jerusalem...ha-ha.

And in every generation, here we stand upon the
threshold to teach wisdom to the various seers:

Jerusalem needs a rich uncle, a sack full of weighing coins, to build houses with her and to trade, eat and drink.

Without a temple of God on the Mount and without a throne for our King David and without heroes' banners.

Jerusalem needs a golden calf and not a image of Bar-Giora: meek and wretched, possessing but a vision and a stone...

.....

As it came to pass they have finished their words and then laughed: ha- ha, the Messiah contorted: as if been cut by a knife.

I too have been contorted: as if cut by a knife. As if they had risen upon him with a knife and stabbed him in his heart- and he had jumped with a knife in his heart over their bodies.

But in mockery they stabbed him- therefore they overcame him, *The Peddlers*.

And I have heard him question with his mouth's blood: Where are the generations that have been waiting for my arrival,

Those that have summoned me from Rome, from Titus's Arch to the kingdom's threshold?

And I have heard him conclude: the generations are not with me... woe to me, alas.

And woe to you, my land, on both sides of the Jordan!

And the Messiah digressed and diverted his path- and to where I do not know, I do not know, I the teller,

Maybe he is the jackal that howls here in Canaan's vines...

And maybe he went to solitude in the-most-isolated-of-all-the-world's-forts:

To the fort of Messada... and there he sits unclothed.

.....

Maybe not... maybe it was he who soared in the form of an eagle from the brook of Kidron

And soared, circling a circle upon Mount Moriah and wept.

I saw him circling a circle and I have heard his weeping. *A fowl weeping...* and thus I have said: a weeping fowl, is it not the End of Hope, the circle -of-farewell: the conclusion?

Israel's Messianism... in the form of an eagle parts from Mount Moriah...

And the eagle finished his circling and flies toward the sea.

Flies without the flapping of wings and it shall be so obscure.

Maybe to the City-of-Titus, back to the Arch where he sat:

Once more, a being, invisible, in his shackles for two thousand years and from his head to the depth: into the Hebrew blood-well,

Like the rule of the Messiah- -" (Greenberg, 1991, pp. 44-45)

The rootless Jew - the eternal Wanderer who served as a romantic hero in many romantic poems and novels - became a would-be *Messiah* through his third Return to Zion. However, the old-new *Messiah* needed the help of the native sons, of the offspring of the Zionist revolution endowed with the power to shake off the dregs of the Diaspora. Shutting out the past was a natural starting point for commencing anew. The degradation of Jewish life in the Diaspora could not be exorcised simply by superimposing the ethos of the New Hebrew upon it - an antithesis to mundane petit-bourgeois lifestyle of the New Jews' fathers and grandfathers who endlessly wandered through the Diaspora. Ideological aspirations

alone could not dislodge Diaspora customs among all immigrants to the Land of Israel. Therefore, the resurrection of the Eternal Jew as a serious challenge to the creation of a New Hebrew society and culture was perhaps inevitable.

Greenberg epitomized the deep-seated Zionist belief that national renaissance within the Land of Israel could neither be brought by the Eternal Jew, nor even by the first generation of Zionists pioneers: only the newborn in the Land of Israel could make it possible. In retrospect, the dictate to the Newborn Hebrew to live according to the principles prescribed by the Jewish revolution has not changed the masses in the Land of Israel and has not created a completely different society. The character and the habits of the Eternal Jew seem to be stronger than those of the New Hebrew rebellion. Even the activism, the willingness to struggle until the end, along with the prowess and the military might of the New Hebrew has not been able to overcome the rebellious and anarchist forces inherent in the Eternal Jew as entrenched by two thousands years of Diaspora life.

Faced with these realities, the native sons who have espoused Zionist ideology and adopted the culture of the New Hebrew – the carriers of Israeli secular culture – have ascribed to the image of the *talmidi bachamim's* (ultra-orthodox religious scholar) a degenerate and degraded character and physical abilities very similar to those attributed to the Eternal Jew by gentiles during his life in the Diaspora. In the perceptions of the secular Israeli mainstream, the ultra-orthodox Jew, the son of the Eternal or Wandering Jew, is also believed to possess supernatural destructive power over the normal democratic New Hebrew people and society. This is due to the fact that the religious life of the Jews are filled with superstitions, demons, anxieties and all kinds of unnatural entities and strange dreams. Even in the wake

of the 20th century's extermination of European Jewry and the evacuation from European soil of the majority of the remnants of European Jewry, the Eternal Jew has been remarkably resilient, having reestablished himself and flourishing in the Holy Land.

Members of the New Hebrew Nation harbor deep fears that the reemergence and spread of the culture of the Wandering Jew spell the end of the Zionist revolution. Sensing an ideological vacuum that has developed within mainstream Israeli society with the disintegration of the Zionist mold, ultra-orthodox Jews have launched a series of continuous and rather successful attacks on Zionist premises and symbols, presenting themselves as the bearers of the true Jewish tradition and heritage distorted by the Zionist quest for the reconstruction of this tradition in a modern vein. The anarchistic Eternal Jew is seeking a showdown with the Zionist movement on the issue of reconstruction of Jewish life. These harsh feelings and sense of betrayal have prompted the native sons to declare a social, economic and cultural war against the sons of the Wandering Jew. In this cultural war, the descriptions, the stereotypes and even those physical and behavioral features of ultra-orthodox Jews, are depicted as almost identical to those of the Wandering Jew.

The Timeless Power of Myth

The negative socio-cultural role of the Wandering Jew is not far removed from Gabriel Garcia Marquez's imaginary short story *One Day after Saturday* in his book *No One Writes to the Colonel* (1961, 1971). In this particular story, the birds die, inexplicably at first sight, by smashing into the windows of the houses during an oppressing heat wave. The old priest of that

town discovered that the birds were dying because the Eternal or the Wandering Jew had arrived in town. The citizens believed their old priest to be insane because he had already told them twice before that he had “seen Satan”. In this case, though, they were prepared to accept as “reasonable” the idea that the Eternal Jew was, indeed, the source of their troubles and had brought misfortune to their town. The story concludes with the priest remaining in office and a remarkable growth of the number of the attendance to the church due to the fear of the Wandering Jew.

Ironically, ultra-orthodox Jews, who claim that lack of religiosity from the part of the Jewish is the source of various calamities in the Land of Israel, employ the cynical use of the Myth of the Eternal Jew by the priest at the end of the story in a similar manner. In Marquez’s story, the Wandering Jew was only a vague vision that the old priest had used in order to enhance faith and faithful attendance among his flock. In present realities in the Land of Israel, faith in the Eternity of Judaism is preserved and bolstered by similar cynical means.

Marquez’s magical realism, expanding the categorized reality so as to encompass magic and other extraordinary phenomena in Nature or human experience, is deeply rooted in South-American culture. The journey of the Wandering Jew has a symbolic power which is used by the priest very effectively. Ironically, this is also true in the Land of Israel where ultra-orthodox Jews use similar weaknesses—literal and figurative in Jewish tradition and which could easily be identified within the mythology of the Eternal Jew — trying to prove that every tragedy and misfortune is caused by the godless ideology of the native sons and not by the Eternal Jew. The principles of socio-economic and national anarchism inherent historically in Judaism are alive and prospering today in the Holy Land.

The collective identity of the native sons is still challenged by the anarchic Wandering Jew. Moreover, ultra-orthodox circles residing in the Land of Israel stress their “otherness” – they understand themselves as belong to *Israel Saba* (Israel grandfather, the traditional Israel (i.e. the Jewish People), rather than to the secular “Zionist-contrived” State of Israel. Their thoughts and deeds underscore that they continue the tradition of the Eternal Jew although living in the Land of Israel. Their outlook is that Jews have proved their eternal existence even in recent times of adversity and will continue to wander on the face of the earth as they wait for the true *Messiah*. The eternal existence of the Jew, they hold, is the ultimate proof of the authenticity, vitality and power of traditional Jewish religious culture over that of the New Hebrews and their modern ideologies consider being mere passing phenomena.

The phenomenon of the Wandering Jew continues to maintain its mysterious nature and intimidating power since the dawn of Christianity up to the end of the 20th century. And this despite the attempts to tame or domesticate him in the Land of Israel, to make him a normal person, a normal member of society in a culture that eagerly seeks normalization with its neighbors and the world-at-large, which inevitably seem to fail. The Eternal Jew’s perseverance is impressive, powerful and engaging as ever. Application of systematic reasoning and scientific methods in a hopeless attempt to expose the roots of his vitality are misplaced. The longevity and magic power of the myth of the Wandering Jew over Christians and Jews alike does not yield to a rational explanation.

Very much similar to the way in which the dreamer believes that what he experiences is true, the legend is shaped and propelled forward, empowered more by instinctual forces than by conscious, rational and

genuine beliefs *per se*. Perhaps for these very reasons the most fanciful novel ever written at the end of the 20th century about the Eternal Jew was Stefan Heym's version of the *Wandering Jew* (Heym, 1999).

By adapting the legendary Jew to our time, Stefan Heym seeks to ask the eternal existential questions about good and evil, order and disorder, believers and non-believers, crime and punishment. All these new escapades of the Eternal Jew together with his road companion Lucifer, emerge concurrently in Jerusalem and in Berlin (the later venue serves as the counterpoint to Jerusalem and is perhaps a negative entity.) In this novel, Lucifer is a professor of history at the Hebrew University, while the Eternal Jew is once again a cobbler in the Old City of Jerusalem, as in the time of Jesus. Yet this time, the pairs' impressive *tour de force* is launched with the fall of Lucifer in the time of Eden. The author then leaps to Luther's Reformation, and then lands in the Warsaw's Ghetto, climaxing with the Eternal Jew ultimately setting up house according to his old-new lifestyle in Jerusalem. In the opening of the book, the plot begins when a communist researcher appears and harbors anti-religious ideologies. The communist researcher engages in a debate with Lucifer, mocks him, declaring that actually there is no such entity as the Eternal Jew.

Lucifer and Ahasuerus are created again and again in a series of whimsical new adventures, each of which is a potent mixture of fantasy and indignation, of lofty sermonizing and earthy satire. In this highly original version of the image of the Eternal Jew, the two, Lucifer and Ahasuerus, are chained together for generation after generation until their last battle in the 20th century against the communist regime and its anti-religious ideology. This brilliant and highly imaginative journey of the two through millenniums of bigotry, cruelty and

rebellious deeds – a journey set in motion by the crucifixion of Jesus – in the end, witnesses a rebirth in the Holy Land of our day but their adversaries in modern times are located on European soil in Germany, the same country where, according to many scholars, the Legend of the Wandering Jew began. Here the saga of the Wandering Jew completes its full circle, reaching its fitting conclusion. The Wandering Jew returns home via a thousand false paths across the world in order to be recognized by every single nation in the entire world.

The Myth of the Wandering Jew has survived, despite German National Socialists' mass murder and despite communists' oppression and denial, as a non-entity under the scrutiny of liberal forces, and subject to estrangement and rejection from the part of Zion. The social-political anarchism of the Jews is brought about by the knowledge, at the same time ironic and melancholic, that everything passes; that tyrannies, oppressors, modernity will be gone some time, and that the only immutable constant is the pact between the Chosen People and their Almighty God. While still shrouded in mystery, never to be fully fathomed it would seem, the Wandering Jew's indestructible, indeed eternal nature, clearly exposes the dialectical relationship between historic reality and the power of imagination as both a destructive and a constructive force.

To sum up, it is quite evident that the mythical character of the Eternal Jew encodes the system of values of Israeli society. It is deeply rooted in the history of the Jewish people and its Christian counterpart. The myth creates a sense of continuity and contributes to the strengthening of Israeli identity. The revolt against the notion of a New Hebrew – and the continuity and

perpetuity of the Eternal/Wandering Jew permeates the works of post-modern Israeli scholars and artists. Postmodern characterization of Israeli society and its protagonists are grotesque and focused solely on the dreariness of life and the baseness of humanity. In many books, poems, plays, as well as in the media, the postmodern Israeli encounters the endless wandering, degradation of every national and traditional symbol or dream (including the Jewish ones), a desire for something better in life which, for the protagonists, can be attained only by the deprivation of the other. All these are continuous mental and moral qualities of these Israeli heroes. In essence, immigrants to Israel who came with their own cultural “Diaspora baggage” are humiliated two times: once in the absorption process into Israeli society, a crucible that involves humiliation by its nature, and again in the portrayal of this process and its product in which these pseudonym heroes arrive to a state of pure nihilism, void of any ennobling qualities.

The Israeli characters – both immigrants and native – are locked in a battle of reciprocal humiliation between being cast in the role of the victim or the role of the victimizer. Human nature is fueled only by blind base physiological needs. This essentially absurd and grotesque existence of Post-Zionist heroes is anchored not only in everyday Israeli reality, but also apparently in acceptance and adoption of the myth of the Eternal or Wandering Jew as a portrayal of reality. Sustaining the myth and confronting it makes it possible for researchers to understand better its real virtues for Israeli society.

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Nationalism and Religion in the Formation of Modern State in Turkey and Egypt until World War I

This study discusses the formation of national identity and the nation state in the modern Middle East in comparison with Turkey, one of the earlier models of national state formation in the region. The basic aim of the study is to examine the position of religion and religious identity as the source of legitimacy in the modern state. In order to have a better understanding of the relationship between nationalism and religion in the Middle East, the study attempts to look at the development of Egyptian nationalism and the role of religion in the making of modern state in Egypt. The study also attempts to make a comparative historical work by analyzing the history of the early Republican Turkey and the consolidation of the modern Turkish state by legitimacy other than religion hitherto the basic source of authority.

Introduction

There are several points that should be made clear in such an analysis. First, comparative analysis between similar cases would teach us historical developments better and provide a systematic assessment to understand differences as well as similarities in the cases compared. Egypt and Turkey have more commonalities rather than differences in their respective historical path in early modernization for establishing nationality and modern state. Second, this study does not consider the development of national identity and nationalism as unique only to the establishment of republic in Turkey. In other words, this study is written in awareness of the fact that the development of nationalism started in Turkey well before the modern republic, during the years of turmoil in the Young Turks' struggle to save the Empire from collapse. The consolidation and development of nationalism and nation-state continued well into the 1930s in Turkey. Therefore, the study

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Key words:

religion, nationalism, Turkey, Egypt, history, religious identity, legitimacy, authority

considers a political and ideological continuity more than rupture between the late Ottoman thinking of Ottomanism, Islamism and nationalism and early republican establishment of national identity. However, the study aims at questioning the early development of the nation state in modern Turkey and Egypt until the First World War, thus will refer only to the early developments in the Young Turks' and Young Egyptians' era. Third, while there are some commonalities and frequent characteristics in the establishment of modern state in Middle Eastern countries, the study does not take the Middle Eastern state as if it would constitute a homogeneous unit *per se*. But the study will utilize the specific features of basically the Egyptian political developments in the 1920s for the sake of historical comparison to make clear the status of religion in the former Ottoman domains. And fourth, the study attempts at understanding the historical relationship between the state and religion in the modern political establishment in Turkey and Egypt, but it is not the objective of this study to analyze these developments in the modernity paradigm. In other words, there is no commonly agreed process of state-making and nation-building which could be employed to understand cultural and social processes in these countries, as there is no basic state formation paradigm that would be conducive to our understanding the political developments in specific regions as a whole. Therefore, each specific case requires further analysis from within and without to grasp better the specificities in national developments in their own social and political settings.

The foundations of the modern state in the Middle East became one of the challenging subjects in the scholarly debate in political history. The modern state formed by a bureaucratic order over a specific population in a certain territory with the monopoly of the use of force is hard to find in the Middle East. This is

because the development of the state and nation in the Middle East has historically determining factors different than Western European statehood. The most significant difference appears to be that the Middle Eastern state formation is more of the making of external powers rather than the conflict among internal forces within society. Therefore, in the modern Middle Eastern setting, the origin of legitimacy of power is not social forces, but rather forces outside the social and political relations between state and society. Thus the power in the modern Middle Eastern state is at best partial, added more sources of conflict to patriarchal authority, the historical foundation of power. The authority is largely segmented and ineffective, but in contrast to its partiality, and perhaps just because of its incompleteness, the state is highly centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian to impose its control not only on resources but also on the people. But the central authority is limited with the large urban areas; the rural and nomadic societies are generally free from central authority. The Middle Eastern modern state is also territorial with the clearly established boundaries drawn by the British and French during the Mandate period, though the society it rules is not with many nationalities, ethnicities, religions and languages. The comprehensive authority of the state covers all country and effective within the boundaries; however, the survival of state power depends largely on its alliance with one or the other of these entities as local power pockets. The state has also a balancing activity among local powers by manipulating them against each other in order to maintain stability and security in remote areas.

The Development of Modern State and Nation in the Middle East

The modern state is a political system which is able to penetrate into society that exerts a high degree of control over social, economic and cultural affairs and as a bureaucratic institutional structure which is able to respond to citizens' demands. The state in Turkey and Egypt is taken for granted to have been established in the reformation period in the Ottoman Empire and to have organized state-society relations in a way different from previous order through reforms and revolutions from above. Once established and consolidated the power in the first quarter of the twentieth century, the state started to control and exert heavy pressure over citizens' participation into political processes, organization of civil society, interest groups, political parties and other institutional practices in the modern nation state. These processes followed different paths and methods in Turkey and Egypt, and this study wants to focus only on the attitude of the state toward religion and religious institutions in both countries.

Turkish Modernity, Nationalism and Religion

It was the Tanzimat period (1839-76) in the Ottoman Empire that established the essence of institutional life of the modern state with the recognition and protection by the state of security of life, honor and private property its citizens. The Tanzimat reforms at the political and economic spheres required the centralization of power to increase state's revenues, and create new institutions to re-organize social and political life according to the requirements of the new age of modern states. The centralization attempts during the Tanzimat aimed at weakening of the influences of internal and external forces over the political and economic affairs of the Empire.¹ In the age of the

Tanzimat, the Ottoman politics and economy were subject to the territorial demands not only of European powers as Russia and Austria, but also of its own vassal, Egypt of Mehmet Ali Pasha. The expansion of European manufacturing and trade also required the transformation of Ottoman economy and administration to a new mode.² For the Tanzimat bureaucrats, the establishment of a powerful and functional government was the only way to challenge the domestic and foreign demands from the Empire, which would have otherwise reduced the power of the state. Many administrative, economic, financial and educational reforms aimed to create a new state with a strong military power depending on new sources of revenue and centralized finances. As the power of the state increased, the new bureaucracy became more effective not only against the privileges of new economic groups, mostly non-Muslims in close relations with capitalist circles in Europe, but also against the authority of the palace and its religious legitimacy.

The conservatives, however, were to be made happy with the strengthening of the state with references to religion. The Tanzimat made it clear that the reforms were not against the *ulema* and their privileges but for the protection of the strong state tradition. Reforms were explained by the bureaucracy to strengthen the state which in turn would protect the Ottomans' rights and to provide justice. But traditional groups, the conservative *ulema*, religious endowments, the military and notables whose interests were destructed by reforms, government officials and their allies the provincial tax-farmers did not wait too long to react the Tanzimat order, and attempt to revert their losses by the reforms.³ The Tanzimat was expected to unify the subjects of the Empire around Ottomanism, prevent nationalist uprisings, integrate provincial groups into the central politics and institutions through local councils,

and create a modern state with the rule of law; however, it failed to create a consensus among its people for unification. While each religious community had their own nationalist projects during the age of nationalism, the reforms increasingly benefited the commercial, entrepreneurial, urban and educated groups, formed mostly by non-Muslims at the expense of Muslim agrarian groups as the process of integration into capitalism gained pace. The Tanzimat also increased the degree of European intervention on behalf of the non-Muslims into the affairs of the Empire.

The response to the rights and privileges of non-Muslim groups and European penetration into the Empire came from the Ottoman Muslim intellectuals, such as Namik Kemal, Ibrahim Sinasi and Ziya Pasha, who formulated their ideological challenge for the liberation of the Ottoman Empire around Islamic political terms and restructuring of Ottoman central institutions. The new Ottoman intelligentsia of middle class origin, educated in state schools and worked in the service of government, considered the establishment of a constitutional system and representative institutions as the solution to the question of saving the Empire. It was Namik Kemal who added a new terminology to Turkish patriotism with the concepts like fatherland (*vatan*), freedom (*hurriyet*) and constitutional rule (*mesrutiyet*). The ideas of the Young Ottomans were also highly colored by Islamic reformism of Jamal Al-Din Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, who challenged economic and political domination and cultural expansion of the West. While the Pan-Islamic ideas of Afghani were occupying the day, the Young Ottomans were defending the representative institutions in an Islamic manner, the representation of Muslims in the traditional religious assemblies, *shura*. The Young Ottoman intellectuals, dissented the rights and privileges provided by the Tanzimat to the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire,

called for reforms depended more on the adoption of Islamic teachings to the modern age. Impressed by the German and Italian unifications, and the successes of Pan-Slavic movements in the Balkans, the Young Ottomans formulated the first theoretical arguments for the *ittihad-i Islam*, the unity of Muslim populations.⁴ The wars which furthered territorial domination of the West in the Muslim societies' lands also increased the radicalism of the Young Ottoman thought. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 (The 1293 War), the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 and the British landing in Egypt in 1882 created a serious threat that unified the Muslims around Sultan-Caliph. Sultan Abdulhamid II, despite all of his unlimited ambition for power and absolute rule, became a focus of loyalty of the Muslims inside or outside of his domain. Indeed the Young Ottoman intellectuals' critique of the absolute power of the Sultan and his greater identification with Islam were among the factors that took the Young Ottomans' thought to a more liberal standing. The Young Ottomans conflict with the bureaucracy that became more powerful with the Tanzimat centralization also furthered the liberal ingredients of the Young Ottoman liberation ideology.⁵

The Young Ottoman intelligentsia's ideas provided a fertile ground for the establishment of a revolutionary society during the absolute rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II, who shelved the constitution for more than 30 years using the Russo-Ottoman War as an excuse for his personal reign. Frightened by a sudden collapse of the Empire by the activities of non-Muslim communities in the Balkans and the sponsoring Great Powers, Abdulhamid II adapted a Pan-Islamic policy to be able to hold the Muslims of the Empire together. Islamism became the inspiring force behind the power of the Sultan-Caliph as well as strengthening element for the Islamic nature of the state.

A group of Young Turks in the Military Medical College established the Society of the Ottoman Union (*Ittibad-i Osmani Cemiyeti*) in 1899 against the absolutism of the Sultan and to re-institute the 1876 Constitution as the only cure for the Empire's weaknesses. Since the ideological inclination of the Young Turks was Ottomanism, that is the unity of all Ottoman subjects within the territorial integrity of the Empire, the group tried to attract members from *millet*s of the Empire. The correspondence of the founders, Ishak Sukuti, Mehmet Resit, Abdullah Cevdet, Ibrahim Temo and Huseyinzade Ali with Ahmed Riza, then in Paris, publishing his positivist ideas in his paper, *Mesveret*, transformed the Society to the Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittibat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) in the early 1890s.⁶ The CUP did not have economic and political reform program until the Young Turks established the Committee's own government following the loss of the Balkan Wars and started to implement nationalist economic and ideological programs. Though there were conflicting ideological currents prevailing in various groups within the CUP, their westernization and the constitutional government were the common objectives that unified the CUP members around. The expansion of education under the rule of Abdulhamid prepared the basis for the emergence of bureaucratic and professional classes. They were, in other words, the by-products of the Hamidian reforms in education, courts and government. The Young Turks were state employees and part of the bureaucracy, educated in the newly established state schools, served as teachers and scholars in educational institutions, trained as lawyers to function in the new legal order in accordance with the modern law. There were also among them newspaper owners and publishers, writers dispersing their ideas of constitutionalism and freedom in books and journals. Many served in the military, trained in modern war

colleges and academies.⁷ The new intelligentsia had specific distinct interests in power, which were in conflict with those of the traditional classes and the traditional segments of the military. The Young Turks were also based on a much broader social base in the Ottoman society.⁸

When the objective of providing unity and gradual realization of minority rights within the constitutional order failed, the Committee, well organized in every college and military corps around the Empire by 1908, acted in a revolutionary way to urge the Sultan to reinstitute the constitution.⁹ The military pressure from the officers in the Balkans came in July 23, 1908, and Abdulhamid bowed the CUP's demand for the revival of the Constitution, but the Committee was unsuccessful in dethroning the Sultan until the Islamic counter-revolution of 1909.

The counter-revolution, called the 31 Mart Event, had several repercussions: it ended the Abdulhamid regime, and helped the CUP to establish a parliamentary system. Though the origin of the counter-revolution remained blurred, the conservative army officers, the *ulema* and the students of religious institutions, and religious groups have all participated in the reactionary upheaval. The CUP found a rare opportunity to extinguish the reactionary influences over the political system. The counter-revolution was inspired by Islamic circles using religion as a pretext for their actions; Islam lost its previous significance in the ideological structure of the CUP. The CUP started to formulate a more nationalist framework minus Islam from then on. The suppression of the counter-revolution by the army commanded by Mahmut Sevket Pasha (later Minister of War and Prime Minister of the CUP) also proved that the CUP would need the military might for its own survival. The most important of these consequences are perhaps the establishment of the modern parliamentary state by

limiting the Sultan's rights, strengthening the legislative authority, and recognizing the rights and liberties of the general public. The CUP had now achieved a more modern state, but the international juncture was not going to give enough space for it to function properly.

The main currents in the CUP ideology developed in the most chaotic years of the Empire from 1878 to 1913, a period when the Empire lost almost one third of its territories and population in the Balkans, North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. Well aware of the fact that European ambitions in the Empire depended solely on their nationalist aims, and the Balkan wars were just due to the formation of Balkan national states, the Young Turks felt that they needed to develop their own nationalism as well. Or, in other words, as Feroz Ahmad rightly points out, they had to start emphasizing one of the ideological ingredients of Ottoman intellectuals from among Ottomanism, Islamism or nationalism.¹⁰

Ottomanism, the unity of Ottoman communities, was already replaced by Islamism after the loss of Bosnians, Bulgarians, Albanians and Greeks. Developed by Ottoman intellectuals like Namik Kemal, and more importantly by Jamal Al-Din Afghani, and adopted by the Sultan himself to appease the remaining Muslim populations of the Empire, Pan-Islamism appeared as an anti-imperialist current against the foreign control of Ottoman finances and alien domination on the culture of the Muslim world. However Pan-Islamism was as traditional as retrospective, since it was looking for the solution to the ills of the Empire in returning to the utopian world of the glorious age of Islam. It was modernist as well in its demand for modern education and for the modification of Islamic rules and codes in accordance with requirements of the modern age, but these views were bound to remain only on the ideological ground. The Ottoman Islamists such as M. Semseddin (Gunaltay), Egyptian Sait Halim Pasha, Musa

Kazim Efendi, Ismail Hakki (Izmirli), Sehbenderzade Ahmet Hilmi, Ismail Fenni Ertugrul and Mehmet Ali Ayni were gathered around the journal *Sirat-i mustakim* during the Abdulhamid rule and the journal *Sebilulresad* in the Constitutional period.¹¹ The fatal blow to the survival of Islamism within the ideological structure of the CUP came from two directions: first, the 1909 counter-revolution, led by Dervis Vahdeti and supplied by his reactionary Islamist ideology, became a threat to the very existence of the constitutional rule; and second, the Albanians were separated from the Empire in 1912 to establish their own national state (and later the Arabs revolted against the Ottoman armies in Hijaz during the war for their state on Arab Peninsula). Westernization was the common bond for the all circles within the CUP, influenced strongly either by Ahmed Riza's positivism or Prince Sabahaddin's ideas of liberalism and decentralization. Abdullah Cevdet, one of the founders of the original Society in 1889, maintained his European manners, dressed as a European, and defended Europeanization of society and education in his journal *Ictihad*. The third important ideological current in the CUP was Pan-Turkism, or rather its political variation, Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism had its sources in the literature and academic work done in the Turkology institutes in Europe. The transformation of literary work to nationalist ideology was realized by the contribution of Turkish scholars such as Yusuf Akcura, Agaoglu Ahmet and Huseyinzade Ali, who migrated from Russia to Turkey with their nationalist feelings. Pan-Turkist writers, scholars and orientalists also founded their Turkish Society in the libertarian atmosphere of the 1908 Revolution, and published their ideas in journals like Turkish Homeland (*Turk Yurdu*). The CUP's Turkish nationalism gained pace with the establishment in 1912 of the Turkish Heart (*Turk Ocagi*) in the same Military Medical College where the seeds for the CUP were laid.

With the founders like Yusuf Akcura, Mehmet Emin, Ahmet Ferit, Agaoglu Ahmet and Fuat Salih, Turkish nationalism gained its organizational structure with the Turkish Heart.¹² Also economic nationalism pursued by the CUP during WWI foresaw the emergence of the etatist economic policies in the Turkish Revolution. In their search for the liberation from European economic control in the Empire and for favoring the Turkish-Muslim element in the Ottoman trade, the Young Turks adopted a nationalist economic policy. The War provided the opportunity to unilaterally abolish the capitulations, which caused the loss of European control in Ottoman economy.

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918, there was only one nation, the Turks, fighting for its independence and organizing its political-institutional structure to be able to establish its state in the near future. With the advantage of finding a ready-made bureaucracy and a military that was dissolved after the WWI in Anatolia, the Turkish nationalist officers started their liberation war against the occupying powers, and an institutional structure for war aims. It was the long-lasting war itself that helped the nationalists to create solidarity and national identity around common aims of liberating Turkey from imperialist occupation and establishing a new system of governance in Anatolia. The modern Turkish national state established in 1923 following the National Independence War had its antecedents in the national identity and the ideology of nationalism created in the late Ottoman era. It is indeed Young Turk nationalism and the development of various other currents of thought in the early twentieth century that provided ideological bases and nationalist foundations to the new state in Turkey. In this sense, the establishment of the modern state in Turkey in 1923 constituted the culmination point of a long process of modernization in the Ottoman Empire, started with the

Sultan Selim's reform attempts in the late eighteenth century, and developed with social and political changes succeeded by complex work of internal and external actors. Therefore, it would not be wrong to contend that the Turkish model of establishing the modern state and identification of the population with it differ not only from the Western European experience but from the Middle Eastern state and nation formation processes as well.

Early Egyptian Nationalism and the Status of Religion

Egypt during the reign of Mehmet Ali Pasha and his most able son Ibrahim experienced a great leap forward in agricultural renovation, industrial development and, educational and administrative reforms. Mehmet Ali Pasha's personal ambitions and Egypt's advantageous geographical location in Eastern Mediterranean turned the country to an early example of the development of the modern state in the Middle East. The need for having a large and deterrent army in Egypt required the change in the method and taxation in agriculture, investment in infrastructure, and establishment of new manufacturing techniques in iron processing, textiles and sugar production. However, the ambitious policies of Egyptian rulers were forced to end in 1841 due to the threat they posed against not only their own suzerain, the Ottoman Empire, but also against the European interests in the Middle East, technical knowledge, capital, labor and organization capability of the state also withered away in the 1860s. Khediv Ismail attempted to create a new impetus to Egyptian modernization by making it as the center of the world trade with the opening of the Suez Canal and by changing Egypt's political organization in

Western ways. During Ismail's reign, new, educated and westernized urban elite started to join in administrative processes, participate into legal system, and serve in the educational institutions in Egypt. Nevertheless, Egyptian modernization was solely based on the extravagant spending on non-productive sectors and Ismail was deposed on British and French demand in 1879 despite his efforts to save finances and administrative system from bankruptcy.

Though the formation of the modern state in Egypt can be taken as far back as the Mehmet Ali Pasha's reform in the early nineteenth century, the development of an Egyptian identity and nationalist movements start with the British occupation of Alexandria and Cairo in 1882. Mehmet Ali Pasha's modernization period in Egypt was defined at best as a false start.¹³ For George Antonius, Mehmet Ali Pasha, having a project of carving out an Arab Empire for himself, did not have any nationalist consciousness and his initiative was already bound to fail from the start. However, the bases for the new nationalist forces were already laid down during the first half of the nineteenth century by the development of Egyptian civilian bureaucracy and military groups, educational and legal reforms. In the last quarter of the century the Egyptian political groups started to be differentiated as a result of the early modernization and as response to the British domination on Egyptian economy and finances. There were various political groups, especially in the military, which defined their position vis-a-vis the Khedive's palace and the British military occupation. Four basic constituencies appeared at the political sphere, each having their own aims and policies toward foreign control in Egypt. Two groups of people were supporting the Palace, a group of wealthy landowners and their representatives in the Assembly led by Sharif Pasha, and a weak reactionary party. The other two groups were in a position to develop nationalist

challenge against British occupation, but with different ideologies and means. One of them was organized in the military around lower-level nationalist officers organized by Colonel Ahmed Arabi. The other group saw the liberation of Egypt in religious ideological terms as developed by Muhammad Abduh.¹⁴ The most radical of these groups was the army officers that acted against the European intervention into Egyptian political affairs following a joint British-French note protesting the establishment of a constitutional government in Egypt. The opposition grew within the army groups against the Dual Control, established by the British and French financial advisor (later with ministerial powers) to administer Egyptian finances. Already the *Casse de la Dette Publique*, founded to control Egyptian economy by the Europeans in similar manner with the Ottoman Public Debt Administration had increased nationalist feelings and hatred within the army. The Casse was reducing the government expenses to almost nil to pay back Egyptian public debts, retiring army officers and personnel and reducing military budget. The army, revolted against the Dual Control, quickly gained strength not only in the Cabinet, but also on the streets in Cairo and Alexandria.

The overthrow of nationalist army officers in Egypt by British bombardment of Alexandria and in the Battle of Tel Al-Kebir, and the re-formation of British rule in Cairo by Lord Dufferin in 1882 became turning point in the development of Egyptian national identity. Though the Disraeli government declared that the occupation would not last longer than necessary, the British aims were too comprehensive, focusing on the protection of British communications, and of British and foreign interests, and provisioning of security and stability around the Suez Canal.¹⁵ Thus Egyptian nationalism developed basically against British aims in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, aware of the fact that an

alliance between Egyptian nationalists and Islamists would turn the tide against the British and foreign interests, the British chose the strengthening of the state under Khedive Tewfik despite the conflict and ambiguous position of the British.¹⁶

Lord Dufferin, former British ambassador in Istanbul, was appointed in 1882 to Cairo by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to secure the stability of Egypt. Lord Dufferin found the country in administrative and financial chaos, and started to work with the Sharif Pasha's government to train Egyptian forces for Suez's security, to form a police force for Egypt's cities, and prepare for financial reforms. Dufferin founded an Egyptian army of 6,000 under the command of Sir Evelyn Wood as the *Serdar*. His financial reforms required the reduction in state employment and especially cutting the numbers of high-salaried foreign personnel in the service of the state. Already drawn the reaction of the French by ending the Dual Control of Egyptian finances with British and French advisors, the British policies of stultifying the French influence in Egypt were strongly criticized by Quai d'Orsay. But more important than external reactions was the reaction coming from within the country. Lord Dufferin had established in 1883 the provincial Council for the Reform of Native Tribunals, reformed the *Abliyya* (lower) courts promulgated in 1881 and instituted the Court of Appeal. The mixed courts, founded by forty Belgian and Dutch judges under British prosecutor-general, were for the trial of foreigners and Christians. It was not long for the popular objections to emerge for the workings of the mixed legal system. Also the Egyptian and French Schools of Law became the cradle for Egyptian nationalist youth.¹⁷

When Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer in 1892) was appointed as the Consul-General to Egypt in 1883, a new Organic Law established the eighty-member General

Assembly formed by the Tawfik's cabinet members, his legislative council's members and 44 elected provincial officials. The new legislation aimed to end the indefinite status of the British advisors in government; however, it did nothing more than increasing the complexity of the relations within Egyptian politics. While the real power remained within the British advisors and military, a power triangle was founded among the British Consul-General, the Khedive and his cabinet, and the Sultan's authority in Istanbul. Indeed the questions stemmed from this power triangle were not solved until the end of the Egyptian kingdom in 1952. The British controlled all important state affairs, trade, agriculture, irrigation, health, foreign affairs, and the military, however, Lord Cromer ignored educational reforms since the British needed more agricultural labor and more taxes to pay Egyptian foreign debt charges. The British military and political advisors also established strict control over religious institutions, especially heterodox orders, but orthodox religious institutions like Al-Azhar and its *ulema* and religious ideology as the legitimizing force remained exempt from British intervention.

Khedive Abbas Hilmi's reign (1892-1914) and his Francophile policies prepared the ground for the nationalist groups and organizations to flourish. Abbas Hilmi's challenge against Lord Cromer in the appointment of prime minister not only provided him the French support, but also granted the popular backing of the nationalist circles, especially the Egyptian army. Abbas Hilmi's Egyptian patriotism found an immediate response among the Islamists such as Jamal Al-Din Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, and the secular nationalists such as Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil, as well as among the Coptic Christians such as Butros Gali.

The Islamic reformist Jamal Al-Din Afghani, in Cairo between 1871 and 1879, saw the cure for Western imperialism and Christian domination on the culture of

Muslims in the Middle East in the return to Islam's fundamentals. For him, Islam was not passive obedience, but an active way of life using mind and knowledge for social regeneration and strength. Being against Islamic scholasticism, he asserted that the need arose for reform in Islam and educational modernization. Afghani maintained that Islamic way of life should have been adapted to the requirements of modernity, and the political unity of the *ummah* was necessary for freedom from foreign domination. However, Afghani also talked about patriotism and nationalism in addition to his Islamist ideas. His travel between nationalism and Islamism, a contradictory ideological swing for present, did not mean any inconsistency for him due to his defense of Muslims' lands against Western intrusion. In his first recorded lecture in 1870 at the opening ceremony of Istanbul University, Afghani talked about the revival of Islamic *milla*, borrowing the meaning of the term as nation, but using it to cover the whole Muslim community in the world.¹⁸ Afghani was adamant in his Islamism during his stay in Egypt, but his Pan-Islamic ideas sometimes remained behind the elevation of nationality, ethnicity and language to the fore. "There is no doubt that the unity of language is more durable for survival and permanence in this world than unity of religion since it does not change in a short time in contrast to the latter" says Afghani when he stressed on the significance of the unity of language as a common tie in human societies.¹⁹ He was aware that his audience in Egypt was a multi-religious one; therefore he was highly pragmatically focusing more on the elements of nationality to mobilize the Egyptians against foreign domination.

Afghani's Egyptian disciple, Muhammad Abduh promoted Pan-Islamic ideas and adapted them to Egypt's underdevelopment and to an idea of Islamic patriotism for Egypt. Abduh's support to Arabi's proto-nationalist

uprising led to his exile with Arabi Pasha, however he managed to go to Paris to join Afghani there. Though he had a peasant origin, Abduh studied law, and following his positions as school teacher and judge in Egyptian courts, he was made the Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899 by the representative of British domination, Lord Cromer, to whom Abduh opposed theoretically. Having positioned himself between the British occupation and Khedive's deficient nationalism, Abduh remained as the highest clerical authority of classical Islam in Egypt until his death in 1905. Abduh was searching for a gradual reform in Islam to return to its earliest purest form. He was also anti-imperialist in his demand for liberation of Egypt from the British. These two points were the features that determined the status of Abduh as an intermediary between the Egyptian territorial patriots and the defenders of purest form of classical Islam. While advocating for a more egalitarian society in Egypt, he also argued about the unity of Muslims in the primitive, uncorrupted form of Islam. In his Islamic society, Arabic would be the unifying force as formed by an amalgam of *Fusha* (classical Arabic) and *Amiyane* (colloquial Arabic). Foreign schools, especially missionary educational institutions, for Abduh, were teaching Muslim pupils the foreign devils and alien beliefs. Abduh, however, had surprisingly good personal relations with Lord Cromer, but many times he got into conflict Abbas Hilmi and his governments.²⁰

Having inconsistent ideas and positions between Islamism, Arabic patriotism and modernism, Abduh found a safe haven in Ottomanism, which, he believed, would protect the political greatness of Islam. During the heyday of Sultan Abdulhamid II in the 1880s, Abduh remained loyal to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, who was protecting the dominion of religion, guaranteeing its possessions and ruling the Muslim lands as the single authority over Islamic affairs.²¹ For him, it was the

Ottoman state and its Caliph to liberate Islam from the infidels' domination and to return the Muslims to the glorious age of Islam. However, Abduh later developed an idea of Islam of the Arabs, or Arabism, which was explicitly contrary to his earlier ideas of Ottomanism. In his teachings, the Kuran became as the basis for the success of the Muslims, and the Holy Book must have been taken in its strictest aspects in accordance with the rules of the Arabic language. Negating Ottomanism, patriotism and nationalism, Abduh recognized Islam as the only remedy for the illnesses of the Muslims. He put forward that Islam must have been practiced only by the language of shepherds and camel-drivers, to whom and in whose language the Kuran was descended. Islamic revival was only possible, for Abduh, by the work of those who knew Arabic language, the practices of the Arabs, their history, culture and customs in the days of the revelation of the Kuran.²² In his later years as the head of the Islamic establishment in Cairo, Abduh also gave up Arabism, and even Islamic political activism, but kept advocating the need for the revival of Arabic studies for Islamic reform.

Having threatened by the opposition from Islamic modernism as well as from the classical Islamic establishment, Abbas Hilmi found more secular allies in the nationalist groups. Ali Yusuf, though the publisher of an Islamic-oriented newspaper *Al-Muayyad* (The Supporter), was an anti-British Egyptian patriot. Yusuf established the Constitutional Reform Party in 1907 with the Khedive's sponsorship and financial support. Since Yusuf's party was organized with imposition from the palace, it was bound to remain ineffective and to have no popular backing. Indeed with the death of Ali Yusuf in 1911, the party also disappeared from the Egyptian political theatre. However, radical nationalists, called the *Hizb al-Vatani* group, gathered around the newspaper *Al-Liwa* (the Standard) in 1900. The leader of the group

was Mustafa Kamil, an ardent nationalist lawyer. He studied in the Egyptian School of Law in 1891 and graduated from the French School of Law in France in 1894. Funded by Khediv Abbas Hilmi during his education, he saw the Khedive as the center of nationalist struggle against occupation and the British as the destructive force for Egyptian administration, people, culture and economy.²³ For him, the British also reduced the significance of Islam and Islamic teachings for its interests not to be disturbed in India by the Indian Muslim community. Thus he blended Islam and nationalism together as did many other nationalists in Egypt²⁴. Mustafa Kamil wrote for the need of returning the glorious past of Egypt and saw the political salvation in the Islamic liberation of Egypt from British rule; and social recovery could only be achieved by a determinate fight against ignorance and education. While he was demanding an autonomous rule under the Ottoman Caliph, he also believed that the Sudan was to be brought under Egyptian rule.

In the Sudanese question emerged with the Mahdi revolt in 1883, almost all Egyptian political parties and groups acted defensively in the nationalist manner. When Muhammed Ahmed, a Sufi sheikh and self-proclaimed Mahdi, called the Sudanese tribes to unify under the banner of Islam and established his Sunni fundamentalist theocratic state, Egypt and British acted jointly to suppress the rebellion and re-gain the Egyptian benefits from the Sudan. In 1899, the joint Anglo-Egyptian expeditionary force defeated the Mahdi's Islamic rule and established there the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the dual rule which would continue to pose the question of sovereignty in Egypt until 1951.

As the alliance between the Palace and nationalists was gaining strength due to the British position in Egypt political life, Cromer retired and was replaced by Sir Eldon Gorst in 1907. The new Consul-General Gorst was

a steadfast liberal and wanted to break up the close relations between the Khedive and nationalist groups. The moderate *Al-Umma* (The Party of the Nation) led by Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid quickly became the supporter of Gorst. Ahmed Lutfi Bey was also backed up by the Coptic community that recognized Gorst's attempts at liberalization of politics, Egyptianization of government posts and strengthening local councils. Upon Mustafa Fahmi Pasha's resignation from prime ministry in 1908, Butros Gali Pasha, the leader of Coptic reformist group became prime minister despite the nationalists' dislike. The debate over Suez Canal concession cost the life of Butros Gali in 1910.

Disappointed by the failure of the moderate *Al-Umma*, Gorst Pasha returned to London, and Lord Kitchener, *Serdar* of Anglo-Egyptian troops in the Sudan, became the new British consul in Cairo. Not only his ambitious personality, but also international developments ended liberalizing experiments in Egypt. Kitchener wanted to put Egypt in order by the proclamation of a new organic law, which required elections for the new Legislative Assembly. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the nationalist groups headed by Saad Zaghlul, Mustafa Fahmi Pasha's son-in-law. Upon the election of Saad Zaghlul as the vice president of the Assembly, the British tried to balance his power with the appointment of Husayin Rushdi as prime minister, who held the office until the end of the First World War. Kitchener returned to England to claim the War Ministry in the summer of 1914. Worried for the nationalist tendencies of Abbas Hilmi, the British replaced him with Husayin Kamil, and announced the establishment of British protectorate in Egypt and the Sudan. Egyptian nationalism lost its pace for the duration of the war, however it found an relentless nationalist leader in the personality of Zaghlul in the national struggle of Egypt during the British mandate period.

Conclusion

The brief comparison between the development of Turkish and Egyptian nationalism and the formation of the basic institutions of the modern state in the beginning of the twentieth century displayed that some propositions of western scholarship in state building in the Middle East can not be convincingly proven. Middle Eastern national states have long been considered and examined as created in a method determined basically by the European intervention. It is either believed that the modern state had already been established by the Western powers themselves at the end of the nineteenth century as it was the case in Egypt and Iraq. Or it is the contention of some scholars that the state was established or reformed under the influence, control and domination of the forces of imperialism as it had happened in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and Syria and elsewhere in the twentieth centuries. It is thought that in either case the native population and the ideologies they developed played a minimal role in the formation of state and its nationalist ideology. This idea leads to think that the Middle Eastern societies remain alien, at least aloof to state structures created by foreigners, and do not feel belonging to their states, but maintain their loyalty to institutions other than the state. This study attempts to show that the formation of modern state in the Middle East was the result of the contending interests between the internal forces as well as their struggle with the interventions from without. It is a more complex web of relations than the straightforward thinking of it as the establishment of the institutional and constitutional structures by the occupying powers similar to their own. The weaknesses of the Middle Eastern states in their capability of penetrating into society and answer social demands and in the loyalty of the population to specific ethnic, tribal

and religious interests appears to be the consequence of foreign intervention as well as conflicting interests within the country. While this brief work on the early development of Turkish and Egyptian nationalism and state attempted to put forward the similarities in the attitude of the nationalists toward state-making and the role of religion, it is out of the scope of this study to analyze the differences in particular paths that were pursued by both states in their continuing struggle to nationhood and statehood after the WW I.

This study did also tell us about the status of religion in the early formation of national identity in Turkey and Egypt. The study's first basic conclusion is the relation between Ottomanism and Arabism as the ideology of unification among Ottoman communities. Arabism grew out of the ideology of Ottomanism through two distinct but not completely unrelated routes. One was the conservative Islamists and Islamist modernists' ideas that Islam could only be glorified in its authentic Arab culture and Arab history as they searched the original foundations of Islamic liberation in Arab/Islamic roots. The second source of Arabism was the work of Syrian, especially Christian nationalists in their demand from the Ottoman capital more jobs, more local power, local finances and local military for the Arab youth in the Arab lands. Though this is out of the scope of this study, the Christian Arab nationalists stressed more on the Arab cultural origins than religious fundamentals in their search for Arab nationalism in Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere. As with the Turkish nationalists who drew the national boundaries within the Ottoman domain after the Turks remained as the only social base for nationalism, the local Egyptian patriotism also defined the "Arab" identity within larger Egyptian Arab and Islamic culture with some Ottomanist overtones. As the WWI was coming closer, Arabism in the Arab Middle East, and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire proper

replaced Ottomanism as the reaction of the nationalist groups and Islamist communities in their challenge against Western domination.

Despite the expansion of Arabism by secular nationalist intelligentsia in the Arab territories, the second conclusion of the study is that nationalism in the Middle East is decorated by an Islamic rhetoric, a fact which would be natural given the nationalist and Islamist opposition to British hegemony in Egypt. And this should be considered natural in the other Muslim communities in the Middle East in which the political authority has been legitimized for centuries either by a popular perception for the divine right to rule or by religious belief for the right to govern. The use of religious terminology by the intelligentsia is not only because of mobilizing the people for nationalist aims, but also because of challenging the ruler's authority whose legality depends mainly on religion. Afghani, Namik Kemal and the Young Ottomans, Muhammad Abduh, Mustafa Kamil and Abd Ar-Rahman Al-Kawakibi went back and forth between Islamism and nationalism. Political activities of the Islamists and their stress on modernity and the adoption of Western technology not only distinguished Islamist modernists from conservative *ulema*, but also rendered them closer to secular nationalists. Due to their patriotic ideas, the political Islamists can therefore be evaluated as an intermediary step between Islamism and nationalism, or rather they can be named as proto-nationalists as Keddie put rightly forward. However, Middle Eastern nationalism is still highly problematic in terms of the role of religion in the making of "national" communities, since the complex relations (or in other words, separation) of the secular national authority and religion are still waiting to be solved especially in the Arab Middle East.

Notes:

¹ For the external pressures over Ottoman economy and foreign politics, see Matthew S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966) and M. E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923*, (London and New York: Longman, 1987, pp. 59-96; and for the new Ottoman social forces emerged with new interests, Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1972), pp. 243-281.

² Donald Quataert, "Main Problems of the Economy during the Tanzimat Period", *150. Yilinda Tanzimat*, ed. by Hakki D. Yildiz, (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Yayinlari, 1992), pp. 212-213.

³ Halil Inalcik, "Application of Tanzimat and Its Social Effects", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, Vol. 5 (1973), pp. 115-127; and *idem*. "Tanzimat'in Uygulanmasi ve Sosyal Tepkileri", *Bellekten (Türk Tarib Kurumu)*, V. 28, N. 112 (Ekim 1964), pp. 640-649.

⁴ Nikkie Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1969), p. 20.

⁵ Karpat, *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁶ Sina Aksin, *Jön Türkler ve Ittibat ve Terakki*, (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980), pp. 16-19.

⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*, (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 16-17.

⁸ Feroz Ahmad, "The Young Turk Revolution" *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 3, No. 3, The Middle East (July 1968), p. 20

⁹ Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress...*, p. 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

¹¹ Aksin, *Ibid*, p. 248.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹³ George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1946), p. 21.

¹⁴ Sydney N. Fisher and William Ochsenswald, *The Middle East: A History*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1990), p. 286. Fisher and Ochsenswald also take the development of early Egyptian nationalism back to the Mehmet Ali Pasha's early educational reform period. In 1826 Mehmet Ali sent Rifaa Rafi Al-Tahtawi, an Al-Azhar graduate and a teacher in Egypt, to Paris as

student guardian. Studying French education, Tahtawi wrote extensively on Egyptian patriotism and the love of country, modernization of the *ulema* and reform in Islamic institutions, and the need for secular education. *Ibid*, p. 340.

¹⁵ For one of the best analysis of British policy in the Middle East, see: Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921*, (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), chapter I, especially, pp. 24-27.

¹⁶ Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State*, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 41-42.

¹⁷ For a detailed information and a meticulous analysis of the Egyptian legal system in the age of nationalism, see: Byron Cannon, *Politics of Law and the Courts in Nineteenth Century Egypt*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), *passim*.

¹⁸ Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism", *Ibid.*, p. 22

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23, c.f. Mehdi Rendessi, "Pages peu connues de Djamel al-din Afghani", *Orient*, VI (1958), pp. 123-128.

²⁰ P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 177-188.

²¹ C. Ernest Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origins of an Ideology", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 1961), p. 389.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 390.

²³ Fisher and Ochsenswald, *Ibid.*, p. 342.

²⁴ Vatikiotis, *Ibid.*, p.195.

Imaginea celuilalt: un document francez privind spațiul românesc de la începutul secolului al XIX-lea

The Image of the Other : A French Document about the Romanian Space in the beginning of the XIXth Century

The article comments upon the report written by the French captain Aubert about the Romanian space during the XIXth century. It analyses the richness of documentation data contained by the report, through the lenses of the historical anthropological categories of "the other's image". The author concludes that the report was elaborated in a period when French interests for the Romanian space was rising.

Spațiul românesc a reintrat în atenția lumii occidentale odată cu Reconquista austriacă începută la 1683, după o perioadă în care Imperiul Otoman părea să domine statornic întinse regiuni ale Europei Centrale și de Sud-Est. Pe de o parte, apariția în raporturile dintre marile puteri ale Europei a *Cbestiunii Orientale*, legate de moștenirea Imperiului Otoman, a menținut trează atenția factorilor politici asupra realităților de la Dunărea de Jos¹. Pe de altă parte, înlocuirea de către puterea

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Key words:

image of the other,
history, Romania,
Captain Aubert, report

suzerană a domnitorilor pământeni cu principii greci din Fanar, la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea, a sporit influența Porții, și a creat impresia falsă că frontiera Imperiului Otoman a trecut linia Dunării, că turcii s-au înstăpânit efectiv asupra Principatelor Române. Totuși, sensibilizarea anumitor cercuri occidentale asupra spațiului din partea răsăriteană a continentului se produsese deja, iar interesul a sporit progresiv, odată cu trecerea timpului. Trecerea de la „Mica“ la „Marea Europă“ era pe cale de a se face, iar Secolul Luminilor, cu apetitul său pentru realități exotice, cu ideea de „cetățean al universului“, cu discursul cosmopolit, va oferi un cadru potrivit în acest sens.

Conflictele militare ruso-austro-turce au readus, treptat, lumea românească în atenția marilor puteri. Boierii moldoveni au arătat cu prilejul tratativilor de pace că Țările Române au beneficiat de-a lungul evului mediu de relații privilegiate cu Poarta, fiindu-le recunoscute autonomia și instituțiile². Într-un asemenea context, Occidentul este informat din relatările celor care au călătorit și au scris despre spațiul românesc în secolele anterioare, că la nordul Dunării există un popor de origine romanică, care în trecut s-a bucurat din partea Imperiului otoman de autonomie deplină³. Războaiele napoleoniene sporesc interesul Franței pentru spațiul Europei de Sud-Est, pe fondul declanșării ostilităților cu Rusia⁴.

Raportul *Notes statistiques sur la Pologne Russe la Moldavie et la Valachie* analizat de noi a fost redactat de Aubert, căpitan adjunct la Statul Major General al Marii Armate, conține 10 pagini dintre care 7 sunt consacrate spațiului românesc. La finalul textului avem câteva date de identificare, respectiv locul și data unde a fost conceput, Paris, 26 octombrie 1807, după care urmează semnătura lui Aubert, căpitan adjunct la Statul Major General al Marii Armate⁵. Din păcate, eforturile noastre de-a obține informații despre căpitanul Aubert, pentru a

lumina rațiunile călătoriei făcute de acesta în spațiul românesc, n-au condus decât la rezultate parțiale. Ce cunoaștem până în momentul de față? În primul rând că Aubert n-a făcut călătoria de unul singur în Țările Române. El a făcut parte dintr-o delegație alcătuită, potrivit informațiilor consemnate de către unul dintre membrii ei, anume Armand Charles Guilleminot având funcția de adjutant de comandant, din comandantul de escadron Simmer, un ofițer rus și din Aubert⁶. Deci trei ofițeri francezi și un ofițer rus. Din informațiile provenite din aceeași sursă, dar și din faptul că avea gradul cel mai mare între ofițerii francezi din delegație, se pare că Armand Charles Guilleminot a fost conducătorul misiunii franceze. În al doilea rând, delegația franceză a părăsit cartierul general imperial din Tilsit la 11 iulie 1807, pentru a se întâlni cu generalul Michelson, comandantul forțelor rusești aflate în principate și Marele Vizir, Celebi-Mustafa Pașa, comandantul trupelor otomane de la Dunărea de Jos⁷.

Aubert își începe relatarea de la Tilsit, de unde își începe călătoria, urmând drumul spre Grodno, Kovel, Luck și Camenița. Ajungând în Camenița, Aubert ține să facă unele considerații de ordin istoric și câteva scurte descrieri despre situația actuală a orașului. Îl lășăm pe Aubert să-și prezinte impresiile despre Camenița, punct strategic al Regatului Poloniei la frontierele sale sudice, dar care a avut un rol însemnat și în destinul Țării Moldovei. „Odinioară acest oraș era citat ca principala cetate a Poloniei. Poziția sa este destul de frumoasă, dar totuși nu are nimic extraordinar. În apropierea Cameniței, cobori o vale adâncă pe care curge un râu peste care este un pod mobil. Acest pod este apărat de vechi ziduri, uneori circulare. Ici, colo, se văd ruinele unui zid de apărare. Orașul este așezat pe un deal a cărei bază din rocă calcaroasă este abruptă. În partea dreaptă se vede o veche fortăreață foarte neregulată, care acum este în reparație“⁸. Pentru ofițerul francez, spațiul

străbătut avusese o istorie impresionantă aflată în opoziție cu realitățile prezentului. Cetatea Cameniței, știa el, fusese considerată ca una dintre cele mai puternice fortificații, din care se mai păstrează doar „vechi ziduri de apărare“ sau „ruinele unui zid de apărare“. Opoziția dintre trecutul glorios și decăderea din prezent este mai accentuată ca niciodată atunci când este descrisă modalitatea în care se refăcea sistemul de fortificație: „În partea dreaptă a orașului se vede o veche fortificație foarte neregulată care acum este în reparație. Lucrările noi care vor fi adăugate celor vechi sunt lipsite de strălucire și nu sunt deloc rezistente. Căptușeala se fisurează în fiecare clipă pentru că lipsește echilibrul cu denivelările de pământ“⁹.

Părăsim Camenița, și implicit Polonia, alături de călătorul nostru, evident mental, nu înainte de a-l lăsa să-și expună în cuvinte puține impresiile despre vechea Polonie: „În general, drumurile sunt bune și țara foarte productivă. Se observă foarte puțină industrie în această parte a vechii Polonii; comerțul modest care se face se află în exclusivitate în mâinile evreilor“¹⁰. Căpitanul Aubert, scrupulos, meticolos și concis în descrierile făcute, cel puțin așa ni se dezvăluie din primele pagini ale raportului, ne avertizează că „de la Camenița se coboară pe o singură pantă până la Nistru. [...] De la Camenița până la Hotin, trebuie să treci Nistrul care separă Polonia rusească de Moldova și are în lățime 60-80 de stânjani. Îl treci cu un bac cu rame în zece minute. Înălțimile de-a lungul albiei pot avea pe malul stâng între 40-50 de stânjani. Malul drept este foarte jos. Distanța este de 6 leghe”¹¹. Iată, avem de-a face cu un veritabil ghid de călătorie care conține informații despre traseul, despre calitatea drumului, date privind trecerile peste cursurile de apă, lățimea Nistrului, modalitatea și timpul necesar traversării, înălțimea malurilor etc. Putem să punem claritatea și concizia discursului pe seama formației căpitanului Aubert, de profesie militar, dar, în

egală măsură, și pe seama unei misiuni cu care a fost însărcinat în spațiul românesc.

Ajuns în Moldova, Aubert se lansează pe o pagină întregă în considerații de ordin geografic, demografic și politic asupra provinciei. Dar, în capitolul despre Valahia, Aubert își prezintă considerațiile generale asupra țării după ce a încheiat prezentarea călătoriei. Acestea, precum și alte elemente din cuprinsul raportului, ne conduc spre ideea că ofițerul francez în momentul călătoriei și-a făcut scurte însemnări, pe care, mai apoi, în Franța le-a ordonat după cum a crezut de cuviință în raport.

Care sunt impresiile ofițerului francez despre Moldova? Acesta se dovedește generos în aprecieri în legătură cu potențialul natural al țării, însă critic în privința sistemului politic, în general corupt și ineficient pentru locuitorii țării, și a modalităților în care sunt puse în valoare resursele solului și ale subsolului. Dar să-l lăsăm pe autorul raportului de călătorie să-și expună observațiile. În mod cu totul surprinzător pentru noi, Aubert crede că „Moldova ar fi capabilă să devină una din cele mai frumoase provincii ale Europei, dacă populația ar putea fi sporită, iar țara administrată“¹². Pentru a-și susține afirmația privind potențialul economic al Țării Moldovei, ofițerul francez insistă asupra principalelor resurse. „Solul, în general necultivat, oferă pretutindeni“, conchide observatorul, „un pământ vegetal care nu ar trebui decât să fie exploatat pentru a trage cel mai mare profit [...]. Turme impresionante de animale de toate rasele alcătuiesc bogăția acestui popor în întregime de păstori [...]. Pe văile râurilor Nistru, Prut, Siret crește o vegetație extrem de abundentă, nutreț de bună calitate pentru animale, iar pe dealuri sunt produse câteva culturi după nevoile țării: grâu turcesc, orz și ovăz foarte frumos. Varietatea podișurilor și expunerea lor diferită le-ar face potrivite pentru orice fel de cultură. Se găsesc păduri de stejari și de lemn alb

și crânguri care sunt distruse de animalele lăsate să pască în voie. În Moldova se găsesc, de asemenea, numeroase zăcăminte de minereu și munți de sare¹³. În concluzie, Aubert considera Moldova o țară bogată, iar problemele existente aici se datorau unei rele administrări.

Pentru Aubert vinovat pentru proasta conducere a țării este, fără nici o îndoială, Imperiul Otoman. Și parcă pentru a înlătura orice dubiu, el conchide că „Guvernul turc va fi întotdeauna un obstacol în calea îndreptării acestei țări. El se alege de pe urma acesteia cu mai multe milioane pe an neglijând resursele¹⁴. În fapt, răul din imperiu, îndeosebi despotismul sultanilor, precum și corupția contaminaseră și provinciile dependente, iar fanarioții reprezentau instrumentele prin care Poarta acționa în statele românești. Ei erau, alături de sultan, promotorii politicii otomane în statele românești, beneficiarii acestui sistem nefast, dar uneori și victimele lui. În câteva fraze, observatorul francez surprinde funcționarea mecanismului politic din Moldova.

„Moldova este guvernată” – scrie Aubert – „de obicei, de un domn creștin grec, care primește investitura de mare domn. Intrigile și aurul sunt cele mai sigure mijloace de obținere a unui principat. Acela care bucurându-se de trecere pe lângă Poartă și având mari bogății a ajuns să fie numit domn, nu are nimic mai bun de făcut decât să-și exploateze poporul; el trebuie să se acopere de datorii imense pe care a fost obligat să le facă. De altfel, nu are nici o garanție. Uneltirile de astăzi i-au servit ca să obțină suveranitatea, mâine îl pot răsturna.”¹⁵ Considerațiile autorului sunt zguduitoare prin simplitatea și claritatea cu care surprinde funcționarea regimului fanariot. Nu este primul care o face. Marea majoritate a călătorilor străini au ajuns la concluzii similare. Puțini sunt aceia care în fraze puține au reușit să spună atât de multe lucruri.

Cu alte cuvinte, tronul Moldovei se obține prin intrigi și aur. Domnii, după ce au obținut investitura sultanului, plătesc sume mari de bani pentru a rămâne în grațiile acestuia și a înalților funcționari otomani, pentru a-și păstra tronul o perioadă cât mai mare de timp. Dar scopul acestor suverani nu era de-a administra eficient țara ci de-a se îmbogăți pe ei și familiile lor. A aduna bani din taxele plătite de locuitorii țării pentru folosință personală era considerat ca fiind un lucru normal. La fel ca și mentalitatea prezentă în epocă ca domnitorii după ce au pierdut scaunul țării să rămână cu averi însemnate obținute din munca supușilor. Iar o domnie mai lungă însemna putere și bani mai mulți. Așa se explică grija celor aflați în scaunul țării pentru a-și păstra poziția o perioadă cât mai îndelungată, cheltuind în acest sens sume mari de bani, pentru eliminarea pretendenților. Observatorul remarcă, indirect, criza de autoritate a instituției centrale devenită o simplă funcție ocupată de cei dispuși să ofere sume mari bani. Cu alte cuvinte, domnia nu se află în slujba țării, nu-i apără interesele, ci, dimpotrivă, le eluda. În acest context, era mai puțin important dacă viitorul domn avea calități de conducător și era bun administrator. Pentru sultan era relevant ca pretendentul care oferea suma cea mai mare pentru ocuparea scaunului țării, să reușească achitarea ei. Dar plata făcută pentru ocuparea tronului era urmată de alte obligații, Poarta având grijă să încurajeze eventualii contracandidați, pentru a-i atrage atenția celui aflat în fruntea țării să-și onoreze îndatoririle. „Așa s-a întâmplat”, conchidea observatorul francez, „cu prințul Canghieri (Hangherli¹⁶ n.n.), nou numit domn al principatului Moldovei care tocmai a fost dat jos de pe tron și înlocuit cu prințul Canimaki (Calimachi¹⁷ n.n.)¹⁸”. Că sistemul instaurat de Poartă era adevărata cauză pentru situația economică și politică gravă din țările române o demonstrează, potrivit autorului francez, și

ușurința cu care domnii sunt schimbați, uneori după capriciul sultanilor sau a înalților funcționari otomani. Deci, conchide Aubert „Rezultă că acela care putea întreprinde ceva pentru această țară, presupunând că ar fi avut această intenție, se află în imposibilitatea de a o face”¹⁹. Dar, răul, corupția, arbitrariul Porții Otomane în relație cu domnitorii fanarioți reprezenta un veritabil model urmat, de voie, de nevoie, de elita politică a țării. „După exemplul domnitorilor“, scrie Aubert, „principalii boieri sunt obligați să-i exploateze pe alții și nu există pentru nimeni nici siguranță, nici proprietate.”²⁰ Absența unei minime garanții pentru siguranța persoanei și a proprietății reprezintă, iată, o altă mare problemă în țările române. Ea aduce cu sine arbitrariul celor puternici și lipsa de încredere în sistemul politic actual, generând în rândul celor mulți suspiciune, frică și neîncredere.

Observatorul își continuă descrierea Moldovei insistând asupra dispunerii satelor și a căilor de comunicație: „Satele, așezate în mijlocul câmpiilor Moldovei, sunt construite din chirpici. Alte locuințe sunt săpate chiar în pământ și nu au la suprafață decât două sau trei încăperi. Terenul din jurul lor nu este mai cultivat decât alte suprafețe și nu există nici măcar o grădină. Totul este acoperit de iarbă și nu se vede nici un drum [...]. Releele de poștă sunt așezate într-o baracă, adesea la bivacuul cailor. Aflați în număr mare, caii pasc în câmpie și rămân sub cerul liber peste noapte. Adesea trebuie să mergi să-i cauți la o depărtare de una sau două leghe ceea ce-i întârzie pe călători, altfel ei merg destul de repede”²¹. Descrierea se poate constitui într-o veritabilă imagine de album pentru semănătoriștii și tradiționaliștii noștri de la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea. Dacă privești la suprafață și superficial imaginea este interesantă, dacă, dimpotrivă, pătrunzi în adâncul ei viața personajelor este marcată de sistemul politic existent. Este o societate tradițională, fără elemente de

modernitate și în care, cu minime investiții, s-ar putea schimba multe lucruri în bine. Cazul stațiilor sau releelor de poștă este poate cel mai relevant. Sunt prost amenajate și organizate. Caii însă, recunoaște autorul, merg destul de repede. Însă trebuie ce-l mai adesea să-i caute pe câmp, uneori la mari distanțe, tocmai când călătorul are mai mare nevoie de ei.

Revenim la Hotin, locul unde l-am abandonat pe Aubert după intrarea în Moldova. Ne-am fi așteptat din partea observatorului francez, cunoscând importanța acestui însemnat punct strategic pentru Moldova, la o descriere mai amplă. Hotinul este potrivit autorului „un orașel, așezat în câmpie; este înconjurat de o fortificație fără strălucire și fără împrejmuiri; este apărat din flanc de câteva turnuri, dar fără nici o lucrare exterioară. Acest loc este considerat o fortăreață de către turci”²². Însă, autorul nu se entuziasmează în fața Hotinului; ba chiar strecoară o ironie subtilă, cum că doar turcii consideră Hotinul o cetate. Nu putem însă să-l suspectăm pe observatorul francez de lipsă de interes pentru realizările românilor. Cetatea Hotinului a reprezentat pentru secolele XV-XVI o fortificație capabilă să facă față asediilor. Dar, pe măsură ce tehnica asediilor s-a perfecționat planul cetății a rămas același și fortificația a devenit tot mai vulnerabilă.

De la Hotin, Aubert a luat drumul Rădăuților, prin Bălcăuți. „Înainte să ajungi la Rădăuți, treci Prutul pe un bac tras cu funia, lat de 60 de stânjeni”²³. Următorul oraș important este Iașul, capitala Moldovei, unde Aubert ajunge traversând câteva localități consemnate în raport într-o formă mai mult sau mai puțin corectă: Chireni, Ștefănești. „Înainte de-a ajunge la Iași urci o pantă foarte abruptă împădurită și parcurgi un teren tare denivelat”²⁴. Capitala Moldovei este singurul oraș care se apropie de exigențele și gusturile căpitanului Aubert. Considerațiile făcute sunt concise: „Orașul Iași este destul de bine construit. Poți vedea clădiri în gustul european, trăsurile

de lux și palate. Străzile sunt garnisite de blane care înlocuiesc pavajul. Populația se ridică la 50-60 de mii de suflete. Religia dominantă este creștinismul grec²⁵.

Drumul călătorului francez se continuă spre Vaslui prin Scânteia și Uncești. Călătoria i se pare lui Aubert mai grea decât în segmentele sale anterioare. Un bun prilej de-a face câteva descrieri și considerații asupra itinerarului parcurs. „De la Iași traversezi un ținut muntos și împădurit. Drumul este prost și greu [...]. În apropierea orașelului Vaslui descoperi o poziție strategică de unde, dacă ar fi fortificată, ar putea fi apărate ieșirile la loc deschis ale mai multor văi²⁶. Interesant este faptul că ofițerul Aubert a sesizat poziția strategică a acestor locuri, în care cu mai bine de trei secole înainte Ștefan i-a învins pe turci. De la Vaslui, Aubert își continuă drumul spre Focșani, prin Socolina, Bârlad, Berheci, Tecuci. Dincolo de faptul că drumul este dificil, trebuie să „străbați o vale brăzdată de pâraie și de canale pe care le treci pe tot atâtea poduri de lemn“, sau „drumul este foarte sinuos, iar pe ploaie este rău²⁷, totuși, ca un fapt pozitiv, această parte străbătută din drumul prin Moldova i se pare călătorului „puțin mai cultivată. Poți vedea culturi de grâu turcesc și orz²⁸. Deci, în Moldova se cultivă și cereale. Dorința observatorului de a-i face pe toți locuitorii Moldovei păstori poate avea câteva posibile explicații. Creșterea animalelor era în Moldova o ramură mult mai dezvoltată decât agricultura. Or, din spațiile de unde vine călătorul agricultura reprezenta ocupația de bază. În plus, terenurile Moldovei propice agriculturii, erau folosite în mare parte ca locuri pentru pășunat.

Urmează Galațiul, unde ajunge trecând prin Mărtinești și Măxineni. „De la Măxineni la Galați sunt câteva podișuri foarte aride. Orașul Galați se află pe malul Dunării. Populația este puțin numeroasă²⁹. De la Galați la Brăila, unde poți să ajungi pe Dunăre a cărei curs nu este prea iute. Și iată-ne ajunși în Țara

Românească, aproape de frontiera Imperiului Otoman. Acest lucru este imediat sesizabil prin prezența într-un număr mare a locurilor fortificate, a garnizoanelor militare și a unor construcții de tip oriental. „Brăila“, i se pare lui Aubert, „un orașel fortificat după metodele turcilor. Situația sa este destul de vitregă. Se află sub comanda lui Nazir Ahmed cu o garnizoană de patru mii de oameni. Lucrările de construcție care servesc la apărarea lui nu au nici o rezistență și sunt destul de prost întreținute.“³⁰ Din Brăila, căpitanul francez urcă pe cursul Dunării spre Silistra și Rusciuc, după care i-a drumul Bucureștiului. Pe acest segment de drum observatorul și-a concentrat atenția asupra sistemului defensiv otoman. Efectivele militare, tipurile și calitatea fortificațiilor, mijloacele de comunicare sunt elemente fundamentale din consemnările sale. Înainte de-a ajunge la Silistra, Aubert remarcă faptul că „Armata turcă este campată pe cele două maluri ale acestui fluviu, fără vreun alt mijloc de comunicare în afara bacurilor. Cartierul general al marelui vizir se află pe malul stâng într-o insulă din apropierea Călărășului“³¹. O mențiune specială despre orașul Giurgiu, unde autorul constată că aparențele pot fi adesea înșelătoare, remarcă care se potrivește mai mult ca niciodată Imperiului Otoman. Fortăreața Giurgiu, conchide autorul, „este considerată de turci ca fiind în stare de cea mai mare rezistență“³².

Aubert utilizează foarte adesea în descrierile sale metoda comparației. Dă glas punctului de vedere al autorităților într-o problemă, după care și-l exprimă pe al său. Pentru el, „orașul se află în câmpie este înconjurat de un zid vechi de apărare care pare să fi fost reparat de curând“³³. Observația este valabilă și pentru Rusciuc. „Orașul este bine așezat; malul drept al Dunării, foarte înalt în această parte, domină orașul și oferă o priveliște încântătoare, dar în interior nu este altceva decât un sat. Străzi strâmte și întortochiate de-a lungul cărora se întind ziduri de pământ în care vezi câteva porți înalte cu

două canaturi³⁴. Despre Slobozia, ofițerul francez știe că în această localitate s-a semnat armistițiul ruso-turc a cărui clauză principală prevedea retragerea trupelor rusești din principate. „Ea a fost aleasă de ambasadorii turci și ruși pentru găzduirea conferinței referitor la armistițiul încheiat între cele două puteri în data de 24 august trecut³⁵. Din Rusciuc, Aubert se îndreaptă spre București, capitala Valahiei, oraș care i se pare „mare și destul de bine construit. Se aseamănă destul de mult cu orașul Iași în privința construcțiilor și a obiceiurilor³⁶. Similitudini găsește autorul și între cele două țări. Despre Valahia, călătorul francez mărturisește că „seamănă mult cu Moldova și are aproape aceleași bogății. Se află sub guvernarea Porții otomane și suferă aceleași inconveniente³⁷.

Încheiem periplul prin Moldova și Țara Românească cu observațiile lui Aubert din finalul raportului. „Așa sunt provinciile Moldova și Valahia cărora nu le lipsește decât o bună administrare pentru a deveni extrem de înfloritoare. Dar ignoranța turcilor, ideile lor religioase care condamnă orice fel de inovație, ba mai mult, ura lor pentru creștinii de oriunde ar fi ei, toate acestea vor fi întotdeauna un obstacol în cale emancipării acestor frumoase țări. Și nu va fi cu adevărat fertilă decât atunci când un guvern puternic și drept o va lua în grija sa și o va proteja³⁸. Observații de mare profunzime privind statutul și evoluția țărilor române, care și-au păstrat actualitatea și pentru vremurile noastre.

Cine este totuși Aubert? Să încercăm pe baza informațiilor din raport să-i conturăm profilul. În primul rând este un fin observator al realităților românești. Căpitan adjunct de stat major general în armata franceză, după cum îi arată și semnătura din raport, era, probabil, ofițer de geniu dacă ținem cont de interesul arătat față de fortificațiile întâlnite, de cursurile de apă, de căile de comunicație de pe uscat. Formația sa îi permite să formuleze considerații pertinente asupra sistemului de

apărare existent, ba, chiar, propune în apropiere de Vaslui, loc înalt, aflat la confluența mai multor râuri și drumuri, construirea unei cetăți. De asemenea, el cunoaște aspecte din istoria recentă a celor două țări române. Schimbările de domni din scaunul țării, conferința de la Slobozia, atitudinea lui Constantin Ipsilanti din toamna anului 1806 sunt toate cuprinse în raport. Apoi, considerațiile despre sistemul politic instaurat de Poartă în țările române credem că sunt opera unei persoane care cunoaște relativ bine realitățile din acest spațiu încă înainte de efectuarea călătoriei.

De asemenea, Aubert se dovedește o persoană deschisă și directă în relațiile cu ceilalți, cu străinii. Își manifestă deschis antipatia față de turci datorită ostilității manifestate față de creștini, dar și pentru reticența lor pentru ideile novatoare. Putem să-l bănuim și de sentimente antievreiești. Oricum nu are o părere bună despre ei. Evreii sunt cei care controlează comerțul din Polonia. De asemenea, nu are deloc încredere în fortificațiile construite după planurile inginerilor evrei, care sunt în opinia sa prost concepute. În schimb, pentru țărilor române arată o oarecare compasiune datorită statutului lor în relație cu Poarta Otomană. Dominația și abuzurile turcilor i se par nedrepte și le condamnă.

În privința scopului călătoriei, Aubert nu face nici o precizare. Guilleminot, celălalt ofițer francez, în raportul redactat la finalul misiunii dezvăluie că a avut ca și țel convingerea factorilor politici otomani să încheie un armistițiu cu Rusia³⁹. Misiunea era una de maximă importanță pentru Franța, în consecință putem presupune că și delegații trimiși la Poartă erau persoane pregătite și în care se avea încredere. Călătoria din Tilsit a început în 11 iulie, unde doar cu câteva zile înainte s-a semnat tratatul secret dintre Franța și Rusia, care prevedea printre altele ca Franța să-i ofere Turciei medierea pentru restabilirea păcii cu Rusia. Călătoria a

începtut în 11 iulie, deci cu o zi înainte de-a fi ratificat tratatul de la Tilsit. Armistițiul dintre Turcia și Rusia a fost semnat la Slobozia, în urma unor discuții purtate între reprezentanții celor două puteri, între 12 și 24 august, și unde delegații francezi au jucat un rol important⁴⁰. Interesant este că Aubert n-a lăsat nici o informație în materialul de față din care să reiasă că a participat personal la discuțiile dintre cele două delegații.

Indiferent de rațiunile călătoriei căpitanului francez, raportul redactat este o sursă documentară importantă despre spațiul românesc din primii ani ai secolului al XIX-lea. El a fost conceput într-un moment în care interesele Franței pentru spațiul românesc sporesc de la o zi la alta⁴¹.

Notes:

¹ Andrei Oțetea, *Scrieri istorice alese*. Prefață de acad. David Prodan. Ediție și studiu introductiv de Florin Constantiniu și Șerban Papacostea, Cluj-Napoca, 1980, p. 69-176.

² Vlad Georgescu, *Mémoires et projets de réforme dans les Principautés roumaines, 1769–1830*, București, 1970.

³ Șerban Papacostea, *Geneza statului în Evul Mediu românesc. Studii critice*. Ediție adăugită, București, 1999, p. 240.

⁴ Pompiliu Eliade, *Influența franceză asupra spiritului public în România. Originile. Studiu asupra stării societății românești în vremea domniilor fanariote*. Ediția a II-a integrală și revăzută, București, 2000, p. 176-198; Jean Nouzille, *La diplomatie française et les Principautés au début du XIX^e siècle*, în *Revue Roumaine D'Histoire*, tome XXXVIII, N^{os} 1-4, Janvier-Décembre, București, 1999, p. 3-36.

⁵ Aubert, *Notes statistiques sur la Pologne Russe la Moldavie et la Valachie, Service historique de l'armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes*, Fond Turquie et Peninsule Illyrienne, 1 M 1629/4.

⁶ *Mémoire de l'adjudant-commandant Guillemot, sur les observations qu'il a faites et les renseignements qu'il a recueillis pendant son voyage en Turquie, Service historique de l'armée de*

Terre, Château de Vincennes, Fond Turquie et Peninsule Illyrienne, cota 1 M 1628/29, p. 1.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ Aubert, *Notes statistiques sur la Pologne Russe la Moldavie et la Valachie, Service historique de l'armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes*, Fond Turquie et Peninsule Illyrienne, p. 4.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 5.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ Alexandru Hangerli, domn al Moldovei între 7 martie și 24 iulie 1807.

¹⁷ Scarlat Calimachi, domn al Moldovei între 24 iulie 1807-1 iunie 1810.

¹⁸ Aubert, *Notes statistiques*. p. 6.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 5-6

²² *Ibidem*, p. 6.

²³ Aubert, *Notes statistiques*. p. 6.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 6-7.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ *Mémoire de l'adjudant-commandant Guillemot, sur les observations qu'il a faites et les renseignements qu'il a recueillis pendant son voyage en Turquie*, p. 24.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

⁴¹ Andrei Oțetea, *op. cit.*, p. 195-196.

Liberalism Against the Nation: A False Hypothesis of Historical Analysis

The main objective of this essay is to offer an answer to the following question: Is there a scientific ground for the theory of the historical opposition between liberalism and the nation? In order to answer this question, this essay is organised in three parts. The first part identifies the position of the nation within the classical liberal discourse; the second identifies the crucial moment of the 1950's as the precise period in which a major change in the relation between liberalism and the nation took place; the third one identifies the moment of the nation's restoration within the contemporary liberal discourse.

The main conclusion of this essay is that, except for a brief though noteworthy period (which explains the actual apparent consensus concerning the opposition between the liberal and the national theories), the nation was a fundamental component of the liberal discourse and of the liberal political practices rather than a result of an opposing political vision.

Numerous researches of political science and contemporary historiography – which one may consider as being within the overarching framework of a *scientific trend* – have formulated and consolidated the theory that the nation, as it is encapsulated within the concept of the 'nation state', was and still is a political idea which finds itself far from the liberal ideology (e.g. Holmes 1999; McMahan and McKim 1997). Moreover, such research has created the impression that there is a historical opposition between the liberal and the national political positions and, in other words, between liberalism and nationalism.¹ In this essay I will try to sketch some general arguments in order to invalidate the thesis of the conceptual incompatibility between liberal and national principles and in order to demonstrate that the theory according to which national liberalism was and still is possible is sustainable by at least as many arguments as the theory of the opposition between the nation and liberalism. The usefulness of such a demonstration is considerable, not only for researchers concerned with conceptual clarifications, but also for those who are interested in studying the relations between the ideological dimensions and the practice of politics.

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Key words:

political science,
historiography,
liberalism, nation,
democracy

In the following pages I will first show that the two conceptions –liberal and national – do belong to the same modern and democratic vision of societal organisation, as they mutually share constitutive ideational elements. Then, I will demonstrate that the thesis of an opposition between the two political concepts is based upon the exclusive consideration of only one historical period and on the extrapolation from the judgements made concerning that period to the whole existence of the two concepts. Finally, I will argue that the actual period is mainly dominated by ‘alliances’ between the two discourses, as liberal pan-Europeanism is based on a willingly established federation of national liberalisms.

On the Historical Possibility of a ‘Liberal Nation’

Taken into consideration from a civic perspective, national identity is a political component of a wider general conception of identity which contains, in a cumulative manner and in an ascendant succession, all the positive social identifications of the individuals.² The political dimension of this collective identity, which the individual participates in, is represented by the national component. Such a definition of the nation – as a collective identity – is consistent with both social theory and social practice and allows us to explain the persistence of the national structure – the only type of socio-political organisation that has demonstrated its institutionally stable vocation. Hence, in the light of this theory, the nation is an identity that was collectively assumed within the integrative perspective of the political rights and duties.³

In other words, what else is classical liberalism⁴ but the ideology that pursues the foundation of a social and of a political order based on the principles of human rights? Defined in an extensive manner, classical liberalism means precisely the political theory and practice which supports the application of the principles of the Enlightenment at the level of the state, offering in this way the fundamental elements of the modern and civic nation. By the middle of the 19th Century, the liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill explained that the national framework of identity was necessary so that the liberal order of the plurality of interests and ideas may be imposed (Mill 1946: 294-5). On the level of political practice, the historical evolution from the late 17th to the 19th Centuries showed that, despite the regional differences, liberalism not only was not opposed to the building of the European and American nations, but, in a majority of cases, found in nation building its main political reason. It is without any doubt that, for instance, in the early 19th Century, the politically conservative forces backed by all means the stability of multinational empires, whereas the liberal parties were actively involved in independent national movements.

A major objection to the arguments quoted above is that, in the form that preceded the expansion of nationalism, liberal discourse did not encapsulate the nation. The adepts of the theory of the opposition between liberalism and the nation stress the fact that early liberal discourse did not mention the nation but, on the other hand, did mention that the liberal values should be universally spread. This is seen as proof of the very contradiction between the national and the liberal options (e.g. Flathman 1989: 52-4). Moreover, the supporters of the theory of the incompatibility of liberalism and the nation hold that if liberals complied with the national principle, they did it either by

opportunism (as the national discourse could have brought the support of the sizable electoral capital of the emerging middle class), or by a less conjectural but still not naturally based necessity – to sustain the consolidation of the nation states (which implies a ‘nationalisation’ of political discourse). Even if these two argumentations do contain some elements that might be considered as being valid, they both fall into the same trap of self-contradiction: if liberalism is fundamentally for – or even opposed – to the national idea, how was it possible for liberalism to fully capture the national discourse and, furthermore, to win its essential political capital by using the national discourse in the public sphere?

The supposed ontological contradiction between nation and liberalism does not here find its supporting arguments, but on a contrary, its counter-arguments. There remains the task of discerning the place of the nation within classical liberalism. The observations presented above according to which liberalism is based on a discourse that favoured universalism are obviously correct. On the other hand, the supposed contradiction between the universal and the national principles is wrong. According to the liberal perspective, the universal values need *a political space* or a *political sphere* – in other words, a geographical, a demographical, and a cultural framework that limits the application of those values – in order to make liberalism possible. Is such a limitation opposed to the classical liberal principles? From a contemporary perspective, the contradiction between the ideal of universalism and spatial, demographic, and cultural constraints might seem obvious. But this contradiction did not represent a preoccupation for the ‘founders’ of liberalism, precisely because of the fact that the need for the ordination and the limitation of universalism perfectly corresponded to the ideal of the establishment of civic and political

relations at the communitarian level. As an implicit consequence, the modern nation is founded by the liberals as a universal political space. Hence, the national dimension of the liberal discourse is not a result of the spatial and cultural constraint, but a practical consequence of the liberal trust in the necessity of the foundation and of the development of a universal political space. The political nation appeared, then, as a universal political space *en miniature* which was in a continuous process of change, having the vocation of virtually apprehending the entire planet (Schnapper 1994: 29). The first modern nation-states, animated by liberal ideas, assumed that their political legitimacy is exportable beyond their frontiers, within the colonies; however, due to practical constraints, the application of those ideas was drastically limited (Schnapper 1994: 29-30).

An Explanation of the Monist Perspective of the Opposition Between the Liberalism and the Nation

What is the reason for the rise of an advanced convergence among numerous researchers with respect to the alleged opposition between liberalism and the nation? I argue that the main reason is the an-historical positioning of those scientists: liberalism is seen only through the prism of the advanced neo-liberalism and of the libertarianism of the second half of the 20th Century. In other words, liberalism is analysed only from the perspective of those types of liberalism that reject, in a liberalised world, any limitation of individual freedom, including the national framework, which is perceived as being such a limitation by its very existence⁵. This

relatively recent development within liberal currents has engendered a galvanisation of the intellectuals and of the politicians who have taken for granted the fact that the nation state was 'dead' for the liberals. Within this framework of discourse, the nation becomes a founding element of the reactionary establishment, whereas, apparently, the mission of liberalism has been the fight against all kinds of *Réaction*, including the nation.

The fundamental change of within the liberal discourse must be placed within the historical context of the metamorphosis of the nation state into the welfare state. This transformation led to the decay of the classical liberal discourse and to the narrowing of the traditional liberal basis within most of the European states that became Welfare States. The basis of the liberal discourse may be found in the very essence of the fight against what seemed then to be an ideological *alliance contre la nature* between the conservatives/Christian-democrats and the socialists/social-democrats, an alliance made around the project of the welfare state and joined by a majority of the 'half-liberal' forces.⁶ The identification of the nation with the redistributive state determined the counter-reaction of the radical liberals who began not only to plead for eliminating the nation from the liberal discourse, but also to attack the nation itself, based upon the assumptions that I've presented above.

Therefore, one may observe a structuring of the radical liberal discourse, under the influence of the globalisation process and, at the same time, as a consequence of the impact of the consensus concerning the Welfare State that the other parties seemed to have reached – a powerful kind of state that the liberals have always condemned. The liberal affinity towards the global dimension and, moreover, the need for political survival have determined the option in favour of the 'denationalisation' of the liberal discourse from the beginning of the 1950's. In this period of the passing to

the 'mass modernity' (Maffesoli 2000: 30-8), we may identify the pinnacle of inflection within the entire history of the liberal discourses on nation or even on the whole history of the liberal reflection on nation. The idea of the conflict between individuals and the state is the theoretical foundation of libertarianism, a current that found a deep echo mainly in the Anglo-Saxon academia, but also in some European intellectual circles (Fines 1995).

The a-historic perception of the national component of liberalism through the sole glasses of the libertarian principles, which were opposed to the nation, is the very key to understanding the structural opposition between liberalism and the nation. The echo of this thesis within the scientific community was based also on the development, within the period mentioned above, of the anti-state and anti-nation currents that became popular among the non-communist left-wing intellectuals. They thought that the 'annexation' of liberalism could have represented an *acquis* of respectfulness and a source of legitimacy, as it was joined with a multicultural, anti-racist and anti-sexist discourse. The image that was created in the literature reinforced the idea that the opposition between liberalism and the nation is fundamental and permanent, whereas in fact, this opposition is specific only to a well determined period that began in the 1950s and ended in the 1980s.

For a Contemporary Possibility of the Liberal Nation

The temporary character of the opposition between liberalism and the nation is underlined by the liberal critique on the anti-national discourse. The existence of the 'liberal nationalist'⁷ current, which may be identified in the resurgence of the right wing liberal orientation since the mid-1980s, demonstrates the very fact that the anti-national period was simply a parenthesis in the history of the liberal thought. The main expressions of the political pendant of this current – the 'liberal

conservatism' – were the radicalisation of anti-communist discourse and the acceptance of 'state capitalism' as a way of development (for instance, in Southern and Eastern Asia), which shows precisely that a new inflection that restores a rather traditional type of liberalism is being observed. According to this last form of liberalism, a nation is far from being a reactionary community that must disappear. On a contrary, the nation is the community that allows the individual to fully reach the civil and political rights and freedoms. If compared to classical liberalism, for which the nation was simply the right framework of citizen's accomplishment, national liberalism put the nation in the privileged position of being the only viable solution for the democratic societal organisation. Why? Because the nation is the sole community that is capable to federate individuals – by the fact that people communicate in a common language and build consistent relations and a prospective idea of their common existence – in a liberal and democratic political structure (Walzer in Peterson 1999: 532-56).

The nation is thus perceived as an essential means of individual emancipation from the other communities that he or she belongs to and as the only form of social organisation that is able to institutionally guarantee the democratic character of the human society. This guarantee is operated by the mechanism of checks and balances – which supports the institutional framework of the manifestation of the rights and freedoms by all the citizen-members of the nation. The political sphere – as accomplished in the national framework – becomes a democratic and a modern social linkage of the individual autonomy and relies on a contractual foundation. National liberalism preaches the protection of the nation as the unique instrument which is historically legitimated and capable of organising the public space so that respect for citizen's rights is ensured. It is

important to notice here, as Will Kymlicka does, that not only a certain nation, but all the nations that are based upon those principles are endowed by liberal nationalism with the same degree of legitimacy.⁸ According to this vision, the nation is not only 'recovered' but also fully integrated within the pantheon of liberal concepts, where it assumes a privileged place. Liberal nationalism puts forward its two dimensions and refuses to consider the nationalist component (in its large sense) as a 'necessary compromise', as, for instance, certain forms of civic nationalism do (Rizescu 2001: 1099).

What was the practical effectiveness of this national liberalism? First, national liberalism concretised itself on the political level by the return, in the 1990s, of the liberal parties to some salient political positions – the American Democratic Party, the British Liberal Democratic Party, the French Republican Party⁹, the liberal parties in the Benelux and the liberal, the civic-liberal or the liberal-democratic parties from the former communist countries. The reanimation of this type of discourse and the appropriation of the European themes within its framework (as the European citizenship is taken by the liberals not only as entirely compatible with the national citizenship, but also as an extension of it¹⁰ explains the political progress of the liberal forces at the end of the 1990's and the in beginning of the new millennium. In spite of the appearance of contradiction, the national and European political identities found their necessary coherence in contemporary liberal discourse, as this discourse is referring to the same fundamental set of values. Supported by the liberal discourse, the European identity is based on national identities, whereas the European federation – an idea that seems more and more productive – is built on the common will of the nation-states. I will not try to evaluate the chances of such a political construction; I

only stress the fact that, once more, the thesis of the incompatibility between the two types of political discourse –national and liberal – is practically invalidated.

Conclusions

Far from being two political concepts that belong to fundamentally opposed sets of values, liberalism and the nation have succeeded in finding themselves within the framework of one political theory and practice. The nation offers the optimal political framework for the *mise en oeuvre* of liberal principles, whereas liberalism is a theory that allows the constitution of the modern political nation. Except for a brief but very ‘vocal’ period, when the major trend of liberalism was the opposition to or even the fight against national discourse, it is difficult to identify the traces of any liberal opposition to the political principle of the nation. On a contrary, there is a whole series of analyses and observations that guide us towards the conclusion that we can discern the existence of a profound historical correspondence between the liberal theory and the national paradigm. If this article tended only to stress some arguments in order to invalidate the thesis of the fundamental opposition between the liberal conceptions and the national discourse, further research will have to determine, in a more precise manner, the nature of the relation that has been established between the two and to study the results of this determination in specific practical cases.

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Notes:

- ¹ This last concept must be understood in its widest meaning.
- ² Within the identity theories that belong to social psychology, 'positive identification' means the sum of the markers that correlate with the points of references, whereas negative identification means the sum of the markers that do not correlate with the points of references. (Lipiansky 1992, 2-6)
- ³ Explaining our theory of the nation as a collective identity is not the purpose of the present article. For such an explanation, see Mişcoiu 2004 (a).
- ⁴ By 'classical liberalism', I refer to the proto-liberal and to the 17th and 18th Century liberal theories that belonged to, or that were close to, the English school of thought (Manent 1997).
- ⁵ The most relevant author is Robert Nozick (Nozick 1974).
- ⁶ I refer mostly to the groups that were constituting, at that particular time, the 'social-liberal' current.
- ⁷ See Tamir 1993. I place under the same label what may seem to be two different currents – liberal nationalism and national liberalism, as, for instance, Will Kymlicka does (Kymlicka and Norman 2000).
- ⁸ "...liberal nationalists are universalistic, in the sense of according to the other nations the same rights - subject to the same limitations - which they demand for themselves. They do not try to impose their national identity on the other nations either within or outside their borders" (Kymlicka in Kymlicka and Opalski 2001 : 90).
- ⁹ A former component of the Union pour la Démocratie Française, transformed in Démocratie Libérale and now a component of the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle.
- ¹⁰ See, for instance, the discourse of Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing on the European and national dimensions of liberalism at www.lymec.org



Dialogue and love as presuppositions of learning in a multicultural world

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In this paper I will deal with some aspects of dialogue, love and multiculturalism. In the first and the second aspect I see very much important presuppositions of a multiculturalism enriching each other. If the person is not able to communicate, to love and define what goals she/he would want to achieve, the person will be not able to enrich the multicultural world! Therefore, I am pressing on the conditions and kinds of dialogue, of the art of love, and in the end, I am giving some ideas about the multiculturalism.

It is more difficult nowadays than in the past to form an synthesis of the arts and different branches of knowledge. Even in the ethics, we have a difficult time to bring over the solution of most complex things.¹ While the constituent elements of culture and ethics are on the increase, there is a decrease in the individual's capability to perceive and harmonize them, so that the picture of a „universal man/woman” has almost disappeared. Still, each man/woman has the duty to safeguard the notion of the human person as a totality in which predominate the values of intellect, will, conscience, and brother- and sisterhood, since these were established. This education

Key words:

dialogue, love, education, culture, cultural diversity, multicultural philosophy

has its source and cradle in the family where children, in an atmosphere of love, learn the true scale of values, while approved forms of culture are almost naturally assimilated by the developing minds of adolescents. Because of the boom in books and computer publications, and new techniques of cultural and social communication, there are many more opportunities favourable to the development of a universal culture in the time of globalisation and multiculturalism. All human beings should in this sense cooperate in a cultural framework and collective activity characteristic of our times to humanize and imbue them with the open spirit of tolerance. These advantages are insufficient to confer full cultural development unless they be accompanied by a deeply thought out evaluation of the meaning of culture and knowledge of the human person.

Forms of dialogue

The basic attitude of the dialogic person is fully turning to the other with body, mind, and essence. When in dialogue, people *look at* each other, *talk to* each other, not at or past each other. They do not close their eyes or look at the ceiling or floor when talking. These are signs of inner monologue. Rather they look directly at the other and speak directly to the other without evading or diluting the issue. They listen, really listen, instead of planning what they are doing to say when the other person stops talking.

Dialogue takes one of two forms – technical dialogue or genuine dialogue. Technical dialogue is the exchange of information. Usually it is an Adult-Adult transaction, crisp and uncontaminated by Parent or Child. Technical dialogue results in objective understanding. In the midst

of technical dialogue, genuine dialogue may spring into being. The process is similar to intimacy happening in the midst of an activity. Genuine dialogue may even occur during a silence, not just in the tender glances between lovers or a shared mystical silence, but also when the spell over an encapsulated person, who was spellbound in childhood, is lifted and his/her essence shines through.

The intent in genuine dialogue is to establish a living mutual relationship. This is not an intellectual activity. There are no gifted or ungifted here, only those who give themselves and those who withhold themselves. In the moment of dialogue each has in mind the other person, is “all there” with the other person, is not thinking of something or someone else, nor fantasizing that the other is different than he actually is.

Dialogic relations

In the dialogic relations a person gives of him/herself, gives of his/her essence to the situation. To give oneself does not mean to lose one's own concreteness or identity, to get lost or swallowed up in the problems, dreams, or activities of someone else. To give oneself means to extend one's concreteness and this requires: some kind of relationship between at least two people, an event they experience in common, and one person, without forfeiting his own identity – or reality – living through the common event from the standpoint of the other.

If one forfeits his/her own reality, as often happens in a coming together, the relationship is symbiotic rather than dialogic. Some people refuse to encounter others with the totality of themselves. They may allow one ego state to be expressed and close off the others. In such a

case their dialogue, whether technical or genuine, will be very limited. Like a person who is constantly Adult, constantly Parent, or constantly Child, they repress parts of their personality. In a marriage, for example, if one or both persons have a script theme of “Life is serious. We are here to work, not play,” the Child will be encapsulated and the marriage will lack a sense of fun. Or if their script for a particular Parent-Child relation, e.g., “You be the little girl/boy, and I will be the big daddy/mama,” the Adult may be shut off. This kind of scheme can be simple transformed into a relationship between the cultures!

To really live is to really meet, really encounter others in genuine dialogic relations. This is not easy. The demands are considerable. They include: mutual claims, sacrifices, promises, and risks. The claim is for complete and vital engagement with the other. The sacrifice means a letting go of other possibilities because a mutual relationship demands a kind of exclusiveness at that particular moment. The promise, which can be spoken or unspoken, binds one to the other. The risk is to be vulnerable, is to give oneself wholly to someone else... The characteristic attitude and word for this kind of relation is I-Thou, and into every individual I-Thou encounter, the Eternal Thou enters in (say believers). Yet, even in the most significant relations, people move back and forth in I-Thou and I-It attitudes. The world of everyday activities requires objective relating. However, the person who lives exclusively in the world of I-It does not really live.

The demands of a dialogic relation are difficult but they are possible because the essence is love. The life of dialogue is not one in which you have much to do with men, but one in which you really have to do with those with whom you have to do.

Spheres of dialogue

People can establish dialogic relations in any or all of the four dialogic spheres. According to Martin Buber, the *first dialogic sphere* is “from stones to stars.” Is there anyone who has not found meaning when encountering a golden sunrise or glowing sunset, a field of mustard or desert of sand, the crash of waves or the quick movement of a small stream, a storm-tossed cypress, or a weeping willow? The writer of the eighth psalm of the Bible experienced this sphere. Perhaps he walked out one night, looked up at the stars, meditated on the meaning of existence, and encountered the Eternal Thou. His words reflect the dialogue: “When I look at the heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast established; what is man that thou are mindful of him, and the son of man that thou dost care for him? Yet thou hast made him little less than God, and dost crown him with glory and honour.”

The *second dialogic sphere* is less commonly experienced. It is with animals and is known by those people who have deep down in their being a potential partnership with animals - most often persons who are by no means ‘animalistic’ by nature, but rather spiritual. In this dialogic relation a person leads an animal into his/her personal sphere. If the person is not phony, if he/she is not pretending to be interested but really is, the animal may respond from the whole of his/her being.

The *third dialogic sphere* is that of a spirit which has entered the world and can be perceived by the senses or, though hidden in the present, can unfold dialogically. The spirit is always revealed in some form. In a piece of art, a piece of practical carpentry, a tasteful dinner, or a bit of poetry, the spirit of the person creating it shows through. When I first read Martin Buber’s writings some years ago, I met Buber’s spirit through his writings. This

same encounter happens when I read or recall certain passages in the Bible. If when I read, I “listen” as though the speaker is in my presence, I cannot treat the Bible objectively. The spirit of the original speaker encounters me in dialogue. The works confront me and demand of me a response.

The *fourth dialogic sphere* is that which can exist between two or more people. The dialogue may be onesided or fully reciprocal. For example, between a student and his teacher, or a patient and his therapist it is onesided, because the focus is on the student or patient who does not have a reciprocal concern for the teacher or therapist. In this onesided relationship the teacher or therapist tries to imagine what the other person is at this very moment wishing, feeling, perceiving, thinking, and not as a detached content, but in his very reality. When this happens, the other person feels accepted, affirmed, and confirmed. If the relationship changes and the student or patient “imagines the real” of the teacher or therapist, and experiences the teacher or therapist at this level of reality, then the relationship between them may change to one of friendship. Each experiences mutual affirmation in a reciprocal dialogue.

Dialogic community

When people are in a dialogic relationship to each other they stand together as a “we”. The sense of “weness” may be a temporary experience such as may occur when a tragedy brings people together, or the “we” may be constant as in some churches, religious communities or other “institutions” where a few or many are committed to an I-Thou relation with each other and

strive daily to live their faith as a part of a holy community.

It is the sense of “we” that leads to the sense of community. Community is not just a group of individuals bundled together and perhaps moving toward one goal. No, although community may include this, it also includes a dialogic turning toward each other, a breaking through of encapsulating armor and an experiencing of each other’s worlds. Community is not a goal to be directly sought; it is a result of people having a common goal in relation to the nature of mankind, the love that was there at the beginning. Marriage (and every other relationship) is sometimes a dialogic community, sometimes not. Community is where community happens! In this sense it is necessary to mention that multiculturalism in the positive expression is there where different people with different cultures live in relatively peace and harmony.

The essence of community is love. Love is an ethical responsibility of an I for Thou. It is unconditional good will. It is wanting the best for the other without thought of return. Responsibility means responding to the claim of each moment out of the depths of being. This involves a decision to respond directly.

Decisionlessness is a failure to direct one’s inner power and therefore is the essence of evil. Decisionlessness is due to anxiety or fear in the Child ego state of not doing things perfectly. This feeling contaminates the Adult. Yet love requires an openeyed trust in the world and its people, including oneself; a trust that all is of value and redeemable, that each can turn from futile decisionlessness and take the direction toward the absolute power. The direction is the heart of a community.

The spiritual self

Dialogic relation is possible because of the spiritual self that is inherent in all people. We are God's Thou and our spiritual self is at the deepest core of our being. On a principle similar to that of a percolator coffee pot, the spiritual self bubbles up and transforms the personality. Because each ego state is useful and necessary, the core of being – which is the loving spiritual self – can permeate all ego states, the entire person, body, and mind.

If the spiritual self permeates a person's Child, that person will express positive childlike qualities such as affection, warmth, curiosity, and a playfulness. If the spiritual self permeates the Adult, a person will make decisions on the basis of facts, but also on the basis of other people's feelings and well-being, and with an awareness that many decisions need to be made to preserve the total environment rather than exploit it. If the spiritual self permeates the Parent, a person will express only those nurturing and positive caring qualities that can be found in parents and will not express Parent behaviour that is destructive to self or others. All ego states can be transformed when a person chooses to experience his or her spiritual self. Like the cup that runneth over love can first percolate throughout a person, then pour over toward others.

It is because we have a spiritual self that we can enter into I-Thou relations, and the spiritual self needs to be used or it becomes closed off and atrophied. When it is used, people act with loving kindness in spite of everything. Although it may not be possible to love everyone, it is possible to show loving-kindness to all people, especially if one is in touch with the spiritual self, which in turn is open to God.

People who hold on to old resentments or outdated fears, who wallow in a sense of guilt, who experience themselves or the world as evil or as without value, send out negative “vibrations” that pollute or destroy themselves or others. Such people have forgotten, or never knew, that in the beginning love created people – and that creation was good, otherwise we would not be. Negative feelings can be changed by conscious, deliberate, voluntary contact with your spiritual self and with the spiritual core of others. It may not be easy to get in touch with other spiritual selves if somebody has been out of touch and alienated. Yet, only the person, you, can do it, and no one can do it for you.

The first step must be a genuine desire to reach out to all the spiritual forces that can be met in the four spheres of dialogue. It may seem strange if you are accustomed to busyness, to physical achievement, and to intellectual efforts. This requires more than intelligence. It requires awareness, right here, right now. Stop now as you read... Become aware, for example, of that piece of rock nearby, the fleck of dust on the glass, the feel of sun on your skin...Do not think, do not study, do not analyze. Just let your physical environment come into your consciousness. Open all your ego states to wider influences and allow for spiritual contact with each sphere of dialogue.

The practice of physical relaxation so that even the tension in the small muscles drains away is an aid to getting in touch with the spiritual self. When lying on the floor or sitting in a comfortable place, you can turn off your intellectualizing and be open to yourself and your environment. You can sense the love that you knew in the beginning to be like a percolator within. You can allow this percolating love to send out positive vibrations of love and healing.

A second step must be a genuine desire to get in touch with all the spiritual forces within you. It may be hard to believe you have a spiritual self that is a reflection of eternal love. Yet this belief is a necessity. Continuing awareness of this core of being leads to the feeling of strength, joy, and forgiveness, and conversely allows you to express your strength, joy and forgiveness toward others as well as toward yourself. In prayer you reach toward God; in meditation God reaches toward you. Both are necessary if you are to get in touch with the spiritual self within.

During the Reformation, Martin Luther, wrote that all of life is a crossing of the Red Sea. This means that coming out of slavery is assuming responsibility for who we are and what we do. This is a life-long process that never ends. Yet love directs us to take a dialogic stand toward all of existence. This is the beginning, because when we turn and go forth to meet love, we discover love has already come to meet us – and this is our salvation. We are chosen and we can choose. All the world calls us to innumerable communions, calls us to respond out of the depths of our being, calls us because we were born to love. Each of us also calls each other to innumerable communions, calls each other to respond out of the depths of being, calls each other because were born to be and born to be loving.

Living in love

Therefore, another presupposition for the dialogue is love... Otherwise people would not be interested in the other person. To live in love is to believe in rainbows, and the promise given that mankind will not be destroyed. To live in love is to enter into dialogic encounter with other peoples and all of existence. To

live in love is to experience personal wholeness and integrity. To live in love is to trust the eternal Spirit, to listen when it speaks, to act when it calls, which is every minute of every day. To live in love is to be awestruck by the wonder of how it all is interrelated – oceans crashing on the shore, yellow mustard fields blooming after the first spring rain, wind moaning through giant pines, a dog barking loudly to protect its master, the eyes of the sick, hurt, and lonely pleading for acceptance, the innocence of an infant reaching out in trust and the tenderness of a hand responding with „I love you.”

Living in love is a life style for those who are dialogically oriented. Such people are open and vulnerable. They respond with their minds, their bodies, and their spiritual selves. Other people are important to them and so is the world in which they live. Dialogic people are self-revealing. Their essence shows through.

Martin Buber claims there are two kinds of people, image people and essence people. Image people are primarily concerned with the impression they make on others. Image people are like overly adapted children. They continually wonder what others are thinking of them. Essence people, in contrast, simply give of themselves, knowing that their basic responsibility is to respond. Their external personality boundaries are permeable, so they move in dialogic encounter with all the spheres of existence.

Encapsulated people

In contradiction of meeting beloved and open people we meet also “encapsulated people”. Living in love is difficult or impossible for encapsulated people. Such people refuse to give of themselves and refuse to let others in. Their responses to themselves and others is conditional and measured.

In many relations, one or both persons are encapsulated. They are shut off from each other because of fear, guilt, resentment, or disinterest, or because they were adapted in childhood to keep their distance. Encapsulated people may be high in achievement, but they are low in loving ability. In any kind of relationship, if the partners are encapsulated because of their childhood training or traumatic experiences, they create psychological walls which say „Stay away!”, or „Leave me alone!”, or „Do not get to close!”

In any kind of relationship, if one or both people are encapsulated because of *fear*, the fear may be realistic and the armor necessary to avoid being brutalized, physically or verbally, or the fear may be unrealistic and carry-over from childhood experiences. A little girl with a loud and abusive father is likely to experience fear later in life if her husband speaks loudly, even though he is not abusive. This fear is unrealistic and is a carry-over from the past.

In any kind of relationship, if one or both „partners” are encapsulated because of *resentment*, resentment may be justified, but being encapsulated is not. Many persons expect their spouse to be a mind reader of their needs and desires and are offended if the reading is inaccurate. Many people harbor resentments for small slights when such things would be dismissed if the relationship was vital. (The analogy to the intercultural dialogue is not far away).

In any kind of relationship, if one or both are encapsulated because of *disinterest*, they are also critical of something about the other – appearance, intelligence, personality, etc.- and perhaps have found someone else more existing. But people are not boring. Beneath the armor, the layers of phoniness, and the psychological games which are played out of habit or delusional self-protection, is the person who was born to love and for love.

Lovingness can be called forth. Psychological walls can melt away in redeeming dialogic encounters. But to pierce the armor of an encapsulated person is difficult. The psychological thickness of the external personality boundary may be so thick that it is permeable only during a crisis. It may be so thick that others, or the person him/herself, may give up trying to get through it.

Love as a basic instinct

If the primary significance of the energy of the universe is a straining toward existence, its secondary significance is a straining, almost equally as imperative, toward the greatest and the most enduring unity in the relationships of human beings, one with another, or, in other words, toward the establishment of an actual, tangible communion with other people.

There is no possibility (in a short paper) to go into detail as to all the various manifestations of this longing for unity. On the professional plane, in the world of sports, in local affairs, in matters of national importance, and even, yes, even in international and multicultural affairs, the urge toward unity and peace is one of the most fundamental in the human make-up. It culminates in intensity through the sexual and bodily instinct, that is to say, through the force of love at the level of the sense perceptions and of the emotions expressing in such an extraordinarily intense way the profound and universal need for love and for companionship which is the fundamental constituent of human nature. And there is no need, either, to underline and expand upon the subject of how this deep-seated urge toward unity is contradicted in practice, and even endangered to the point of failure, total or partial.

Formation of the “ego”

The conscious personality – let us call it the „ego” – is slow in forming because it is slow in breaking away from the emotional and instinctual mists of infancy and very early in childhood. (This is very important to know for multicultural education, because the younger the person, the better it will be to learn from others.) Its formation appears as a progressive and difficult adaption to needs that become more and more elaborate and further and further involved in relationships with others. From the Baby to the Adult of twenty-five years of age there takes place a progression from total dependence on others for life and life´s needs to total participation of these with others – or at least for everything to proceed smoothly along the lines which the study of evolution suggests, there should be this progression. In the progressive acquisition of his/her autonomy, which is his/her constitutional necessity, the thinking human being should acquire, at the same time and in the same proportion, the feeling for spontaneous self-sacrifice that would him/her to participate more and more in communion with the rest of the human race, and make her/him correspondingly less dependent upon it at all the different levels on which human life is actually lived. Without being in the least paradoxical one might say that the human being is less autonomous to the degree that he/she falls short of self-discipline for or adjustment to the community. Anyone who has a need of others to acquire a feeling of security or fulfillment shows thereby that he has retained the emotional attitude of early childhood; anyone who cannot rely on or trust in his/her own resources – we would say, try out his/her own unique personality – is in direct proportion dependent, or lacking in autonomy.

The ideal normal adult man/woman would be he/she who fully, spontaneously and positively felt the need not of others but to be with others and to be something to others. But the ideal adult man/woman does not exist. Every personality tends toward this ideal, more or less; but no one completely succeeds in attaining it precisely.

Problems of educating and learning about myself and the others

For the „educator” the most difficult undertaking undoubtedly consists in striving to form for oneself the most complete picture possible of the interior world of a person, without, naturally, projecting into one´s own interior outlook. This, however, is the supreme necessity. Since education amounts in actual fact to befriending, guiding, correcting, and coordinating the autonomy of the person, his/her initiative and his/her endeavors, so must one realize to the full all that he/she is capable of at any given moment of his/her evolution and development. Many of the educational errors arise, it would seem, from the educators and coaches demanding things from the person in the other culture without fully realizing that these are beyond their powers. Such demands can but increase to an excessive degree the unhappiness normally inevitable at each stage of development in the relation between at least two people from different regions, continents, cultures, or nations. And in the measure in which this distress is excessive, the possibility of an adaptation to ensuing situations is paralyzed, or at least partially so.

One example from the sports: An athlete at the start of his/her career does not begin by lifting a hundred

pound bar bell. Even supposing that he/she could do so, the effort would be so exhausting for such a small result that he/she would quickly give up the sport, unless he/she were so obsessed that in the violence of his/her energy he/she had to give up anyway through bringing about some accident to his/her muscular power of movement. She/he will begin with ten pound weights, and she/he will so gradually and progressively increase the power of his/her performance that he/she will hardly be aware of it him/herself when one day he/she will lift the hundred pound with ease. The comparison is quite classic.

At the extreme, this kind of educational „boosting” can lead to the growth of an attitude that wants to throw up the whole thing, the whole „coming together”, the whole „learning from other cultures” – like the athlete and the weights. It turns upon a theory that arises from confused thinking. From the fact that a certain person, in a certain actual situation, is perhaps not yet altogether capable of avoiding a certain fault, it is deduced quite falsely that he/she is not bound by objective and universal moral rules. From such a proof of failure it is then assumed that this is an indication of the standards attainable by him/her. This can be a kind of narcissism, in the sense that, to fly from a conflict and from a necessary sacrifice, one gives to a particular subjective course of behaviour a general character it does not possess. The moral ideal in treating each other from different cultures which the human rights describe, the absolute standard value of being equal according to race, gender and religion, does not depend upon individual variations from it.

A moral and intercultural education centered upon the demands of good and on the virtues in the most positive sense will permit the person not to be swallowed up in an egocentric evaluation of his/her weakness. The faults - which are inevitable – that he/she

will commit will help him/her, instead, to know his/her identity better. This is certainly so, but what is more important, they will help him/her to know, by contrast, the resources in him/herself or the problems in his/her relations with others.

(Multi-)culturalism in the public sphere

Multicultural (political) philosophy explores ways of accommodating cultural diversity fairly. Public policies often have different consequences for members of different cultural groups. For example, given the importance of language to culture, and the role of the modern state in so many aspects of life, the choice of official languages will affect different people very differently. Similar issues arise concerning the cultural content of education and the criminal law, and the choice of public holidays. To avoid policies that create unfair burdens, multicultural theory turns to abstract inquiries about such things as the relation between culture and individual wellbeing, or the relation between a person’s culture and the appropriate standards for judging them. Multiculturalism raises related questions for democratic theory also. Culture may be important to deciding on appropriate units of democratic rule and to the design of special mechanisms for representing minorities within such units. Each of these questions is made more difficult in the context of cultures that reject the demands of liberty or equality. The challenge for philosophers is to develop a principled way of thinking about these issues.

Political philosophers from Plato to Mill largely managed to ignore the question of culture. The societies in which they wrote enabled them in large part to take it for granted that the appropriate unit about which to ask

questions concerning justice or democracy was a society that shared a culture. As a result, problems of justice or democracy were seen as superimposed on a homogeneous community. Although Mill saw nation states as inevitable, he believed that members of smaller cultural groups would readily give up their inherited culture to join other, stronger nations.

Demographic and political changes throughout the twentieth century have made traditional assumptions about the relations between cultures and politics largely irrelevant to public life. Almost all of the world's countries now have substantial minorities from more than one culture. As a result, the ideals of political philosophers, whether concerning democracy, justice or membership, must be redeemed in settings very different to those for which they were first proposed.

Different states are multicultural in different ways. Belgium, Switzerland and Canada are federations of different language groups. Australia, Canada and the USA have substantial aboriginal populations. And most developed countries have large but geographically dispersed immigrant populations. Geographical concentration makes federalism and secession viable options for dealing with cultural difference. In its absence, what is needed is some way of building a political culture that does not exclude those who are different.

Theories of (multi-)cultural rights divide on a number of questions. While not all cultures are individualistic, most prominent views about multiculturalism share a root commitment to the view that culture matters because of its role in individual people's lives.

They differ, however, in their detailed accounts of how and why it matters. Three accounts are prominent. First, some have suggested that culture is largely incidental to political life. While this cosmopolitan view

does not deny that people have strong cultural attachments, it supposes that the state has no business taking up any sort of stance in relation to them. Instead the state should treat culture in the way many states treat religion, as a private matter on which the state is officially neutral. Ideally people will be able to help themselves to the resources and possibilities of all of the world's cultures. Second, some have assigned each person's own culture an important role, either as an important aspect of identity or as a precondition of that person's ability to develop autonomously. On this view, the demands of justice are the same across cultures, but among those demands is the protection of the cultural conditions essential to individuality. Third, some have claimed that politics is an essential form of cultural expression, and that institutions should be designed to allow cultures to express themselves politically.

Cosmopolitanism is in many ways an attractive ideal, but there is some reason to doubt that it provides a realistic model for organizing political life. Most of the world's people have neither the resources nor the opportunities to move readily between cultures. Perhaps as important, few have any real inclination to do so. In the light of these circumstances and the central role of the modern state in coordinating economic and other activities, states have no real alternative to adopting policies with significant cultural consequences. Official languages must be chosen and the legal framework within which people go about their affairs defined. Any response to these issues will make it easier for some cultural groups and more difficult for others.

While advocates of cosmopolitanism might doubt the long-term significance of such effects, important questions of fairness arise concerning the effects of any such choices. Multicultural liberals make fairness the starting point for their accounts of cultural policies. They insist that accommodating cultural difference is

fundamentally different from discredited policies of segregation that sought to exclude minorities. Some philosophers argue that aboriginal peoples should be given extra resources and political protection in order to enable them to maintain their cultural context. Because that context provides the background against which they are able to become autonomous, the state has a special responsibility to make sure that it is secure. Otherwise they would be unfairly deprived of something others receive free. The only way to protect that interest is to allow them to exclude outsiders from their society. In the same way, boundaries between states should be drawn in such a way as to enable as many people as possible to find themselves with a secure culture. Within self-governing areas, immigrants may be chosen with an eye to the society's cultural stability. Others have made parallel arguments emphasizing the extent to which cultural identification provides a secure anchor in a changing world.

Still, any way of drawing boundaries will leave some people as members of dispersed minorities. Some thinkers advocate integrative policies for such groups so that maintaining some of their traditional practices does not pose a barrier to successful participation in the larger society in which they find themselves. Examples of such policies include allowing religious groups special exemptions from common pause days (when most businesses tend to be closed) or providing heritage language classes for the children of immigrants. In the UK, some have advocated extending anti-blasphemy laws to non-Christian religions. On similar grounds, many liberals advocate an inclusive educational curriculum. Such policies are sometimes said to offer advantages for members of the dominant culture as well as for minorities. In the longer term, they may well lead to the disappearance of many aspects of the cultures they aim to protect. As a result, the ultimate consequence of

multicultural liberalism may well be the development of a cosmopolitan culture, in which cultural difference has a status little different from that of religion. While such a loss of diversity may be regarded as unfortunate, multicultural liberals defend their policies in terms of the interests of the current generation, and so have no commitment to diversity as such.

For multicultural liberals, cultural rights are always understood as rights that individuals have to certain cultural conditions. They are not rights that cultures have over their members. Those who wish to reject their inherited culture are always entitled to do so, however difficult they may find it. As a result, multicultural liberals insist that illiberal cultural practices are outside the bounds of toleration. While there are sometimes pragmatic and humanitarian grounds for limiting the use of force to eradicate such practices, communities that coerce dissident members are not entitled to support in so doing. Thus, everything from arranged marriages to coerced participation in religious rituals is outside the range of special protection or even toleration, however important they may be to the survival of the cultural context. Rights of exit are important for the same reasons.

Differing conceptions of property rights also complicate liberal attempts to protect minority cultures. Many aboriginal cultures (and some religious groups) have traditionally held land in common. If members wish to leave to join the surrounding society, they cannot take their share of the land with them without endangering the material basis of the culture. In such cases, there may be no way of protecting culture without sacrificing individual liberty.

Conclusion

Perhaps one of the most important virtues of being and learning in a multicultural system is dialogue, love, tolerance and knowing the own character. Our world becomes more and more international. And many people ask in this time where I come from, where should I go, and what should I ought to be? In answering these questions, we need a clear identity and an answer to the question of what it means to be part of this particular culture. Therefore, before I am able to go into an international and multicultural relationship or discussion about it, we have to consider the conditions of an atmosphere of a fair dialogue. But the first presupposition of entering a dialogue is to be interested in the other person, and a kind of love to the others. Love is at first openness for the other and being friendly in the hope of companionship, and in dedicating of oneself to the other. After this we are able to learn from the other persons and with them.

Notes:

¹ Therefore, I call my books „*Komplexe Ethik*” (first volume on „Basics”/Grundlagen, second on „politics”/Politik, Vienna 2005 and 2006, jms-printings). I would like to say thank you very much to Professor Sandu Frunza and his edited book „*The challenges of multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe*”, Cluj 2005. That book is a great resource of the main problems in our time of transition; the book gave me a lot of suggestions for writing something on the given topic.

Grupuri etnice și religioase în România - (co)incidențe în aspectele educaționale Ethnic and Religious Groups in Romania — Educational (Co)Incidences

If the access to education were conditioned only by the legislative aspects, there shouldn't show up any major differences regarding the educational level of different social categories (out of religious, ethnic or other characteristic perspective). But there are. And the present paper approaches them. Based on the official statistic information published by National Institute of Statistics, we intended to underline the existence or the absence of some connections between the educational variables (the last graduated school, level of school attended at present, illiteracy) and the religious or ethnic affiliation ones. The long term implications that derive from the presence of the educational gaps between different ethnic or religious groups may become sometimes difficult or quite impossible to predict. An appropriate example could be the recent violent riots in Paris' suburbs, from Germany or those from Chechnya, Turkey – Kurdistan, Ireland etc.

Context general

Potrivit articolului 32 din Constituția României [6] dreptul la educație este asigurat pentru toate categoriile sociale. Aspectul multicultural este reliefat și de posibilitatea minorităților naționale de a avea învățământ în limba maternă iar a grupurilor religioase de a organiza propriul învățământ confesional. Aceste aspecte multiculturale sunt întărite de legea organică¹ ce reglementează sistemul educațional [7]. Astfel articolul 4 prevede respectarea drepturilor fundamentale ale omului, al demnității și al toleranței, al schimbului liber de opinii. Articolul 5 reconfirmă faptul că apartenența la o categorie socială nu trebuie influențeze în nici un fel accesul la toate nivelurile de învățământ indiferent de naționalitate, rasă, sex apartenență religioasă sau politică. Și articolele 12 și 104 întăresc statutul nediscriminator și bazat pe lipsă de xenofobie, rasism sau șovinism. Dacă accesul la educație ar fi influențat doar de reglementările legislative nu ar trebui să apară diferențieri în ceea ce privește nivelul educațional al

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dialogue, love, education, culture, cultural diversity, multicultural philosophy

diverselor categorii sociale (fie ele structurate din punct de vedere al apartenenței religioase sau din cel al grupării etnice). Eventualele diferențieri pot fi influențate de particularități de tipul celei evidențiate în butada „crede și nu cerceta” - atât de utilizată pentru a pune la zid elementul religios în anii în care religia era considerată a fi „opiumul popoarelor”².

În cele ce urmează vom verifica dacă aceste aspecte se regăsesc în situația din realitate reflectată de datele statistice. Pentru aceasta am utilizat informații statistice culese cu ocazia ultimului recensământ. Am folosit grupări combinate între diverse variabile. Pentru a întări concluziile analizei descriptive, am testat statistic diferențele/ asocierile cu ajutorul unor indicatori/ teste uzuale în cazul variabilelor măsurate pe scalele nominale și/ sau ordinale (χ^2 , J , C , V și T)³

Ca sursă alternativă de informație am utilizat caietele statistice bazate pe anchete exhaustive relativ la sistemul educațional realizate de INS și publicate bianual.

Starea de fapt

Pentru început, semnalăm o situație existentă în țara noastră cu puține explicații credibile. Este vorba despre corelarea între variabila naționalitate (etnie) și limba maternă. Am putea presupune că cele două variabile ar trebuie să aibă aceeași distribuție. În realitate lucrurile nu stau așa. Valorile luate de testele și indicatorii statistici prezentați mai sus sunt extrem de ridicate. Acest lucru semnifică o puternică asociere.

$$17015340 * J = 2,8 * C = 0,94 * V = 0,84 * T = 0,89 *$$

Totuși, la analiza descriptivă a detaliului statistic prezentat în anexa 1, constatăm câteva paradoxuri aparente. Astfel populația care are limba maternă limba

română a fost cu aproape 337 mii persoane (aproximativ 1,5%) mai mare decât cel declarat de etnie română. Și în cazul limbii maghiare există un peste 12 mii persoane care s-au declarat de altă etnie decât cea corespunzătoare limbii materne.⁴. Cazuri în extrema cealaltă sunt în cadrul etniei rome (țigani). Mai puțin jumătate dintre cei autodeclarați de etnie rromă (țigani) vorbesc limba rromani, un semn clar de erodare a identității culturale a persoanelor de etnia respectivă.

În tabelul 1 prezentăm situația populației, pe etnii, care urmează o instituție de învățământ la recensământul din 2002. Remarcăm nivelul redus de acces al etniei rome la educația postgimnazială. Valorile (calculate ca procent din totalul celor înscriși în sistemul educațional) fiind situate în jurul cifrei de 3% atât pentru nivelul liceal cât și pentru cel profesional și de ucenici (SAM) și cu valori puțin mai mari de 0,5% pentru învățământul superior. Aceasta în ciuda asigurării unor locuri speciale pentru candidații de această etnie în învățământul postgimnazial.

În urma aplicării statisticilor au rezultat următoarele valori:

Tabel 1. Populația de 6 ani și peste, care urmează o instituție de învățământ, pe etnii

Nivel educațional	Superior de lungă durată	Superior de scurtă durată	Postliceal și magistri	Liceal	Profesional și de ucenici SAM	Gimnazial	Primar	Nedeclarată	Total
Etnia									
Români	6.977.7	793.9	8.777	66.983	7.01.88	1.771.44	8.676.76	59	3552.144
Maghiari	25905	2000	50.93	39519	1.8650	7.382.4	55002	6	215167
Rromi (țigani)	447	45	75	2747	2582	433.16	421.48	1	91361
Ucrinieni	595	56	33	1347	885	4220	3962	1	11093
Germani	1435	80	37	1666	410	24.6	1086	1	7792
Rusi									
Lipoveni	542	28	43	904	335	204.5	1291	0	5155
Turci	305	28	29	495	142	1799	1628	0	4426
Tătari	71.0	72	53	1037	188	1376	766	0	4291
Sârbi	625	31	40	664	149	843	687	0	3029
Slovaci	222	27	37	538	152	9.2	901	0	2749
Altele	4677	67	766	1691	370	7156	7077	1	11255
Total	532336	31655	58893	716401	222923	1354485	993129	69	3908482

Sursa de date: INS, 2004 [2]

$$c_{calc.}^2 = 59924^* \quad j = 0,12^* \quad C=0,12^* \quad V=0,04^*$$

$$T=0,04^*$$

Din punct de vedere al asocierii dintre cele două variabile, deși semnificativă statistic, valorile ce măsoară intensitatea dependenței înregistrează un nivel redus.

Din aceste considerente am reorganizat informația considerând pentru variabila etnie două cazuri (rromă și non-rromă) refăcând procedura de testare statistică. Informația astfel rezultată este prezentată în tabelul 2.

Tabel 2. Populația rromă și non-rromă de 6 ani și peste, ce urmează o instituție de învățământ

Nivel educațional \ Etnia	Rromi (țigani)	Altele	Total
Superior de lungă durată	447	531889	532336
Superior de scurtă durată	45	31610	31655
Postliceal și maistri	75	58308	58383
Liceal	2747	713654	716401
SAM	2552	219471	222023
Gimnazial	43346	1311140	1354486
Primar	42148	950981	993129
Nedeclarat	1	68	69
Total	91361	3817121	3908482

Sursa de date: Rearanjare a datelor primare efectuată de autori pe baza informației INS [2]

Calcululele au condus la următoarele valori ale statisticii testelor.

$$c_{calc.}^2 = 47341^* \quad j = 0,11^* \quad C=0,11^* \quad V=0,08^* \quad T=0,07^*$$

Acest nou mod de organizare a informației statistice nu a condus la creșteri ale valorilor intensității asocierii între nivelul educațional parcurs și etnie.

Pentru a verifica concluziile am utilizat și surse alternative de informație. Astfel, potrivit caietelor statistice [1] referitoare la sistemul educațional (bazate tot pe cercetări exhaustive), situația existentă în sistemul educațional la începutul anului școlar 2004-2005 era cea prezentată în tabelul 3.

Tabel 3. Populația școlară preuniversitară la începutul anului școlar 2004-2005, pe etnii

Nivel educațional \ Etnia	Prescolar	Primar	Gimnazial	Profesional și de ucenici (SAM)	Liceal	Postliceal și de maistri	Total
Români	583613	870757	938608	209139	725484	44888	3432489
Mugliară	43890	50758	54545	16222	39066	3630	208351
Rrom (țigani)	11493	38505	22425	2382	1088	9	75902
Germană	504	1045	1310	205	1117	67	4678
Ucraineană	2120	3157	3600	598	815	8	10398
Sărbă	441	511	695	109	544	15	2415
Turcă	668	1932	1548	234	837	2	5221
Tătără	250	500	525	85	410	26	1797
Alte etnii	1233	8631	7103	1518	1287	68	17320
Total	644612	975896	1030359	290623	770868	48713	3761091

Sursa de date: INS, 2005 [1]

De remarcat că pentru învățământul superior nu am dispus de structura defalcată pe etnii la nivelul dorit. Aceasta a dus la imposibilitatea comparării complete cu informația de la recensământ. Se poate constata totuși că informația statistică nu diferă semnificativ față de cea de la recensământ.

$$c_{calc.}^2 = 48328^* \quad j = 0,11^* \quad C=0,11^* \quad V=0,05^* \quad T=0,05^*$$

Și valorile indicatorilor/ coeficienților cu ajutorul cărora am studiat intensitatea asocierii păstrează concluziile deja formulate. Asocierea există (semnificativă statistic) dar intensitatea este redusă.

O altă variabilă relativ la aspectele educaționale este **ultima școală absolvită** a populației de 10 ani și peste. În anexa 2 prezentăm un tabel bidimensional al acestei variabile pe etnii cu informații culese la recensământul din 2002. Constatăm că 70% dintre rromi au cel mult studii primare (cu consecințe nefaste asupra ratei analfabetismului funcțional la această etnie). În cealaltă extremă se situează cetățenii evrei. Aproape jumătate dintre aceștia au studii superioare, peste 90% având cel puțin studii secundare.

Valorile înregistrate de indicatorii/ coeficienții calculați pentru a măsura intensitatea asocierii înregistrează niveluri semnificative statistic.

$$c_{calc}^2 = 1729963^* \quad j = 0,30^* \quad C = 0,29^* \quad V = 0,10^* \quad T = 0,08^*$$

Intensitatea legăturii este consistentă rezultând că informațiile descriptive sunt relevante din punct de vedere al evidențierii accesului și dorinței de asigurare a unui nivel educațional corespunzător.

În anexa 3 este prezentat detaliul statistic referitor la gruparea combinată a populației de 10 ani și peste în funcție de religie și ultima școală absolvită. Deși ar exista unele valori descriptive interesante (40% dintre persoanele de religie mozaică au studii superioare), în realitate variabila ultima școală absolvită are o concordanță mai puternică cu naționalitatea.

$$c_{calc}^2 = 177187 \quad j = 0.1 \quad C = 0.1 \quad V = 0.03 \quad T = 0.03$$

Din punct de vedere al valorilor luate de indicatorii/ coeficienții calculați cu această ocazie, concluzia este că această posibilă concordanță este de o mică intensitate. Având în vedere că etnia și religia sunt puternic legate, probabil că asocierea între etnie și ultima școală absolvită încearcă să se transmită și spre variabila religie.

Pentru a ne susține afirmațiile, prezentăm în anexa 4 un tabel de contingență pe baza căruia am aplicat și între variabilele etnie și religie setul de indicatori/ coeficienți

de măsurare a intensității asocierii (concordanței).

Rezultatele au fost următoarele:

$$45439864^* \quad 1.45^* \quad C = 0.82^* \quad V = 0.48^* \quad T = 0.44^*$$

Valorile coeficienților care măsoară această intensitate sunt la cote ridicate, fapt ce indică existența unui nivel ridicat de semnificație statistică.

Un aspect extrem de interesant ne este relevat de gruparea pe vârste și etnii a populației analfabete. Informațiile statistice sunt prezentate în tabelul 4.

Trei sferturi dintre analfabeți au mai mult de 40 de ani iar aproape o treime peste 75 ani. Deoarece am considerat că persoanele de 40 de ani și peste au șanse foarte mici de a depăși acest handicap am detaliat doar grupele de vârstă până în 40 ani. Probabil că, în absența unor programe guvernamentale specializate, eradicarea fenomenului pentru populația mai vârstnică de 40 de ani se va realiza pe cale biologică, prin dispariția generațiilor respective. De altfel, marea majoritate a analfabeților de peste 40 de ani se află în segmente de vârstă înaintată (peste 70 ani).

Politicile, uneori coercitive, inițiate și implementate în perioada regimului comunist se pare că au dat roade mai bune decât situația prezentă. Nivelul fenomenului pentru persoanele între 35 și 40 de ani înregistrează cifre cu aproape 50% mai mici decât cele din prezent. Aceasta fără să mai ținem cont de diferențele de flux demografic în defavoarea generațiilor tinere. O menținere a stării de fapt existență în prezent nu va duce la diminuări semnificative ale fenomenului pe termen lung. Sunt necesare politici speciale de alfabetizare a generațiilor dispuse încă la învățare și unde rata analfabetismului se menține la cote îngrijorătoare.

Tabel 4. Populația analfabetă pe vârste și etnie la recensământul din 2002

Vârsta \ Etnia	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40 și peste	Total
Români	13376	18695	17215	13680	9648	6339	206425	373379
Maghiari	1287	1953	2258	1761	1222	830	8316	17627
Rromi	10959	15741	17248	12113	8611	5902	34163	104737
Ucraineni	35	63	58	53	39	36	2745	3029
Germani	14	28	26	27	26	18	350	489
Rusi	29	28	22	19	10	11	1453	1543
Turci	884	1041	981	666	517	434	1847	6370
Tătari	22	29	15	17	17	14	404	518
Sârbi	7	7	6	10	5	4	271	307
Slovaci	5	5	5	7	6	5	293	327
Altele	49	41	54	35	20	25	443	668
Total	26609	37591	37835	26353	20098	13893	346247	508326


Sursa de date: INS, 2004 [2]

Valorile testelor de semnificație au fost în acest caz:

$$c^2_{calc} = 92671 * \quad j = 0,43 * \quad C = 0,39 * \quad V = 0,16 * \quad T = 0,15 *$$

Din punct de vedere al asocierii celor două variabile, constatăm ea este semnificativă, din punct de vedere statistic și că intensitatea acesteia substanțială.

Pentru a putea trage concluzii relevante din punct de vedere al influenței apartenenței unei grupări etnice asupra analfabetismului am eliminat variabila vârstă refăcând analiza doar pentru populația grupată pe naționalități. Informația descriptivă este prezentată în figura 1.



În ceea ce privește valorile testelor/ indicatorilor statistici, a rezultat:

$$c^2_{calc} = 744980 * \quad j = 1,21 * \quad C = 0,77 * \quad V = 0,86 * \quad T = 0,68 *$$

Se evidențiază o asociere de intensitate ridicată, semnificativă din punct de vedere statistic. Remarcăm rate foarte mari ale analfabetismului pentru anumite etnii (în jur de 20% pentru etnia rromă sau peste 10% în cazul turcilor).

Concluzii

Că există diferențieri în ceea ce privește nivelul educațional al grupurilor etnice și/ sau profesionale este un aspect de netăgăduit. De altfel din punct de vedere al educației nu contează doar o diplomă de un nivel cât mai înalt. De exemplu, faptul că nici o femeie de religie mozaică din grupa de vârstă 15-19 ani [2] nu a născut copii spre deosebire de femeile din aceeași grupă de vârstă aparținând oricărei alte denotațiuni religioase, relevă o altă fațetă a diferențierilor educaționale ale diverselor grupuri religioase.

Ar fi fost interesantă introducerea în calcul și a așa numitului alfabetism funcțional. Criteriile care departajează populația, din acest punct de vedere, ar fi pe lângă clasicele abilități de scris, citit, socotit caracteristici care să poată asigura o bună funcționare a individului în societatea complexă a zilelor noastre [8]. Aceste abilități suplimentare ar putea să se refere la: - cunoașterea unei limbi străine de circulație internațională; - permis de conducere; - abilități în utilizarea mijloacelor financiare moderne (carduri bancare). Din păcate nu există informații statistice oficiale pe baza cărora să putem analiza nivelul de alfabetizare funcțională a populației.

Pe baza informațiilor statistice oficiale prezentate pe parcursul lucrării putem desprinde ca o concluzie generală faptul că educația și accesul la educație diferă semnificativ în funcție de apartenența etnică a persoanelor. Coroborat cu faptul că între religie și naționalitate există o legătură (asociere) puternică, diferențierile observate în cazul grupurilor etnice se transmit, mai departe, spre grupurile religioase. Această legătură la mâna a doua este însă de o mai slabă intensitate (chiar dacă ea rămâne semnificativă din punct de vedere statistic).

Implicațiile pe termen lung a prezenței sau adâncirii decalajelor educaționale între diverse grupuri etnice sau religioase pot fi în unele cazuri greu previzibile dacă nu chiar imprevizibile – un exemplu în acest sens ar putea fi recentele violențe apărute în suburbiile Parisului, din Germania sau cele din Cecenia, Turcia – Kurdistan, Irlanda etc. [5].

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Note:

¹ Legea 84/ 1995 cu modificările și completările ulterioare

² Formularea îi aparține lui Karl Marx – “the sigh of the oppressed, the heart in the heartless world, the opium of the people”

³ Este vorba despre testul Hi (Chi) pătrat, coeficientul de asociere J , coeficientul C al lui Pearson, coeficientul V al lui Cramer și coeficientul T al lui Ciuprov (Tchuprov). Prezentăm, în continuare, o scurtă trecere în revistă asupra modului de calcul, a ipotezelor ce se formulează și a interpretării rezultatelor obținute.

Testul de concordanță C^2

Se formează două ipoteze:

H_0 : cele două variabile sunt independente (distribuția empirică nu diferă de cea independentă)

H_1 : există o diferență, semnificativă statistic, între distribuția teoretică (ce presupune independența) și cea empirică

Pentru a putea alege, cu un prag de semnificație α , una dintre cele două ipoteze se apelează la statistica:

$$C_{calc}^2 = \sum_{i,j} \frac{(n_{ij} - m_{ij})^2}{m_{ij}}$$

unde

$$m_{ij} = \frac{n_{i.} * n_{.j}}{n}$$

În cazul în care $C_{calc}^2 > C_{\alpha,(r-1)(p-1)}^2$ unde $C_{\alpha,(r-1)(p-1)}^2$ este valoarea tabelară corespunzătoare nivelului de semnificație α , și numărului gradelor de libertate $(r-1)(p-1)$ se alege ipoteza H_1 . Unde r și p sunt numărul de linii și, respectiv, coloane ale tabelului de contingență.

Altfel, ipoteza nulă este confirmată și asistăm la independența celor două variabile.

Coeficientul ϕ

Formula sa de calcul este:

Inconvenientul care apare (referitor la faptul că, teoretic, acest coeficient poate lua și valori supraunitare) a dus la mai multe variante de îmbunătățire a formulei de calcul.

Coeficientul C

Una dintre variantele propuse îi aparține lui Karl Pearson. Formula propusă este:

Problema este că în acest caz nu se mai atinge valoarea 1. S-a trecut, deci, în extrema cealaltă. Valoarea maximă a acestui coeficient crește, pe măsură cresc r și p . Pe de altă parte, la niște valori ale lui r și p prea mari se pierde o parte din capacitatea intuitivă de analiză a problemei. Se recomandă folosirea acestui coeficient în cazul în

care numărul de căsuțe ale tabelului de contingență este mai mare de 80-100.

Coeficientul V al lui Cramer

Cramer a găsit o variantă de îmbunătățire a modalității de calcul astfel încât să poate să fie atinsă valoarea 1. Pentru aceasta la numitor apare produsul dintre n și minimum dintre r și p . Formula de calcul este:

Coeficientul T al lui Ciuprov (Tchuprov)

Varianta propusă de acesta este:

Și în acest caz se obține aducerea valorii rezultate între 0 și 1.

⁴ Indicatorii/ coeficienții marcați cu semnul „*” indică un nivel de semnificație mai bun de 0,01 (probabilitate mai mare de 99%)

⁵ Aceasta în ciuda sincronizării eliberării de către guvernul maghiar a certificatelor de maghiar cu perioada în care a avut loc recensământul.

Anexe:

Anexa I

Populația după etnie și limba maternă la recensământul din 2002

Limba maternă \ Etnie	Română	Maghiară	Romani	Ucraineană	Germană	Rusă	Turcă	Tătară	Sârbă	Slovacă	Altele	Total
Români	19379562	13352	1000	1111	1655	477	111	27	319	212	1761	19399597
Maghiari	32070	1397906	1046	88	497	34	9	0	21	47	89	1431807
Rromi	275466	23950	235346	5	160	10	103	12	17	1	70	535140
Ucraineni	4540	149	2	56116	24	226	7	8	10	0	16	61098
Germani	11094	6413	86	17	42014	6	20	2	30	12	70	59764
Ruși	7382	25	4	12	2	28334	0	0	4	0	28	35791
Turci	4307	12	27	2	17	0	27668	25	11	0	29	32098
Tătari	2600	4	12	16	3	1	110	21171	0	6	12	23938
Sârbi	2427	72	28	13	51	0	10	3	19948	4	5	22561
Slovaci	1214	195	1	1	45	1	0	13	5	15706	45	17226
Altele	15855	1892	18	26	420	157	77	11	46	29	43426	61957
Total	19736517	1443970	237570	57407	44888	29246	28115	21272	20411	16027	45551	21680974

Sursa de date: INS, 2004 [2]

Populația de 10 ani și peste în funcție de nivelul ultimei instituții de învățământ
absoluite și etnie, la recensământul din 2002

Nivel educațional	Superior lungă durată	Superior scurtă durată	Postliceal	Liceal	Profesional și de ucenici (SAM)	Gimnazial	Primar	Fără școală	Nedeclarat	Total populație peste 10 ani
Etnie										
Români	1209502	70615	531520	3812277	2686823	4772179	3467246	374938	10253	17435383
Maghiari	58257	5919	37834	231552	230909	413182	230123	47260	663	1305699
Rromi (țigani)	621	63	426	9269	15216	94739	146291	140220	1977	408842
Ucraineni	1217	112	731	5344	6435	22063	12141	5051	42	55136
Germani	5603	340	2140	12405	8093	17312	8723	1501	72	56189
Rusi-Lipoveni	1425	75	513	5040	4565	10899	7707	2763	58	33065
Turci	1055	53	268	3567	1591	5981	6309	7930	83	26837
Tătari	1556	124	628	5644	2827	5975	4368	1027	7	22156
Sârbi	1723	111	564	4672	2783	6562	3382	527	18	21147
Slovaci	480	44	260	2279	1976	5775	4032	769	2	15619
Bulgari	664	33	264	1639	945	2109	1617	268	8	7547
Croați	126	21	54	533	799	2669	1783	207	4	6195
Greci	1208	45	242	2573	489	922	690	132	9	6206
Evrei	2352	77	224	1663	254	639	375	57	7	5648
Cehi	127	12	68	487	395	1434	960	115	31	3629
Polonezi	267	12	79	522	406	1121	680	56	2	3145
Italiani	729	48	160	1152	218	472	218	33	37	3067
Chinezi	300	5	9	864	20	713	169	41	17	2138
Armeni	563	13	77	559	71	239	145	23	1	1691
Ceangăi	22	2	17	119	206	419	239	103	0	1127
Alta etnie	5091	202	278	5096	410	2063	1147	375	102	14764
Nedeclarată	275	16	20	442	91	264	151	219	106	1586
Total	1293163	77740	576084	4107698	2965522	5367731	3898496	583615	13499	19431138

Sursa de date: INS, 2004 [2]

Anexa 4

Distribuția populației la recensământul din 2002 în funcție de etnie și religie

Etnie	Români	Maghiari	Rromi (țigani)	Ucraineni	Germani	Rusi-lipoveni	Turci și tătari	Sârbi	Alta etnie	TOTAL
Religie										
Ortodoxă	18251823	28287	438162	48262	5246	9655	825	20476	15239	19817975
Romano-Catolică	345557	587033	20310	267	36040	63	52	284	36823	1026429
Reformată	17446	665343	16385	132	1291	14	5	12	449	701077
Penticostală	276481	5697	34449	6167	496	43	11	162	956	324462
Greco-Catolică	160896	19645	6148	1721	1542	22	8	38	1536	191556
Baptistă	107405	12963	4749	252	357	44	4	238	627	126639
Adventistă de Ziua a Șaptea	78225	9055	4622	1287	277	53	9	26	116	93670
Musulmană	3310	56	805	33	26	9	54759	37	8222	67287
Unitariană	1153	64984	682	4	65	1	21	3	11	66944
Creștină după Evangheliile	39903	1810	2029	198	292	4	6	6	228	44476
Creștină de rit vechi	9775	129	628	723	12	25675	0	1056	149	38147
Evanghelică lutherană sinodo-presbiteriană	2218	15205	131	7	6358	6	5	29	3153	27112
Alta religie	105405	21600	6040	2045	7762	202	328	194	11654	155230
Total	19389597	1431807	535140	61098	59764	35791	56033	22561	79183	21680974

Sursa de date: INS, 2004 [2]

A Transcultural Reading of Television Advertising

Global television has enabled cultures across the world to meet within the virtual space and interact in terms of decoding, meaning making and appropriating messages. It is also the case of the Romanian audience, a local community of viewers who have long been exposed to highly censored and restrictive programming (under the communist regime) and who are now enabled to identify with the (western) communities they have aspired to. We intend to illustrate our case with TV advertisements, which, generally, provide abundant material for television viewers, with socio-culturally determined profiles, to re-construct meanings into either coincidental or disjunctive semantic outputs. Since the act of consumption is productive, we aim to show that in spite of the possibly conflicting readings of the poly- and multi-semantics of the ads, viewers can coalesce into interpretative communities irrespective of their cultural make and cooperate towards the production of a joint meaning. We consider that this is an illustration of transculturalism at the level of a local audience interacting with the symbolic representations of cultures elsewhere on television.

Introduction

We would like to highlight some of premises for our argument that advertising on Romanian TV can and does lend itself to transcultural reading. The TV signs¹, most visibly in advertisements, carry sometimes ‘surplus’ meanings that are not always available at surface reading. They conflate not only representations but also meanings of the second order: connotations or cultural meanings. When these cultural meanings transgress the socio-cultural coordinates of a distinct national community to meet those of another national ‘entity’, they multiply and diversify accordingly the semantic potential of the TV sign. The result might be that the subsequent readings of the sign by the different cultural subjects will not coincide, for the cultural frameworks applied differ, as expected. This is an instance of transculturation at work. To this we should add three more aspects to clarify the current television tableau for the Romanian audience, which, like audiences everywhere, can be reached by the global and local programmes through advanced technologies.

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Key words:

transculturation, local contextualization, cultural melding, ideological frameworks, encoding/decoding, postmodern television

Firstly, as has been noted by several media and communication scholars, the new technologies in communication, by which television too has been benefited, have led to a time and space contraction (McCracken, Lull, Appadurai). To be more explicit, cultures that are geographically distant from each other can now come into 'direct' contact within the virtual space. Television can mediate for the Romanian viewer a 'meeting' with 'exotic' representations, to which s/he will apply the local socio-cultural grid for interpretation.

Secondly, we have to consider the historical context of the Romanian television viewer. At the risk of oversimplifying the constituency of the Romanian audience by declaring it polarized, we will consider two discernible types: the one is the viewer who has a long-term experience almost exclusively of television under the former communist regime, and the other, the new television viewer, who is more culturally and technologically competent, a sophisticated multi-tasker, who can experience concomitantly multiple media (watch TV, listen to the radio, surf on the net, engage in chat, etc.), and who, by way of consequence, is the more TV-literate of the two. If the former has developed avidity for foreign imported production after having been deprived for so long of the 'capitalist' type of messages only to feel now saturated with the overrepresentations of the 'other', the latter has learned how to slalom between the surplus offers of programmes and channels of the new television. We must, however, give credit to both for their growing selectiveness and cultural competence when it comes to their viewing choices.

Their choice making is made all the more difficult by the literal bombardment of the proliferating programmes of the global television². The meeting of the global with the local engenders a cultural melding of which transculturation is the example we have in view.

Cultural values and products transgress national borders through the television medium and come in contact with a locality that boasts its own particulars. While some have mourned the end of cultural diversity as prefigured by the 'invasion' of the imperialist messages of television, which, it was said, would lead to the homogenization of cultures, it has been proved (Appadurai, Ang, Thomson) that the outcome is (exclusively) positive. The result of the global/local encounter is a cultural cross, rather than the cultural devouring of the one by the other, causing new forms to emerge. Out of the meeting of the domestic with the foreign, of the dominant and imperialistic ideology, which is highly mobile³, with the local, subordinate and aspirational⁴ one, which is comparatively fixed in space, hybrid forms emerge. The unfamiliar and exotic is domesticated even while it is absorbed or imprinted with local features.

Lastly, we have to take account of the exposure of audiences today to the programmes and messages of what has been labeled a postmodern television⁵. The defining characteristic of postmodern television is the openness of its messages inviting audiences to make their own meanings of it. It is a television designed for and fully aware of what has been increasingly defined as active niche audiences⁶ in contrast to passive mass consumers. Audiences can bring at the moment of decoding their own cultural predispositions to make sense of the television images and symbols. So even while the television has gone global and addresses all viewer communities with a dominant message carrying the interests of the economic and political 'aristocracy' in the world, the consumers, be they individuals or collectivities, are actively detotalizing the message and reconstituting it to gratify their own needs.

Foreign/exotic imagery in advertising

Of the multitude of advertising productions featured on Romanian TV I have chosen a series that is an eloquent case in point. The choice was motivated by the ‘actors’ in the ads performing the roles of Rastas – perhaps the prototypical outcomes of cultural mixing at work⁷ (social and racial, as well) - and for their ‘co-nationality’ with the coiner of the term transculturation⁸. So far, ‘two episodes’ have been aired of what seems to be a sequence of independent stories with slightly different plots which are variations for an identical message: Buy the new Fiat Panda. The two mini-films feature as leading characters two Rastafarians, in the first case, and in the second, four. In both cases, they seem to be far removed from their country of origin (the Caribbean/ Jamaica) and that of adoption (the UK, for most), performing in a mountainous scenery intimating a European country traversed by the Alps. In the first episode the two Rastas are riding in a Fiat Panda apparently in a prolonged joyride or drive test, get carried away with the sheer pleasure of pure driving and find themselves out of bounds and into a foreign land. They meet here a huge mountain dog with a long tangled coat resembling very much their own dreadlocks. As the dog seems to be one of their own sporting a coat that makes him the one familiar element in an otherwise alien location, one of the young men salutes him in Rasta fashion. The dog obviously makes no reply, which leads the young men to believe it is a case of mistaken identity. (*Hey, let’s go man, this no Rasta dog!*) The second episode features four young Rastas huddled in the same Fiat Panda, this time enjoying collectively an identical snowy landscape somewhere in the Alps again (most likely). The breathtaking view seems to inspire them to howl out a

Rasta salute, which will cause an avalanche. The four barely have time to leap into the car, start the engine, and roll out of danger’s way. Making a narrow escape, they stop, however, not far from the snow slide and one of them mischievously invites the others to relive the experience and celebrate the Rasta ‘power’ of stirring the unmovable majesty of the Alps. (*Let’s do this again!*). Both exclamations are in broad Creole accent, while the message of the advertisement in Romanian translates as: *For every Fiat Panda 4x4 you get 10 000 km free.*

It is obvious that what invites a transcultural reading of this advertisement is, on the one hand, the combination in the storyline of symbolic images belonging to two cultures that are geographically removed from each other: dreadlocks for the non-conformist Rasta⁹ of tropical origins and the snowy mountains for a conservative cold (in the winter) European country (Austria or Switzerland). The element that compresses space and allows the two remote coordinates to intersect is still another symbolic image, the Fiat Panda - a metonymy for Italy as car manufacturer. On the other hand, and most importantly, the advertisement addresses a fourth party: the local audience of a formerly communist country of the Eastern European bloc – the Romanian viewers. All of these details are the significant elements of a syntagm that has to be made sense of and domesticated by the local audience. The problems may arise from the fact that the syntagmatic constituents are capitalist values which have not yet been completely absorbed by a ‘national’ community that is still in a transient stage to an authentic functional market of the western type (in terms of the former East/West divide in Europe). The members of the local cultural as the intended recipients of the message are most likely to read its metaphors by selecting from the paradigmatic dimension such

associations as dictated by reminiscences of their formerly subordinated status (a satellite country of the former USSR). However, the process is not so straightforward. It is not a matter of an aspirational 'subordinated' (through its westward ideals) audience accepting indiscriminately ready-made messages as intended by the 'dominant' encoders. Rather, the audience will make its own meanings that are determined by the socio-cultural and political conjecture.

Transculturation: conflict or consensus?

The inherent polysemy of advertisements is another factor that can lead to the multiplicity of meaning-makings. Apart from their intended message, which positions readers as a target group of consumers, advertisements subsume latent meanings made possible at the moment of decoding. The meaning making of advertisements is a process whereby audiences or the individual viewer map onto them a code system that can be, at variance, in line with, opposed to, or a negotiator of the dominant code employed by the encoders¹⁰. The straightforward preferred meaning of the two Fiat Panda advertisements would be an invitation to a particular group of consumers to purchase this particular make of cars. The persuasion operates indirectly – one has to read between the lines – but also with such universal concepts and values as reliability (of the car), autonomy (the 10 000 km for free), freedom (to travel anywhere). This interpretation is also facilitated by the stereotypes employed and the images appealing to a particular segment within the audience: young nonconformist carefree young people with a sense of adventure, possessing, nevertheless, the financial means to

purchase the car. The Rasta young men are the metaphors for a non-conformist and rebellious way of life, which in turn, define the majority of young people everywhere. They also play on youth's sense of adventure and disposition to travel to distant exotic places (hence the sharp contrast of their presence in a 'cold' country as suggested by the syntagmatic reading of the snowcapped mountains, the avalanche, and the furry mountain dog). Operating with such powerful symbols, the two advertisements can easily select within the overall audience a particular socio-economic and generational segment and subject position them as prospective buyers of Fiat Pandas.

However, 'deviant' meanings can too be extracted from the combination of text, imagery and symbolism of the commercials. Media students have remarked on the possibility of aberrant decoding¹¹, where there is asymmetry between the codes of the producers and the consumers. It is the appendage of the active audience to decode the media messages as fits its disposition, taste and needs¹². It is therefore to be expected for a collective local audience to make its own meanings out of the foreign media messages¹³. The message of the imported text is further compounded by the fact that it contains constituents of multiple cultural coordinates: the Caribbean's own or their countries of adoption/emigration, the Alps presumably in Switzerland or Austria, and Italy. The Romanian viewers have thus to draw on their general knowledge, cultural competence as well as on their television literacy so as not to miss any of the references. The intricacies of the ads are further complicated by the fact that the local decoders have different socio-economic scales and employ a frame for reading different from the encoders' own. Such disjunction can lead to conflict and to a distorted interpretation of the intended message/preferred meaning.

As a general rule, a meeting of cultures entails some amount of conflict. If transculturalism exemplifies a conflictual state, it also aims at resolution¹⁴. If no truce were met, the commercials, in our case, would have failed in their original intention: persuading viewers to purchase the car advertised. Just as they leave enough leeway for audiences to give their own interpretations and reconstruct meanings on their own socio-cultural and economic coordinates, the foreign producers also make sure it is narrow enough so as to prevent any exaggerated deviance. The local readers are invited, through the use of transparent metonymy, to come midway with their interpretation. They can appropriate the message and reassign it new, yet not semantically far removed, meanings. Perhaps the resolution is facilitated by the conjunction of the two interests: of the car makers to sell and of the targeted television viewers to buy the car in question. As well, there are two metatextual elements adding up to the reciprocal 'efforts' at coincidental meaning making: a discipline on the encoders' message to aim unwaveringly at the code system of the viewers' culture. In this sense, perhaps the producers of the two ads while making allowances for the financial potential of the average Romanian also play on their unscathed thirst to journey abroad and enjoy the liberty of unrestricted travel. The Romanian viewer is thus enabled, in his capacity of consumer of the ads, to negotiate his/her individual or collective identity vis-à-vis the foreign culture(s) imagined.

Each image in the two ads, whether symbolical or concrete, can offer a multiplicity of interpretations, based on the cultural frameworks of the readers. In the case of the Romanian viewer the interpretations can be narrowed down to a set that resonates with the local idiosyncrasies. Thus the car is the objective correlative¹⁵ for an alternative present for the audience of a formerly communist country. After having been denied for so

long the liberty of choosing a western lifestyle and being currently in a painful and prolonged economic transition, the local audience cannot avoid their aspirational needs influencing their interpretations. The Fiat Panda, thus, is literally the vehicle that facilitates contact with the geography aspired to. It can take one beyond the infamous Iron Curtain, which, unfortunately, given the living standards of most of the Romanians, still exists in an economic form.

Moreover, the transcultural reading of the two commercials can lead to deeper meanings playing on their metaphorical charge. The Fiat symbolizes for the Romanian viewer the freedom to travel, a liberty s/he has been long been denied for political and ideological reasons. The conjunction of multiple cultural images in the ads suggests that there is practically no geographical barrier for a Romanian proprietor of this car in the new socio-economic and political conjecture. Perhaps the same commercials broadcast in the West would not lead to such passionate readings and would have a more neutral and narrow impact. The act of interpretation allows for cultural specificity and at this level – of contextual reference – meanings take on ideological dimensions. The act itself of consumption is productive, for the viewers appropriate the texts as they come in contact with their everyday social practices.

The possibility of multiple readings by interpretative communities or the individual viewer is also one of the defining traits of postmodern television, which is referred to as multi-accentuality¹⁶. Each individual may participate synchronically or diachronically in several cultures and embrace particular beliefs, values, attitudes, beliefs, styles, etc. Membership of (sub)cultures is fluctuating and the viewer can negotiate his/her identity across the socio-cultural communities that are themselves constantly overlapping. On the one hand, the viewers can coalesce in interpretative communities as

dictated by their communion in media tastes and needs. On the other hand, they can choose to individualize their media readings. The possibility to form allegiances¹⁷ with groups elsewhere in the world, as made possible by the circulation of the media texts of the global television¹⁸ through the new technologies, is one possible resolution to conflicting reading. So, while the polysemy of the two car commercials makes them prone to multiple decodings and asymmetrical meaning making by the representatives of different cultures, their global circulation facilitates a consensual reading by coalescing viewers in an interpretative community. Viewers everywhere can give a symmetrical reading of the commercials mediated by their identical interest in a particular make of car. Or else, they may simply intend to enjoy the preferred meaning of the ads for which reason they accept wholesale the 'recommended' system of meaning.

An additional factor that contributes to disjunctive reading is the language of the commercials. The lines of the story are in English in a broad accent reminiscent of Rasta¹⁹ talk while the message about the car purchase facilities is in Romanian. Rasta talk is rather clueless as symbolism where it concerns the Romanian viewers. Few, if any of them, have at best a vague idea about Rastafarian ideology. Presumably, the young men's hairstyles, the famed dreadlocks, will prompt some associations, if any, with the revolutionary music of Bob Marley. In the absence of a substantial cultural (linguistic) competence, the symbolic value of the Rasta talk will remain opaque to the Eastern European viewer, even while it is transparent to the members of the multicultural communities in the West. The linguistic assignation is hardly accidental. Rasta talk is used for the exclamatives and the non-conformist defying exchanges, while the matter-of-fact and marketing logo is in Romanian. Both of these contrasting dimensions

interlock in the make of the car advertised: a functional, sturdy, small vehicle that stirs, on the other hand, a young man's sense of adventure and invites them to act on impulse. Just as it conjoins references to contrasting dispositions and moods, so the car imagines a context where cultures meet to combine rather than to clash. This is a symbolic rendering of the transcultural conflict followed by consensus.

Conclusions

TV advertisements lend themselves to multi- and poly-meaning making. This potential is amplified by the new type of television: global television. Their messages become accessible to an assortment of cultures and will be subjected to a wide diversity of cultural frameworks used as grids for interpretation. If the decoding of the message can, thus, result in conflicting outputs when the input is identical, this is attributable to the work of the multiplicity of interpretative communities existing within the worldwide audience as well as to the socio-cultural make and personal/psychological needs of the individual consumer.

It can be said, then, that the commercials carried globally have the power to coalesce viewers into a group accepting the preferred/intended message. However, the reading itself is, in reality, multi-accentual, for the individual/collective decoder negotiates or even opposes the intended message. In order to facilitate a non-conflicting decoding, the producers (encoders) might have to make extra efforts when they address multiple or alien (geographically or ideologically) cultures. While ads usually rely heavily on symbolism and rich imagery, theirs should be made, perhaps, more transparent. But even so, the transcultural vectors will orient the message

in different cultural directions. The viewers, as members of different (sub)cultures, will deconstruct the message and use the separated ingredients to mix their own cultural cocktails. The cultural blending is meant not to collapse the intended message into an unidentifiable rubble, rather than to produce a hybrid sprout in celebration of a consensus reached.

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Notes:

- ¹ John Fiske speaks of the TV sign being organized and interpretable at three levels called orders of signification: first-order signs are representational, second-order signs are connotative, third order signs are to be interpreted in terms of subjective responses which are shared, to a degree, by all members of a culture - intersubjectivity.
- ² Global television, through the new media and communication technologies, makes its programmes and messages available to all viewers across the globe.
- ³ McCracken notes that the media represent the dominant ideology and encode their messages in forms that favour a decoding in line with the preferred meaning: one that is in harmony with the interests of the political and socio-economic power bloc.
- ⁴ Antonio Gramsci's concept of a hierarchy among nation states, socio-economic or cultural groups, according to which those which detain economic power try to subordinate the others.
- ⁵ Eco speaks of the neo-television in contrast to paleo-television.
- ⁶ David Morley contradicts the theory of the direct media effects (exposure to programmes can narcotize viewers and desensitize them or, contrarily, induce violence in their behaviour.
- ⁷ Rastas claim their background to be of Caribbean origins, the region where there occurred, in the 18th century and thereabouts, a turmoil caused by a racial and cultural mix to the extent to which today the inhabitants of the islands can no longer trace exactly their lineage.
- ⁸ Cuban Fernando Ortiz coined the term in 1947 to describe the natural tendency of people to resolve conflicts over time, rather than exacerbate them. In contemporary culture, transculturalism focuses on such problematics as dissonance, tension, and instability as well as on the stabilizing effects of social conjunction, communalism and organization.
- ⁹ Rasta, or the Rastafari movement of Jah people, is a religious movement that reveres Haile Selassie I, the former emperor of Ethiopia, as King of Kings, Lord of Lords and the Lion of Judah. The name Rastafari comes from Ras Täfäri, the pre-coronation name of Haile Selassie I. The movement emerged in Jamaica among working-class and peasant black people in the early 1930s, arising from an interpretation of Biblical prophecy, black social and political aspirations, and the teachings of their prophet, Jamaican black publicist and organiser Marcus Garvey. The Rastafari movement has spread throughout much of the world, largely

through immigration and interest generated by Nyahbinghi and reggae music—most notably, that of Bob Marley. By 2000, there were more than one million Rastafari worldwide. About five to ten percent of Jamaicans identify themselves as Rastafari.

¹⁰ Stuart Hall in his seminal paper about the encoding and the decoding of television messages distinguishes three types of operations by viewers: one that is in line with the dominant code, another that negotiates the meanings, and still another that decodes the message in an oppositional way.

¹¹ When the message is encoded according to a set of codes that does not coincide with the one used for decoding, the result is aberrant decoding. Eco 1972 noted that this is a frequent occurrence in the mass media.

¹² Katz et al. (1973) – uses and gratification theory. According to them the mass media fulfill five basic needs of the consumers: cognitive, affective, personal integrative, social integrative, and tension release needs.

¹³ Recent work by Katz et al. (1990) reconsiders the theory of the ‘hypodermic needle’ model of international effects whereby American (imperialist) values are injected in the hearts and minds of third world citizens. Katz remarks that audiences do not accept them wholesale but overlay their interpretative schemata onto the imperial messages.

¹⁴ Lewis makes a point of transculturalism being more than conflict but also resolution. If it deconstructs central meanings, it has something to offer as replacement.

¹⁵ Grant McCracken (1990) coined the term. It refers to the ways in which products are advertised in ways that are designed to capture emotional conditions, social circumstances, and lifestyles that have

been purposefully displaced and made distant in the ad. Commodities are made available for the consumer to regain that which was made to appear as out of reach.

¹⁶ Postmodern television is designed to appeal to different audience groups. John Bignell, the media semiotician, asserts that the codes of television are affected by the relationship between the ideological structures of the programmes and the social and cultural positions of viewers.

¹⁷ Anthony Giddens (1984) speaks of the ‘time-space’ convergence. Essentially, it refers to the bringing together of viewers and places and events that were previously distant or unknown. It enables him/her to identify with dispersed yet knowable communities and to thus join virtually regional, national or transnational collectivities.

¹⁸ Chris Barker (1997) defines global television as one which through technology, ownership, distribution and audiences operates across the boundaries of nation states and language communities. London and New York

¹⁹ Rastas believe that their original African languages were stolen from them when they were taken into captivity as part of the slave trade, and that English is an imposed colonial language. Their remedy for this situation has been the creation of a modified vocabulary and dialect, reflecting their desire to take forward language and to confront the society they call Babylon

Church-state relations in Romania: problems and perspectives of inter-denominational cooperation at the level of church-based NGOs

In this paper inter-denominational cooperation is treated as part of the church-state relation because the propensity for inter-denominational cooperation is influenced by the legislative framework that regulates church-state relations. Although inter-denominational cooperation is hard to achieve, the author argues that some policy solutions are accessible to the government to encourage churches to cooperate at the level of church-based NGOs. The model is similar in some aspects to the faith-based and community initiatives developed in the United States. The author also attempts to uncover the possible problems that arise when dealing with the potential for inter-denominational cooperation.

The relation of church and state in Romania is a very hot subject in public debates and the national media in recent years. Among the events that caused this revival of the issue are: the opposition of the Romanian Orthodox Church to public access to the communist secret police (Securitate) archives – especially the files regarding its clergymen; building of a national cathedral in Bucharest; and inter-denominational dialogue concerning the restitution of church properties (especially those of the Uniate Church, but of the Orthodox Church as well) nationalized during the communist regime. Inter-denominational relations in Romania have changed continuously since 1989, mainly due to the general influence of events like the reestablishment of the Uniate Church as a recognized church, the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1999 and the following visit of Patriarch Teoctist to the Vatican in 2002, the governmental change

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Key words:

inter-denominational cooperation, church-state relations, Romania, church-based NGOs, Orthodox Church

after 1996, which promoted bills and decisions to support the solving of property restitution issues, and the decision of the government in 2004 to recognize the right of churches involved in the problem of restitution of worship places to go to court against the Orthodox Church.

Inter-denominational cooperation in Romania exists in a few successful cases of social activities of the churches. The most successful cases are at the level of church-based NGOs. Church-based NGOs are the non-governmental organizations, part of the civil society, which were either established by churches in order to manage the social activity programs previously administered directly by the church, or developed a very close link with a specific church (or more generally, a denomination) so that one can easily consider this relation as a patronage affiliation. After 1989, churches got more involved in social problems, developing new mechanisms for pursuing these aims. Among other means, they developed NGOs that are in close relation with the church (local church, diocese, archdiocese, or metropolitan). The churches developed internal programs for sustaining their social activities: education focused on specializations like social work, strategies for attracting funds from the government or from abroad, and the “traditional” activities of attracting funds from the believers that participate frequently in activities of the church. Apart from these means of supporting their social activities, many churches in Romania receive governmental funds distributed by the State Secretariat for Sects. Based on the legislative framework that regulates denominations in Romania, we could classify the churches as historic churches (ROC, Roman Catholic, Uniate, and protestant denominations); and young or newly established churches (established in Romania especially in the twentieth century: Baptist, Pentecostal, Adventist, Jehovah’s Witnesses, etc.). A third category is

formed by religious movements that have a long tradition in Romania but are strongly ethnically based, representing a symbiosis between religion and the ethnic group (e.g. Jews and Muslims).

In this paper inter-denominational cooperation is treated as part of the church-state relation because the propensity for inter-denominational cooperation is influenced by the legislative framework that regulates church-state relations. If the legislation promotes differentiation in treatment of denominations, then the denominations that are considered by state institutions as being “of lower status” may feel discouraged from engaging in cooperation with denominations that have a higher status. This type of differentiation gives access to important resources only to the recognized denominations, thus frustrating the unrecognized denominations. As a result, cooperation across this status cleavage is achieved only with great difficulty. Throughout Romanian history, even recently, lack of inter-denominational mutual acceptance, lack of cooperation and accommodation, has permitted and even contributed to civil conflicts and intolerant policies and attitudes.

Although inter-denominational cooperation is hard to achieve, in this paper I will argue that some policy solutions are accessible to the government to encourage churches to cooperate at the level of church-based NGOs. The model is similar in some aspects to the faith-based and community initiatives developed in the United States. I will discuss the differences of these two approaches later in this paper.

In this paper I will try to uncover the possible problems that arise when dealing with the potential for inter-denominational cooperation. These problems might raise barriers to inter-denominational cooperation. The argument is based on extensive interviews with experts, high-level clergymen, and

policy-makers, on analysis of legal documents, and on two public opinion polls (a local and a panel national survey) conducted in 2004. From the range of problems underlined later in this paper I will address in detail the issue of church-based NGOs and policies linked to these organizations, which are part of the issue of inter-denominational cooperation.

Areas of inter-denominational relations

Inter-denominational relations in Romania are marked *first* of all by historic problems, manifest even before 1989. Because of space and time limits I do not intend to enter here into the details of these pre-1989 problems. Nonetheless, I want to emphasize that one of the problems of cooperation is linked to the restitution of church property, especially the property of Uniate Greek-Catholic churches that was nationalized in December 1948 by the newly established communist regime. In spite of the negotiations inside the joint Orthodox-Uniate Dialogue Committee, results are not yet visible and the two churches have not reached a mutually acceptable solution. Another important factor that has impeded inter-denominational cooperation ever since the inter-war period is the nationalistic attitude of the Romanian Orthodox Church in issues like religious representation and church-state relations (Gillet 2001). The Romanian Orthodox Church (henceforth ROC) identifies itself with the history of the Romanian people, with the creation of the Romanian national identity, and the subsequent unification into a single state. The relation between ROC and Romanian nationalism was changed after 1945, being captured and used by the communist party for its legitimation. However, the submission of church to the state (the secular power) is

considered to be conditioned by symphony between the state and the church – a “secular custom of submission towards the state” inherited from the Byzantine period and marked by an alliance between the emperor and the patriarch (Gillet 2001, 15).

According to Olivier Gillet (2001) the relationship between the church and the state during the communist period was a full continuation of the “Caesar-pope” model of symbiosis between secular and temporal power existent in the Romanian territories throughout history. The integration of the church (ROC) in the communist regime was underlined in its new theory of “social apostolate” drawn by the first Romanian orthodox patriarch under the communist regime, Justinian. This theory aimed to adapt the church to the reality of the new regime. Inspired by the soviet orthodox discourse, this theory collected a series of directives that the church should follow in the formation of its clergy (Gillet 2001, 37).

The same model was followed by the two patriarchs that followed Justinian. After 1989 ROC faced the loss of internal unity concerning the way it should relation to the state and to other denominations. However, the dominant pattern at the upper levels of ROC as concerns the issue of collaboration with the communist regime remained the same after 1989, although several high-level clergymen (like Metropolitan Nicolae Corneanu of the Banat) recognized their collaboration and presented a “*mea culpa*” soon after the revolution. ROC continued to support and promote the idea that during the communist regime all churches (including ROC) were in danger of being closed and that many high-level clergymen fought against it¹, even though critics and scholars (Gillet 2001) argue that ROC’s clergy pursued accommodation politics with the communist regime and even assisted in anti-Uniate communist policies.

The legislative complex that sets the framework of inter-denominational relations is not limited to a single law, be it the law of cults, but rather is connected to a complex legislative framework that encompasses, for example, the law on religious denominations, the law on foundations and associations, and the law on the possibility to donate to associations and foundations 1% of the income tax that every employee has to pay to the state. Taken into account that churches established their own NGOs for representing them in social problems that cannot be efficiently dealt with by a church as an institution, the legislation on associations and foundations influences the factors involved in inter-denominational relations. The legislative framework on finances influences the inter-denominational relation through the so-called “one percent” campaigns that aim to attract financial support from citizens in order to support the development of the organizations of civil society. As I will discuss in the second part of this paper, these campaigns would be an alternative (full or partial, depending on the radicalism of the proposed reform in the field of church-state relations) to the direct state subsidies given to the recognized churches.

Treating the issue of inter-denominational relations as closely related to church-state relations can also be done from the neo-corporatism perspective: the arrangements between churches and the state copy a “corporatist” framework of interaction between trade unions and the state. As a form of societal configuration, corporatism is largely viewed as a “system of interest and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associational organized interests of civil-society with the decisional structures of the state” (Schmitter 1974). Corporatism’s system of authority and interest intermediation is derived partly from Catholic social thought. From the theoretical point of view one can

distinguish between state corporatism and societal corporatism. The former puts an emphasis on a strong state in a regime based on authoritarian top-down organization. Societal corporatism, the second variant of corporatism, sometimes also labeled neo-corporatism, is based on a bottom-up relation between interest groups, state, and society, characterized by a framework of participatory interest groups (pluralism).

Societal corporatism is a means of providing social solidarity, avoiding class conflict, and discouraging individualism among masses, while at the same time providing opportunities for participation of the populace in local, regional, and functional groups. However, several factors might impede a neo-corporatist arrangement in inter-denominational and church-state relations. If the state does not involve NGOs (inclusive of churches and church-based NGOs) in social issues, stressing a total division between church and state, like in the case of France, neo-corporatism arrangements are harder to be implemented in a society. Other factors that affect societal corporatism are, as Schmitter (1974, 127) underlines: “asymmetric dependence, unauthentic and fragmented representation, weak associational loyalties, suppressed or manipulated conflict, little mutual respect among groups, no effective means of appealing to wider publics and pervasive state bureaucratic control.” Thus, churches and church-based NGOs should organize and act as fully institutionalized organizations – in accordance with Huntington’s (1999) criteria for assessing institutionalization – capable not only of aggregating interests but also of influencing their members’ behavior and of bridging differences through collaboration with other similar groups.

The second area of inter-denominational relations refers to internal, confessional-structural factors. The dogmatic differences between the churches are always an important argument against cooperation or even

dialogue. These differences have endured for centuries, and only in recent years have clear steps been taken toward reciprocal acceptance between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. Even if a dialogue is established, the differences raise important barriers to cooperation at the theological level. Thus, a different level of cooperation not necessarily involving dogmatic issues might be a better solution for accommodation. The personal preferences of the leadership and the strategies the leaders adopt towards cooperation are very important, as underlined in the interviews with leaders of the Orthodox Church.²

Negative reaction towards proselytism is another type of structural problem impeding cooperation. The “other” is perceived as a potential competitor on the “religious market”. From this point of view, believers are regarded as a commodity that the church fights to keep for itself. The strategy of strengthening its own believers in their faith and religious orientation is not what is important, but rather the strategy of impeding other “competitors” from having informational access to “your own believers”. Proselytism is currently widely regarded as being promoted in Romania.³ It is considered a negative strategy for attracting new believers, especially by the historic/traditional churches (ROC, Roman Catholic, Uniate, and protestant). The neo-protestant churches, especially the Pentecostal church, view proselytism as a strategy for recruiting believers, not necessarily a strategy for placing blame. According to leaders of the neo-protestant churches, proselytism is currently used by all the churches in Romania.⁴ These opinions of the churches in Romania should be analyzed in the context of the decline in (active) believers within the historical churches, and an increase in the number of believers in neo-protestant churches, especially after 1989. Thus, identifying a possible cause for the decline of believers’ number, historical churches also identified

the mechanisms and the competitors that use them, blaming the strategy as being unfair and immoral. Moreover, the accusations by the historical churches of proselytizing on the part of neo-protestant denominations lead to conflicts between believers and clergymen of the different denominations, many of which are mentioned in the Freedom of Religion reports of the State Department since 1998.

A *third* area is represented by the state financing of the places of worship. As part of the current arrangement of church-state relations, recognized churches are eligible to receive governmental funds not only for paying the clergy but also for renovating and building places of worship. These sources of funding could be considered as a mechanism for differentiating not only between the recognized and the not recognized denominations, but also between the dominant church (ROC) and all other churches, as the study of the association Solidarity for Freedom of Conscience, Bucharest, underlined. This study reveals a high disproportion between the funds received by ROC for building new places of worship and the funds available to the second (Roman Catholic) and third (Uniate) historical church. As concerns the taking into account of their number of believers, the 1992 and 2002 censuses show the statistics indicated on Table 1.

Cooperation is impeded by disproportionate intervention of state agencies in favor of certain churches. The same study indicated that numerous churches were built after 1989 with the help of institutions like penitentiaries (using a cheap, if not free, workforce of prisoners) and the army (a workforce as cheap as that of prisoners). These churches belong to the Orthodox Church, thus inducing the idea that the dominant church can benefit from any kind of help it wants from state institutions. In such a context, cooperation is troublesome since other churches might

feel frustrated, or the Orthodox Church might feel that it does not need to cooperate with other churches in order to achieve certain interests.

Besides the funds received for building new churches (about 2000 new worship places were built in Romania by the ROC between 1990-2004, and 1000 ROC worship places are on the way to being completed), another issue of worship places as a factor that influences inter-denominational relations is represented

	Believers at the 1992 census	Believers at the 2002 census
Orthodox Church	19,802,389	18,817,975
Catholic Church	1,161,942	1,026,429
Uniate Church	223,327	191,556
Old rite Christian church	28,141	38,147
Reformed church	804,454	701,077
Christian Evangelical Church	49,963	44,476
Evangelical Augustinian Church	39,119	8,716
Evangelical Church Synod-Presbyterian	21,221	27,112
Unitarian Church of Romania	76,708	66,944
Baptist Church	109,462	126,639
Apostolic Church of God (Pentecostal Church)	220,824	324,462
Seventh-Day Christian Adventist Church	77,546	93,670
Armenian Church	2,023	687
Jews	9,670	6,075
Muslims	55,928	67,257
Romanian Evangelical Church	Not recognized in 1992	18,178

Sources: State Department, International Religious Freedom Report; Romanian National Institute of Statistics

by the approximately 3000 Uniate, Roman Catholic, and Hungarian worship places that were nationalized by the communist regime. These places were almost all given to the ROC. After 1989, the refusal of ROC to return these places produced a situation of conflict unfavorable to inter-denominational cooperation. As table 2 reveals, there are strong financial ties between the state (executive power) and churches (primarily ROC).

The fourth area is represented by the relations between politics and the clergy. After 1989 many of the clergy had close relations to political life, whether directly, being elected in local councils, as mayors, in county councils or as MPs; or indirectly, agreeing with the usage of religious symbols like worship places and religious services by politicians, especially in electoral campaigns in order to increase their chances of being elected. Mass media reflected many cases of such

	2000	2004
Romanian Orthodox Church	11,000,000 USD	6,900,000 USD
Roman Catholic Church	650,000 USD	400,000 USD
Uniate Church	925,000 USD	127,000 USD
Reformed Church	280,000 USD	98,000 USD

“collaboration” between politics and clergy.⁵ Realizing that in the long term the image of the church will be negatively affected by such “collaborations,” the Synod of ROC decided in 2004 that no orthodox clergy would be allowed to be involved in politics. Very few clergy-politicians decided to stay in politics and accept the penalty of being forever excluded from the orthodox clergy. The relation with politics was no more successful for the clergy that aimed to use their links with politicians in order to solve problems like restitution of nationalized properties. Archbishop Pimen of Suceava and Radauti switched several times between accusing and greeting politicians that had at certain times the power to decide the restitution of forests to the Archbishopric. Archbishop Pimen has yet to reach his goal concerning this restitution.

The fifth area of analysis (civil society issues) is represented by the NGOs established by churches. Currently, there are more than 4,000 registered and active NGOs in Romania, according to the Civil Society Catalogue, published in 2000 and updated yearly by the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society. More than one third of the total number of NGOs has social protection as their declared interest and field of action. About one tenth of all NGOs have religious issues as their declared aim. Half of the religious-based NGOs (about 100) work for social protection. However, there are many social protection NGOs that have not declared any specific affiliation, but only the focus on social protection, and therefore it is difficult to find their link with a specific church, although such links exist. Some of these have developed more intensive and successful programs than have the state institutions. A few examples include, but are not limited to: Caritas, the largest NGO in Romania (from the point of view of funds, employees, and number of projects financed); Vasiliada (an Orthodox NGO); Christiana (Orthodox

NGO); Kida (Reformed NGO), Prison Fellowship Romania (interdenominational NGO).

Efficient results of the civil-society’s involvement in social protection might be reached through subsidiarity, as Charles Glenn argued. The organizations of civil society, churches and their NGOs included, can be involved in activities that public decentralization cannot cope with. In his opinion, subsidiarity has the capacity to promote changes in the nature of policies and social services (Glenn 2000). The explanation for this resides in the fact that through subsidiarity the governmental institutions attract external actors in the policy process, thus enlarging the range of factors that can influence the success of policies. Nonetheless, external institutions, especially civil society institutions, can interact more informally with the direct beneficiaries of social programs. According to Glenn, at least in the educational system, subsidiarity and larger autonomy of decision of civil society institutions brings not only more efficiency, but also related psychological benefits: people tend to be more open in their relations with non-governmental institutions than with procedure-driven and formality-based state bureaucracies. Another important argument presented by Charles Glenn is that in the case of decentralization within the institutional framework, the main actors are the same ones that worked under strict supervision of state institutions and are acquainted with the procedures of a centralized system. Putting the weight on the same actors when promoting changes in systems like social protection means that the accent is placed on the same energies, and thus reform cannot advance. If a system that is not effective is changed through decentralization the results are marked by the same inefficiency of the lower levels, which now can protect themselves from change all the better (Glenn 2000, 24). The commitment of civil society organizations can move reform ahead in the social

protection sector. Sustaining the existence of more than one solution for social protection should be a governmental goal. Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus emphasized that a greater range of particularities in the policy sector will give the possibility for people to select the one which is most appropriate for their goals (Berger and Neuhaus 1996, 206). Churches' involvement in social protection has a long tradition in Romania. They established hospitals, asylums, clinics, and orphanages that eventually became integrated into the state social protection system.

However, negative effects can be identified also as concerns the involvement of churches and church-based NGOs in the area of social protection issues, and also community issues in general. It might be possible for church-based NGOs to use their charity activities in order to promote religious beliefs and theological doctrines, even to condition their services upon certain religious beliefs. Of course, state regulations should take sides in similar situations in order to prevent such violation of rights and equality in treatment, especially when state funds are used for social services.

Churches play an important part in the process of involvement of civil society organizations in social protection activities. They can access many resources (capital, material, and human) and direct them towards social issues. As part of civil society, churches have a double mechanism of getting involved actively in this sector: directly, as institutions that coordinate small-scale material aid from their membership directed towards its needy members, and indirectly, through the NGOs that are created under their patronage. The latter is a more complex method of delivering public service, because it requires specialized staff, drafting of strategies for collecting funds, and a closer interaction with the beneficiaries.

The importance of church-based NGOs is not limited to social protection. If people with different beliefs, who do not interact on a day-to-day basis, begin to cooperate in order to solve their community's issues, they will create, unconsciously, the conditions for toleration and acceptance of other individuals' values.

An interesting model of church-state relation with influences on inter-denominational relations is represented by the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives Program (henceforth FBCI) developed and implemented in United States of America by George W. Bush since January 2001. The Office of FBCI at the White House, together with similar offices in the administration's departments, is coordinating the distribution of funds to churches across the United States for a specific purpose: support for existing church programs in social protection or for establishing new projects of this type. In 2004, the FBCI program gave to the churches more than two billion dollars from federal agencies and about 50 billion dollars from state and local governments. This financing framework does not require a church to manage the funds through an NGO, but encourages them to cooperate with other churches in similar programs. Since March 2004 the churches are encouraged to enter in partnerships with governmental agencies in order to implement their faith-based programs. Church-based NGOs do not have access to these funds. The money cannot be used for preaching or promotion of doctrine. According to the FBCI Office, since the program was established, new initiatives for delivering social services were established by the churches.⁶

However, there are many critics of FBCI Program. The Democratic Party does not support the transfer of federal funds to churches, considering this a breach of the separation of church and state as promoted by the

US Constitution.⁷ An important criticism is that the program permits discrimination based on religion when the churches hire the personnel in their faith-based programs. This critique is rejected by the White House on the grounds that it cannot impose on the churches the hiring of people with a different denominational affiliation to work in programs specific to one denomination; e.g. a Roman Catholic charity should have the right to hire only Roman Catholic people. Unfortunately, there is no legislation to regulate this issue. Another criticism raised by the Democrats is that the state is basically making a step back in the issue of its involvement in social issues and it prefers to leave the churches to tackle these difficult problems.

Map of inter-denominational cooperation

The historical experiences of inter-denominational and church-state relations have had an important externality in terms of differentiation between churches, viewed as an informal perception of “the other” recognized churches in Romania. Each church tends to perceive the other churches as competitors for believers and for resources (material, human, and other resources like the weight of trust that individuals put in the churches’ messages). The state of affairs modified after 1989. Beginning with the relative opening of the “religious market” for other denominations than the Orthodox one, the way that churches perceived their denominational competition was changing. A strong weight was given to the proselytism issue, as underlined above. When addressing their general position in society (relationship with the state, historical relationship with the population, contribution to the national formation), churches tend to be either very sensitive and oriented

toward the status-quo (especially the Romanian Orthodox Church), or to be oriented towards future relations with the state based on a zero starting point, on the total freedom of religions and total separation between church and state institutions.

Two main groups of churches, plus one other small and particular group, can be identified according to their position towards proselytism and more generally in terms of their position in society: the traditional churches and the new churches. Traditional churches are more or less the churches that have at least 100 years of activity/existence in Romania in the form of an organized denomination. The Romanian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, the Uniate Church and the Protestant Churches are the denominations that perceive themselves as being the historical-traditional churches. The Neo-Protestant churches (Baptists, Pentecostals, Seventh-Day Christian Adventist, and the Jehova’s Witnesses) are perceived by the other churches as being newcomers and thus not having “social and national roots” in Romania. The third group of churches is formed by denominations that either have a tiny number of believers, or are non-Christian denominations, thus not being perceived as a potential theological threat (the Armenian denomination, Islam, Judaism, the Old Rite Christian Church, and the Romanian Evangelical Church).⁸




Figure 1. Map of inter-denominational cooperation

Inter-denominational cooperation tends to be more present inside the same “historical group” of churches. Being considered a member of the category with the same general label increases the chances of openness for cooperation with other members of the same group. In the same time, inter-group cooperation tends to be less when considering the traditional vs. new denominational dichotomy. If a certain group of churches is considered to act as a clear competitor in the religious/theological field, then its “members” tend to be regarded as unfit for cooperation, thus affecting the general framework favorable for inter-denominational cooperation. Non-competitive groups will be accepted for cooperation mainly because they are not perceived as a threat to the status-quo. There is an exception to this: mainly because of the historical factors and individual clergy reticence toward solving the dispute between the Orthodox and the Uniate Churches, the propensity for cooperation between these two churches is low event at the level of church-based NGOs.

Public support for cooperation. Attitudes towards church-state relation and inter-denominational relations

In May 2004 I conducted an opinion poll with the help of Bogdan Voicu and the Center for Political Studies and Analysis, the Romanian Society of Political Science. The sample comprised 385 respondents with a margin of error of 5%. A national panel survey was organized in November and December 2004 in collaboration with Marina Popescu from the University of Essex, Gabriel Badescu from Babes-Bolyai University, and Grigore Pop-Eleches from Princeton University. The margin of error

of the sample was 3% with a total of 3310 respondents for the two surveys.

The results of the survey in Bucharest revealed that people consider churches as an important part of the civil society. Almost half of the respondents agreed that churches should collaborate more with NGOs than with political parties. Three quarters of the respondents believe that churches should be involved in social issues, like social protection, more that they have been until now. In the mean time, three quarters emphasized that churches should not get involved in the politics. This is only an example of the strong opinions people have concerning church-state relations. The panel study shows that 67% of respondents believe that churches should increase their cooperation with the NGOs, while 78.1% believe that the Romanian Orthodox Church should become more involved in social protection issues. At the same time, 76.1% of respondents believe that churches should cooperate in order to solve community problems and social protection issues. At the

79.9%	Panel	Trust in church	Accept neighbors with different religion	Panel	75.3%
72.8%	Bucharest				
76.1%	Panel	Churches should get involved in social issues	Individual cooperation in community problems	Panel	49.2%
75.1%	Bucharest				
67%	Panel	Churches should cooperate with NGOs	Support for cooperation between churches	Panel	61.1%
47.2%	Bucharest				
62.2%	Panel	The state should finance churches	Churches should auto-finance	Panel	30.7%
61.9%	Bucharest			Bucharest	34.2%

Tabel 3

level of propensity toward openness towards personal cooperation with individuals of other religious denomination, 49.2% of Romanians would cooperate in community problems without regarding religious differences. This is consistent with the large proportion of respondents (75.3%) that are tolerant towards people from a different religious denomination and would accept them as neighbors.

Currently, inter-denominational cooperation is the exception not the rule. Churches are involved individually in disparate social projects. There is a lack of coordination between government (central or local), churches, and other civil society organizations, for integrating services to the needs of the community in order to maximize efficiency. As concerns public opinion, there is an overwhelming general trust in the churches. 79.9% of respondents in the first wave of the panel study responded that they trust churches in general, while 72.8% of the respondents to the survey in Bucharest trust in churches. No other institution except the army has reached such high levels of trust. Furthermore, public support for interdenominational cooperation is at high levels, as the public opinion polls revealed. There is a lack of mass-media interest towards public involvement of churches in social issues – there is virtually no reflection in mass-media of successful stories (Caritas, Vasiliada, Prison Fellowship, Stavropoleos + Concordia). The churches and their NGOs are often missing a strategy to promote their programs and results.

Almost at two thirds (26%) of the respondents had a successful experience in general cooperation on issues of common interest, while the potential for future cooperation, especially on local community issues, is even higher, reaching almost 50% of the respondents. There are no statistically relevant differences in terms of propensity for cooperation at the level of different

religious groups. Thus, we might conclude that individual openness towards cooperation is not negatively influencing inter-denominational cooperation, and that the reticence at the level of the clergy might be explained not as a pressure from the laity but as a personal choice of the clergy, and/or a top-down non-cooperative influence in churches with strong hints at the level of clergy hierarchy.⁹

Current public policy on inter-denominational relations and policy alternatives to improve cooperation

The current situation concerning the place of churches in civil society is characterized by the lack of a clear legislative framework. The old law on religious denominations dates back to 1948. After 1989 many drafts of a new law were discussed by churches and officials of the State Secretariat of Religious Denominations, but, at best, a draft of the Law on Religious Freedom and the Status of Denominations will be submitted to the parliament in November of this year, as the new Secretary of Religious Denominations stated in March 2005. The draft was strongly criticized by experts and is expected to be highly debated in the parliament.¹⁰ The main criticism revolves around the fact that the law continues to differentiate between recognized and non-recognized churches, thus braking principles of freedom of association and religious ideas stated in the constitution.

Church-based NGOs currently have a great potential of being more involved in “secular issues” like social protection than they have until now. State institutions have developed partnerships with church-based NGOs in social issues, and in many cases have done so effectively.

The principal stakeholders in inter-denominational relations and cooperation at the level of church-based NGOs are:

- The churches
- The central government
- The local government
- Non church-based NGOs.

The current public policy is characterized by scarce (directed without specific aim), random (without clear grant giving rules), and biased (criticized for being directed moreover towards ROC projects) support by the state for churches' social protection projects. Although a current regulation permits citizens to give 1% of their income to NGOs, churches are not eligible to receive such funds because they are not regulated by the law of NGOs, invoked by the legislature when adopting the "1% law".¹¹ The theoretical financial potential available to NGOs by this new regulation is about 20 millions euro, while, based on similar experiences in Hungary and Slovakia, if about 25% of the people donate 1% of their income, NGOs might receive about 5 million euro, taking into account that only half of Romanians have a second job and thus are required to submit a yearly balance fiscal form to the fiscal administration.¹² Until now, churches have not expressed any concern about their exclusion from the 1% law. However, it is very probable that, after the first year of the application of this law, the churches will realize the great potential for receiving money through this program and will push the government to change the regulations in order to allow churches to compete for these funds. Alternatively, they could establish more NGOs in order to receive these donations.

Nonetheless, theoretically it would be an important increase in the churches' sources of funding, and it would support the idea of changing the current regulation concerning state funding for churches. As I

will propose below, this change might be accompanied by new regulation concerning direct funds that the government gives to churches, in the direction that part of these funds should be given in a project proposal-based criteria and involvement in social issues.

As concerns social protection, currently the large majority of social protection problems is managed only by state. As I mentioned above, NGOs, whether church-based or not, are getting involved more and more in social work projects and other activities regarding social protection. However, as proved by post-1989 experience, the government had not succeeded in tackling these social issues. Thus, it is necessary to allow for subsidiarity of social programs. Moreover, it would be more efficient to support partnership between NGOs that are involved in social issues, between churches, and between these and governmental agencies.

Alternative policies

1. Direct involvement of government with more funds on social problems, funds to be delivered to the churches according to the current regulations.

This would increase the funds given by the state to the church, but it would not change the unbalanced criteria for distributing them to the churches, thus creating new ties between the state and the church, not allowing the latter to be independent from the state. This would continue the government control of churches through financial means.

2. Interdenominational cooperation encouraged by the state maintaining the current status of regulation.

Apart from the current situation, this add-on would change very little in church-state relations.

3. Church-based community initiative programs that have access to public funding. The government delivers new criteria for distributing the money to churches by splitting these funds in two parts. The first part would be delivered proportionally, based on the number of believers as recorded by the census. The second part of the funds would be delivered to church-based NGOs that are involved in social issues, based on program projects submitted by the churches and these NGOs. A third part of the financing would be delivered by the government indirectly, allowing individuals to donate 1% to the churches.

This would probably encourage church-based NGO's to cooperate in order to attract more money and to better manage projects. Because of the scarce financial resources, it might not be sustainable. However, the government might combine this policy with a cut in the financial resources delivered to the churches under the current policy, thus balancing direct funds with funds delivered based on programs of cooperation and local development. As well, it would increase the number of NGOs and would strengthen the civil society as a whole.

4. Increase of churches' involvement in social projects with an emphasis on individual non-cooperative projects.

The government would apply the same policy as in the previous strategy, only with a change in focus.

The costs of changing the current status of inter-denominational relations and church-state relations are:

-Reorganization of the financing system. (This is possible because the system is currently changing. This would allow for new organization framework.)

-A potential competition between denominations might arise, but the competition would not become worst than it is now.

The benefits after changing the current system would be:

-Further development of the NGO sector.

-Creation of specialized and diversified social services, even in areas where the government has not succeeded in offering such services in sufficient quantities or to satisfactory standards.

-Inter-denominational cooperation at the local level through NGOs would positively influence inter-church cooperation at higher levels.

Recommendations and proposed measures to be taken:

In order to increase inter-denominational cooperation, the government should take the following measures through the State Secretariat for Sects:

1. Diversify the funding for churches, splitting the current framework in two parts:

- Direct funds on proportional basis, and
- Direct funds based on program projects of delivering social services.

These funds should partially replace the current proportional and discretionary funds that the State Secretariat for Sects delivers to the churches.

2. Encourage the public-private partnership at the level of church-based NGOs (cooperation between church-based NGOs and cooperation between government agencies and church-based NGOs).

- The State Secretariat for Sects should make public the criteria for evaluating the project proposals of the churches. Currently these criteria are not clearly defined in terms of the weight of each criterion towards the final evaluation that a proposal receives. The criterion that regards inter-denominational cooperation at the level of church-based NGOs should receive special attention, and the government should thus encourage churches to

cooperate at the level of NGOs for ad-hoc community problems such as social charity. This cooperation should not be seen as permanent and centralized, but rather as a modular cooperation on common aims and problems in which the churches and their NGOs currently become involved through individual resources.

3. Direct the churches towards the alternative source of funding of 1% regulation.

- organize information meetings at the national and regional levels to give details about the available possibilities to access the 1% financial resources.

Conclusions

In the changing environment of church-state relations in Romania, inter-denominational cooperation is still limited to a formal dialogue between high-level clergymen. Nationalism, unbalanced and not transparent funding of churches by the government, personal interests of the leadership, un-orthodox relations between politics and churches, and the slow development of NGOs related to churches and their access to governmental funds, represent several areas of factors that have influenced, often negatively, inter-denominational cooperation. Although citizens' attitudes are congruent with an increase in the involvement of churches in issues like social work, with cooperation between churches for solving community issues, and with a certain degree of toleration necessary for cooperation, inter-denominational cooperation would need the support of the state through certain regulations that change the current access to governmental funds and encourage the creation of more church-based NGOs and of modular collective action (understood here as ad-hoc cooperation between church-based NGOs for

solving common problems at the level of local community).

In order to increase inter-denominational cooperation, the government should diversify the funding of churches, splitting the current framework in two parts: direct funding on a proportional basis and direct funding based on program projects of delivering social services. With this second framework, the government has the possibility of encouraging public-private partnership at the level of church-based NGOs (inter-church-based NGO cooperation and cooperation between government agencies and church-based NGOs). A third source of funding should be accessible through the 1% regulation.

Theological factors do not favor inter-denominational cooperation: the divide between churches has proved to be very difficult to overcome using the message of tolerance based on dogmatic similarities and historical common roots. However, modular collective action, replacing centralized inter-denominational relations, may offer a feasible solution to the scarce collaborative experiences at the level of churches. Building the framework for inter-denominational cooperation at the level of church-based NGOs might lay a foundation for more tolerance in society, while the collaborative experience, under the form of ad-hoc modular collective action, could offer a solution to current community problems.

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Notes:

¹ Recently, ROC underlined the heroic attitude of Patriarch Justinian (1948-1977) and his opposition to “the oppressive, totalitarian and atheistic regime” (ROC Patriarchy press release no 158 from February 21st 2005).

² Interview of the author with Archbishop Bartolomeu Anania of Cluj, Vad, and Feleac, August 18, 2004; and with Iustin Marchis – priest at Stavropoleos Orthodox Church in Bucharest, August 16, 2004.

³ All the clergymen I interviewed emphasized that proselytising is used currently in Romania for attracting believers even from other churches. Interviews of the author with: Archbishop Bartolomeu Anania of Cluj, Vad, and Feleac, August 18, 2004; Archbishop Jakubiny Gyorgy, Roman-Catholic Archbishop of Alba Iulia, August 19, 2004; Gyero David

– Administrative advisor to the Unitarian Diocese of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca, September 8, 2004; Kato Bela

– Vicar Bishop to the Reformed Diocese of Cluj-Napoca, September 8, 2004;

Dorin Moțoc

– Orthodox Priest and Advisor for social assistance issues to the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchy, August 25, 2004; Mircea Marțian

– Greek Catholic Priest and Mass-media advisor to the Greek Catholic Diocese of Cluj and Gherla, September 7, 2004

⁴ Interviews of the author with: Mihai Suci

– Executive Director, Romanian Baptist Union, Bucharest, September 6, 2004; and John Tipei

– Rector, Theological Penthecostal Institute, Bucharest, September 6, 2004.

⁵ A few examples are: Evenimentul Zilei, June 17, 1997; Ziua, March 6, 1998; Ziua, April 12, 1998; Evenimentul Zilei, April 12, 1998; Evenimentul Zilei, April 16, 1998; Evenimentul Zilei, February 5, 1999; Ziua, December 16, 1999; Evenimentul Zilei, January 30 2001; Evenimentul Zilei, December 11, 2002; Evenimentul Zilei,

October 19, 2002; Ziua, September 1, 2004; Evenimentul Zilei, July 11, 1004.

⁶ Interview with Kathy Wills, Assistant to the President of the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives Office at the White House; November 17, 2004.

⁷ Interview with Katie Finn, Deputy Director of Outreach and Religious Issues in the Electoral Staff Washington D.C. Coordination Office of the Democratic Party presidential candidate, Sen. John Kerry; October 14, 2004.

⁸ These groups are based on perceptions expressed by religious leaders interviewed by the author in 2004 and 2005 in the International Policy Fellowship Program.

⁹ In an interview that I conducted with the clergy from various denominations, a widespread opinion was that one of the most influential factors for non-cooperative inter-denominational relations is the clergy themselves. Clergy often behave as if inter-denominational relations offer only a win-lose situation.

¹⁰ Gabriel Andreescu “Spre crearea unui stat ortodox roman?” March 2004, www.humanism.ro.

¹¹ For details concerning the 1% regulation see www.unulasuta.ro. For a detailed comparative legislative framework in Eastern Europe see www.onepercent.hu

¹² www.unulasuta.ro



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Cultural Policy in Romania: Justifications, Values and Constraints. A Philosophical Approach*

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This study proposes a philosophical analysis of the public discourse that accompanies the cultural policy in Romania: justifications and finalities of State intervention in the cultural field, as well as representations of the roles that the public authorities attribute to culture/art. The objective is to bring into light the philosophical, political and aesthetical values that found and legitimise the cultural policies and shape the relationship between State and artists/art. It is basically about understanding the nature of representations on culture and art that underlie the State intervention in the cultural field and, consequently, to determinate the ethos of the cultural policy in post-communist Romania and to expose the constraints that are still limiting its exercise.

The transformations that took place in Romania in the process of transition from a centralized economy to a market-oriented economy and the approaching of its accession in the European Union bring into attention, here also, the topics of principles, finalities and modalities of the cultural policy, as well as of its impact on structuring and functioning of the art world. In the western countries, where, already in the 1960s, strategies of public support for arts and artists were put into practice by the Welfare State, there is an abundant yet diverse scientific literature – coming from various discourses like philosophy, sociology and economy of culture – on the public policies and particularly on the State interventionism in the cultural or artistic fields. In post-communist Romania, where a long-term cultural strategy was formulated only in 1997, those who got involved in a debate, often ignored by academics, were mainly cultural administrators, experts and animators of

Key words:

Romanian cultural policy, arts policy, culture definitions, art definitions, State interventionism.

NGOs. Thus, the theoretical corpus regarding the Romanian cultural policy primarily comprises *strategies and policies* realized by the staff of the Ministry of Culture (1997-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-2008) or by foreign experts in the framework of the PHARE-RO9709 program *Cultural Dimension of Democracy* (1997-2000), and *evaluation reports* by Romanian and European Council experts in the framework of the European program of national cultural policy reviews (1999), which were gathered in a compendium entitled *Cultural Policies in Europe: A Compendium of Basic Facts and Trends* (2003). Secondly, the theoretical corpus consists of interventions at seminars and workshops organized during various European and national programs – such as *Mosaic* (1998-2000) initiated by the European Council, *Policies for Culture*, launched in 2000 by the European Cultural Foundation and the ECUMEST Association, and *Culture Forum*, initiated in 2000 by the Romanian Presidency and continued in 2002 under the title *National Cultural Forum* – or initiated by alternative artistic institutions (the International Centre for Contemporary Art-CIAC, the Contemporary Art Archive-aac etc.) The applied analyses of cultural practices and consumption, able to found the cultural policy, had been missing for a long time, with the exception of several researches initiated or realized by IMAS (1999), the Concept Foundation (2000) and ARCULT (2002), while the academic research of cultural policies has only recently drawn attention thanks to the initiatives of the *Policies for Culture* program that put into play the comparative analysis of regional cultural policies and their evaluation in terms of cultural management¹. As far as the problem of the relationships between public authorities and “artistic scene” and its role in the framework of a cultural policy is concerned, the approaches are often fragmentary and limited to random articles in art and cultural magazines

(*Arta, Artelier, Balkon/Idea*, the Cultural Policies supplements of the *22 magazine, Dilema, Observatorul cultural, Cuvântul*, etc.), while the interdisciplinary enterprises aiming at joining art theory and history with sociology or political sciences are either rare (e.g. Magda Cârnci, *Artele Plastice în România 1945-1989*, Meridiane, 2000) or they do not directly question the principles and justifications of the many modalities of public support for visual arts or their impact on the art world and particularly on the status of the artists. Furthermore, the theoretical enterprises regarding public policies theory and practice (Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Sorin Ioniță, eds., *Politici publice. Teorie și practica*, Polirom, 2002) have, till now, ignored the field of culture and arts.

Therefore, the involvement of the academics in the actual debate concerning public policies is necessary and philosophers should take on the task to reflect on the problems generated by the State’s interventions in the field of culture and artistic creation. These problems have to be rigorously approached in terms of cultural/arts policies, but accordingly to the exigencies of the philosophical reflection and not only in the experts and cultural managers’ technical language – which tends to eliminate any reflection regarding values, seen as “ideological”. Therefore, our analysis will focus not only on the strength or weakness of cultural/arts policies but also on their founding values and legitimising conditions, their dilemmas and contradictions. A *philosophical approach* supposes the interrogation of “certitudes”, a critical reflection on what seems to be beyond any question, as the justification of State intervention in the field of culture or the futility of defining the operating concepts of any cultural policy – “culture”, “art”, “artist”, “creation” etc. For sure, neither the justification of State intervention nor the definitions of these concepts are self-evident or innocent, as the

coherence as well as the legitimacy of a cultural policy are depending on the relationships between the justifications and institutional mechanisms or financial means at issue, and on the meaning (explicitly or implicitly) associated to these founding concepts.

From this perspective, the major questions that arise regard the arguments that justify the State intervention in cultural field: the arguments expressed in terms of national interest and prestige, of socio-economic benefits or of correcting the market “inequities” are they legitimate and sufficient in order to justify the State intervention in the (autonomous) field of culture or is it necessary to appeal to other justifications? Is the “market failure” an useful concept for understanding and explaining the cultural policies and the high degree of governmental intervention in the artistic field? Can public authorities play a (legitimate) role in the process of defining art, the artist and the artistic quality?

In order to respond, we will conduct an *analysis of public discourse*: justifications, finalities of the State intervention in the cultural field, formulated by public authorities or cultural administrators in discourses, debates, strategies and reports of the Ministry of Culture (and Religious Affaires) during the governments 1997-2000, 2001-2004 and that started in 2005 (for the corpus of cultural policy, see the *Bibliography-Sources*.) In other words, we will focus on the *cultural policy* (term employed in the singular form), defined after the French sociologist Philippe Urfalino as “an alliance [*mise en cohérence*] successful, that is socially accepted, of a representation of the role that the State confers to art in order to consolidate or to transform the society, and a set of public measures” proposed for that purpose – and whose main component is of ideological nature². Starting from the idea that the “cultural policy” (as defined) is inseparable from certain values and open to conceptual invention, our approach will try to bring into

light the philosophical, political and aesthetical values that found/legitimise it and shape the relationships between State and artists. It is basically about understanding on what type of conceptions on culture and art is the State intervention in the artistic field grounded and, thus, to determine the ethos of the Romanian cultural policy and to expose the constraints that are still limiting its exercise.

1. Justifications and finalities of the State’s intervention in the cultural field.

Our analysis firstly concerns the nature of the arguments used by the State in order to justify its intervention in the cultural field, in other words the answer to the question *why* must culture or artistic creation be an issue of public support: in the name of the national interest or prestige, because of the social and economic benefits that culture can provide, in order to correct the “inequities” of the market or to insure the existence of an autonomous cultural and artistic life? Public authorities do not always explicitly formulate these justifications but they can be deduced from, or depend on the expected *results* or effects of the public aid. Differently put, they depend on the *functions* the State tends to prescribe to culture and art. Furthermore, these expectations become the referential system when evaluating the cultural act and the public action that had supported it.

1.1. A grandiloquent justification: the national interest and prestige.

The ultimate purpose of the public involvement in the cultural field, as revealed by the *langue de bois* of the official discourses and reports, would be “promoting art and culture”, with the international extension of “promoting Romanian cultural and artistic values worldwide”. Such a general discursive formula leaves open the problem of the finality of the public support for culture, that is the problem of roles attributed by the public authorities to culture. Compared with the prior period, we obviously witness, after 1989, a transformation or “normalization” of the mission of culture, which liberates itself from the strongly propagandistic task of being an ideological instrument used to shape “the new man” of the communist era and to construct “the multilateral developed socialist society”. This does not mean that public authorities renounce to expect some results in exchange of financing art and culture, as new functions are now assigned to them, reflecting this time “a new vision of the art and culture’s role in constructing the consumption society”³.

In terms of importance, the first fundamental role assigned to culture is the *identarian* one – “to promote the identity of the society” –, as it is mentioned in a *Common Statement* of the Ministry of Culture and the main unions of cultural creators, released at the closure of the “National Alliance of the Creators’ Unions” (ANUC) annual symposium in November 1998⁴. Viewing culture primordially as “carrier and generator of identity” is a position once more reinforced – under the form of the *national* identity – in the presidential discourse of Ion Iliescu at the National Cultural Forum “The Romanian Culture’s Status and Perspectives at the

Beginning of a New Millennium” (June 2002), which was aiming at defining a national strategy regarding culture as a synthesis of the previous debates within the regional cultural forums: “Culture, as part of our national being, is meant to assert our national identity within the globalized world of the future”⁵. Therefore, the intervention of the Romanian State in supporting culture is mainly founded on a justification formulated in terms of *national interest* – supporting artists, creators as “guarantors of the national cultural identity” – and *prestige*, which is presumably attainable (at international scale) by “Romania’s participation in the international cultural dialogue”, by the “worldwide dignified affirmation” and “imposing the Romanian culture on the international stage”⁶.

Despite the apparent generosity, such a grandiloquent justification in terms of national interest and prestige generates a serious problem, that is the *evaluation*: the results of a policy tending to “promote art and culture” in order to “guaranteeing the national cultural identity” are extremely difficult if not impossible to quantify (quality or quantity? success or failure?), leaving a broad space for arbitrary in the public action: not having to concern themselves with any measurable or accountable effects of their policies, the public authorities are in a position that enables them to manage resources at their will. On the other hand, at the international scale, the actual effects of an imperial type of cultural policy like the one of “imposing (Romanian) culture on the international scene” depend on the allocated resources – there can be visible results where massive institutional and financial resources are involved (the example of France, but there is no lack of surprises here also) –, as well as on the acknowledged capacity of the State institutions to provide cultural legitimacy⁷. Or, both the infinitesimal resources put up by the Romanian

State on this purpose, and the decisional arbitrariness or the lack of transparency with which the former had been administered, cannot else but condemn the public action founded on the national prestige argument and the cultural acts subsumed under this purpose to a limited public impact and irrelevance from the cultural point of view⁸.

Unassuming an exhaustive evaluation of the policy of promoting Romanian culture abroad, even a sketchy analysis of the founding discourse and the review of the cultural actions developed in this aim in the last years can offer us a good suggestion about the character of this policy and about the efficiency of the actions under the sign of “promoting culture and art” in the name of national prestige or interest. The manner in which the public discourse and the 2001 to 2004 reports of The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs underline the “promotion of the *image* of Romanian art abroad” [a.e.] and the “art’s festive stakes”⁹, bears witness to the submission of the cultural policy to a rhetoric whose main target is the cultural image. It also exposes its *festive-glorifying, official* character, both through the nature of the cultural supply submissive to the diplomatic rigours rather than to the artistic excellence and through its addressees: the favourite events are “The Days of Romanian Culture”, “The Year of Romania”, “centenarians” or celebrations of scholars and artists, all these under the ministry or presidential patronage, profiting by the presence of the official representatives of the Ministry or of the President of Romania, while the audience is frequently limited to the diplomatic community or Romanian communities, ignoring the large cultural public in those countries; in the mean time, the displaying places are not recognized cultural spaces, but our own (the embassy or Romanian cultural centres headquarters) and those of some official

governmental or international institutions (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, European Council in Strasbourg, European Parliament in Brussels, The Nations Palace in Geneva, etc.) Some examples of actions of promoting Romanian culture are fairly relevant. In 2002, “the most important cultural events” in Germany had been, according to the MCC report, “The Days of Romanian Culture in Bavaria” and “The Festival of the Danube Countries” where “The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs had a remarkable presence” through a delegation which consisted in “craftsmen, Info stand, traditional dishes and shows of *Masca* theatre” under the management of a State secretary. The “Romanian Cultural Year in Sweden”, intended to be “one of the most complex actions of The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs”, finalized in February 2003 through an “itinerant tour” considered to be “one of the most appreciated actions of promoting Romania by the State”. Let us consider: “The tour consisted in the official trip of a delegation of artists to Sweden which sustained jazz concerts with folk influences in every Romanian cultural centre or embassy in the western countries the caravan had crossed. In the same time there have been offered CD-s with *Eminescu, Brancusi* and *UNESCO*, books, albums, etc. for the Romanian Diaspora. The action culminated [...] with the concert in Geneva, at the UN Palace in the presence of the President of Romania, Mr. Ion Iliescu”. The Project “Romanian Cultural Year in Great Britain” scheduled for 2004, includes as priority, besides a Brancusi exhibition at Tate Modern Gallery (actually organized by the English!), and a painting exhibition (Victor Brauner), sales exhibitions of contemporary vernacular creation, of naïve art, presentations of wines and traditional dishes, folk music shows and fiddlers bands¹⁰. Otherwise, the international presence of Romanian creators “from the craftsman and

folklore singer to [...] famous fine artists” had been programmatically assumed in the official discourse of the minister of culture and religious affairs in the period 2001-2004. All external cultural manifestations like “The Year of Romania” or “The Days of Romanian Culture” in that period lay under the sign of a celebrative patrimonial saga, voluntarily exhaustive but extremely composite, so that the modern or contemporary art exhibitions (group or “centenarian” – Ion Irimescu, Alexandru Ciucurencu, Victor Brauner, etc.) in the Romanian cultural centres or other places more or less known coexist with those of archaeology, history, folk art and handicraft, technical heritage, etc.¹¹

This frenzy of commemoration and celebration which characterizes the cultural policy of Romania not only abroad, but also inside the country, shows that it was intended to be “a machine producing consensus”, i.e. “national culture”, in a country in double search (national and international) of identity¹². But, in fact, as remarked in the ICR case, the cultural supply and, implicitly, “the national identity” proposed as such have been marked by a lack of equilibrium between the traditional-particularistic and modern-synchronic forms of Romanian culture, in the latter’s detriment. On the other hand, the emphatic presence at the “remarkable events” of The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs – which had mostly acted not as a mediator, but as a direct producer of culture -, transformed “the promotion of Romanian art and culture abroad” into an approach of status or self-representation, in other words, into a status earning activity of the cultural administrators, rather than of the culture representatives or of the artists themselves.

1.2. A pragmatic justification: the socio-economic benefits of culture funding.

Another role attributed to culture, subsequent to the identarian one from a chronological point of view as well as from the point of view of its importance, is that of an *instrument* or *parameter of economic and social development*. After 1996, when Romania entered the European Council program of national cultural policies reviews and, then, started the negotiations for accessing the European Union, a (new) European perspective is imposed into the public discourse, according to which “culture is to be regarded not as a consumer of funds, but as a generator of economic sustainable development and social cohesion”¹³. Accordingly, *The Status of Art Creators and Performing Artists in Romania* adopted in 1998, combining the language of the “golden age” with the new jargon of the informational era, recognizes the role of culture in “the processes of social transformation” and assumes “the key role of contemporary artistic creation in the construction of the informational society”¹⁴. This new perspective was nationally consecrated through the *Cultural Strategy* initiated within the framework of a European Union program (PHARE-RO 9709-01) and finalized in 2000 that regarded culture as part of the market-oriented economy. It was also embraced – at a discursive level –, at the National Cultural Forum “The Status and Perspectives of Romanian Culture at the Turn of the Millennium”, held in June 2002. But, in fact, that strategy was to be abandoned, the new forum dedicated to culture under Ion Iliescu, again president of Romania, explicitly aiming at building a new national strategy in the cultural field – “*the renaissance of the national culture*”. In that context, the discourse of president Iliescu reasserted the “economic potential” of culture as

“a mean of general growth of the country”, the fact that culture “is not *only* [a.e.] an unprofitable consumer of resources, but, on the contrary, it can and it should be creator of resources”, and added: “Culture is a superior form of freedom; it should essentially contribute to the progress of the entire society. I want, through this succinct definition, to emphasize the value of culture from the human-social point of view and its impact in *the world of real, practical values* [a.e.] of democracy, including the economic sphere and the construction of a democratic State, of the civic, communitarian spirit”¹⁵. In this case, however, the presence of the restrictive-limitative adverb *only* (“doar”), as well as the implicit separation between culture and “real, practical” values that is noticeable in the president’s discourse, unwillingly translate an opposition between culture and “real” world, rather associated to the old Marxist dialectics of the superstructure and the infrastructure than to the dialectics of the cultural demand and supply in the market-oriented economy.

On this basis, the prestige argument is completed by a *pragmatic justification* of financing culture from public funds, formulated either in terms of impact or *social benefits* – “social cohesion and inclusion”, “struggle against inequalities and discrimination” and “satisfying cultural needs” of the public –, or in terms of *economic benefits*, initially evaluated in general terms as “general growth of the country”, “durable development”, then employing an argument already used in the European discourse but only recently brought into the Romanian discourse in an explicit way, that is the precise economic benefits that the presence of culture could offer to a community: development of cultural tourism, attracting investors, urban economic revitalization etc.¹⁶

Such a justification has the merit of repositioning the cultural act in relationship with the public to which it addresses, the culture in general in relationship with the

social, and of reconciling art and economy, after the rupture provoked by the romanticist and then vanguard artistic ideology. Furthermore, it presupposes as a *sine qua non* condition the evaluation of cultural policies efficiency thus inducing an increased degree of responsibility of the public action. Neither are there missing problems in this case. On the one hand, this is about the overestimation of the possible impact of the cultural act, which can be followed by deception even in the cases of massive allocated financial resources. This could lead in the end to the questioning of the public support for culture itself. Once again, France’s case is relevant: not only have philosophers who quibble been very sceptical towards the capacity of art and culture to ensure “social cohesion and inclusion” and to eliminate inequalities, but also classical researches of sociology of culture have contested such claims¹⁷. That is why, the public authorities’ expectations should be properly calibrated, and the effect of the cultural act should be pursued at the micro-social level rather than globally¹⁸. On the other hand, the pragmatic justification of culture funding in terms of socio-economical benefits involves the risks of generating an administrative-bureaucratic vision over the artistic creation and of instrumentalizing art, as public authorities would tend to confound it with the “cultural animation”, and the artists with the “cultural animators”. This is proved by a strong affirmation made by an important cultural administrator (actually only at a regional level) at the first edition of the Debates market “Why and how should culture be funded? In Romania” (February 2005), according to which “the artists need to understand they only exist in order to satisfy the public needs”¹⁹. Without making further considerations on this statement, we need to say that the categories of *animation culturelle* and *animateur culturel* had appeared in France not to replace those of “art” or “artist” and the correspondent

practices and professions, but to manage a surplus of “creativity” postulators, also turned up as an effect of cultural policies centred on the budgetary and administrative interventions of a State waiting for the social benefits of culture funding!

Underneath this pragmatic-instrumental vision, one question stands still: what (else) can justify the public support for culture and artistic creation, if we cease to consider the idea of a social impact of the arts obvious?

1.3. An ideological justification of the State intervention: correcting the market „inequities”.

The first episode of the project of the Debates market “Why and how should culture be funded? In Romania” launched by the ECUMEST Association at the end of February 2005²⁰, occasioned an interesting official discourse trying to justify the public action supporting culture, which should be considered. As an answer to the challenge issued by the moderator of the debate – Corina Şuteu, who was wondering if, in the currently context of globalisation, Romania was or not in the situation of following the European tendency of “less-State” in supporting culture – the State minister coordinator of the domains of culture, education and European integration (and a writer, on the other hand), Marko Béla, proposed another argument of the State intervention in the cultural domain: “The State should support culture, creators, because culture should not be considered a ‘product’ in the market conditions”, adding that “it would be a mistake to believe that we could submit culture to the market conditions”²¹.

If the idea according to which the Romanian State should continue to financially support creators is

acceptable, considering their precarious social condition and the actual state of culture, its justification – which goes back on the thesis according to which *the freedom of creation, as well as the access to culture, are facilitated by the existence of a public space insubordinated to the market laws*, namely exempted from risk and competition – imposes serious reserves. It is true that such an ideological presupposition is quite largely spread. We find it in the review of the Romanian cultural policy accomplished by an European group of experts during a programme of the European Council²², as it has for a long time fostered the cultural policy of the Welfare-State in France: along the successive surveys of the French Ministry of Culture “there appear as mutual objectives of governing the arts not only the consolidation of the conditions of artistic production and distribution, but also - symbolically - the solidary taming of the market pressures on the creation and the minimizing of the obstacles towards democratisation”²³. Or, if the aim of the public action in favour of the artistic creation is to assure the economical-financial conditions for its surviving – on which it is added, as previously stated, “the promotion of the (Romanian) culture on the international scene” –, then such a justification like the one mentioned above risks at producing effects contrary to those in view.

Two arguments can be counter-positioned against the justification of State intervention in terms of correcting the market “inequities”. On the one hand, our communist past not very far off (whose consequences we all know) shows that the price paid by the Eastern artists for the “liberation” from the private capital’s guardianship and for avoiding the risks of the free profit culture was their submission to a bureaucratic system (through the agency of the unions of creation, totally dependent on State), or, in some cases, their subordination to the State-Party and their transformation

into “artists of the State”, either “officials”-engaged or passive, with the mentality of assisted persons²⁴. Or the purpose of the actual cultural policy is not and cannot be the bureaucratisation of the artistic life and the reproduction of the former “artist of the State”, or the production, instead, of the “socially assisted” artists. This objection deserves to be kept in mind, so much more as, on the other hand, the State interventionism and the protectionist system thus created can provoke distortions in the art world even in a democratic system, as proved by the French experience of the last decades. As the analysis of the sociologist Pierre-Michel Menger demonstrates, the cultural policy of the Welfare-State debouched in the control of some assisted segments of the artistic market, quite protected domains in which the logic of the State’s cultural voluntarism involved the blowing up of the population of candidates to artistic profession and of the number of institutions with cultural aims, as well as of the assisted artistic production (the “official” art), and finally led to an overpopulation and artistic overproduction crisis²⁵. Other researches on this topic, conducted by Raymonde Moulin in terms of the sociology of art, also prove that the conjugated effects (even though undesired) of the concern of compensating the “market failure” consisted in modifying the organization system of the artistic life and the modalities of the artistic recognition and in promoting an art indifferent to the public taste, but which was imposed as a dominant aesthetic paradigm²⁶. More, as the recent report of another French art sociologist attests, the attempt of decoupling the contemporary French art from the art market system drove to a failure of the initially proposed purpose, that of propelling it in the foreground of the art worlds (and this in spite of the huge amounts of allocated public funds) – fact proven by the weak positioning of the French contemporary artists in comparison with the

American, German, English or Italian artists, both in the international classifications of the great artistic institutions and in the international art market²⁷.

1.4. An a priori justification: culture as source of human progress.

An argument of a nature different from the previous ones had been formulated in the debates on cultural policy in France, outlining a justification of the public action in favour of creation which depends, in a certain manner, on evidence: art, culture are promises of human accomplishment, they participate in what favours the conception of a better life²⁸. In the public discourse in Romania, a similar argument is bound to the role attributed to culture or cultural creativity as “essential source of human progress” and “improvement of the quality of life” (on which is added, in more instrumental terms, the culture’s “educating-intellectual mission”, on which the MCC report in 2002, for example, insists)²⁹. The merit of such a justification is based on its gratuitous or humanitarian character: in this case we do not deal with a sponsor-State, which expects determined services or benefits in exchange for its financial intervention in favour of the artistic creation, but with a generous *maecenas*-State³⁰. Nor is this *a priori* justification non-problematic.

As Ph.Urfalino remarks in the *Postface* (2004) of his book *L’Invention de la politique culturelle*, the pertinence of the observation according to which art and culture participate in what favours a better life tends to become uncertain, as nowadays it gets to be more and more difficult to fix indisputable referents for the words “culture” and “art”. Therefore, the dispute over the contemporary art in France re-imposed in the debate

“the philistine’s question”, already invoked by Tolstoy: “Is it true that this is art and that art is as important as we could make such sacrifices for it?”³¹ Setting out, another question should necessarily be asked: in this case, what can still justify the intervention of the public authorities in the artistic field, in order to support art and artists? In the actual ideological conditions, fixed by Ph.Urfalino³² in the formula *l’après-politique culturelle* – that is the double exhaustion of both State and intellectual’s sacredness, and the end of a philosophy of history, of the cult of art, which founded the heroic cultural policy *à la française* –, there remains a less exalting justification of the public action of supporting the artistic creation: the very existence of an autonomous artistic life. And this action should have as a directing line the ensuring of the artistic life’s economic pre-conditions.

We can add to all of these the observation that a responsible public policy in the artistic field cannot ignore *the actual status of the artist*. As Pierre-Michel Menger observes in his excellent book *Portrait de l’artiste en travailleur* (2002), the artists, beside scientists, seem to be nowadays at the hard core of a “creative class” or of an advanced social group, “the manipulators of symbols”, at the vanguard of the transformation of high qualified professions, and the cardinal values of the artistic competence – imagination, play, improvisation, behavioural atypicality, even creative anarchy – are regularly transposed in different productive worlds³³. That is why, if a final justification of the public support for the arts and artists should be found, we believe that this can derive neither from the concern of sparing them from the competition risks and the market “inequities” nor from their (presumed) capacity of producing “social cohesion”, of eliminating the social inequalities or their passive answer to predetermined “cultural needs”, but from that what

fundamentally defines them: innovating capacity, originality, non-conformism, even “creative anarchy” – that the society itself needs. Artist or creators in general should be considered neither as “socially assisted” nor as “social assistants” or “cultural animators”, but as the innovative, imaginative core without which the society itself would be poorer.

2. The founding values of the cultural policy: representations of culture and art in the public discourse in Romania.

If the idea stating that culture and art must be publicly supported is undeniable, the legitimate question that still arises is: *which culture, which art?* This question proves the importance of defining the terms with which any type of cultural policy operates: “culture”, “art”, “artist” etc. Another question immediately arises: *who* must define them – the State through the Ministry of Culture, the artistic institutions, the artists themselves or the public? It has also been observed that in the public documents from Romania, there does not exist a national definition (*i.e.* unanimously accepted) of culture and art, that can be a unique methodological instrument³⁴, but one has to immediately add that the public authorities are not the ones who are called to explicitly formulate it. If the artistic institutions, the theoreticians, the critics, the artists and their public can be legitimately subjected to the exigency of answering “the philistine’s questions”, the State cannot be subjected to this exigency: as Ph.Urfalino puts it, the State cannot act and think but on a large scale, which means in a *neutral* way, trying to avoid the excesses. However, both the public discourse – the formulated policy and strategies, the roles attributed

to art and culture – and the actions and institutional structure of the Ministry of Culture translate a certain (implicit) vision of the cultural administrators on art and culture. This is why by analysing the public discourse we can bring at light the representations of art and culture that found the different cultural policies, and their axiological options.

2.1. Culture as identity, heritage and literature.

In what follows, we shall try to determine firstly the nature of visions on culture, that underlie the cultural policies in Romania in the period 1997-2005, and also the tensions between different competing visions, starting from the attributed roles to culture and from the terms – cultural-individuals or national-collectives – in which it is understood.

An identarian vision on culture: from “cultural identity” to “national identity”. The occurrences of the term “culture” in the cultural policy discourse constantly translate the pre-eminence of an *identarian vision* on culture, understood as a “carrier and generator of identity”, although this identity is not defined the same in the successive governments in Romania (1997-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-). However, such a vision and the dilemmas of identity are not specific for the Romanian cultural space, but are widely spread in the European space, especially in the Eastern countries where, as Corina Şuteu observes, after the fall of communism the attempts of regaining the traditional values or the modern occidental ones have taken the form either of a violent „identarian revendication” or of a „quick fix internationalization”³⁵. This is why, the problem which is firstly put, in our case, is to determine the constitutive elements of this identity and implicit of culture: are

these just the *memory* and the *traces of the past* – the heritage, the traditional and vernacular culture – or/and the *contemporary creation*? Another question concerns the nature of the identity that culture confers: is it conceived in the first place in individual-cultural terms or in national-collective terms?

A first observation that has to be made is that the attributes “national” or “Romanian” attached to the term “culture” do not have a unique meaning in the analyzed period. The meaning of the term “Romanian culture” or “national culture” enters an axis that goes from a neutral pole (the simple territoriality), designating the culture produced on Romania’s territory³⁶, up to a strong pole, an identarian one, but which stands either for a “cultural identity” of the individual or for a collective “national identity”, which is sometimes understood (in a “nationalist” manner) as a national specific in opposition to the international one. Consequently, in the public discourse and in the cultural policy there still subsists the ancient ideological conflict between (national) tradition and modernity, as well as a tension or even an opposition, to the extremes, between a vision on culture which is rather utilitarian-individualistic (centred on the individual) and another one “nationalist”-collectivist (centred on “the national being”).

Thus, between 1997-2000 (the CDR-PD-UDMR government), the preoccupation for the “national culture” is considered by the cultural administrators a false problem: as it is affirmed in the evaluation report for the cultural policy, elaborated by the Romanian experts, “the cultural identity” supposes other frames than the frontiers and the criteria of the nation; consequently, the specificity of the Romanian culture is equivalent to what Nicolae Iorga had already designed as “the Romanian synthesis”³⁷. The strategy of the Ministry of Culture from this period has an utilitarian-

individualistic tint, putting along the social development and the individual one – which is understood as the intensification of the “cultural creativity”, for the “improvement of the life quality for all the members of the society” –, and emphasizing the individual and the participation: “The Ministry of Culture grants priority to the fundamental right of each individual to the access and the participation to the cultural life and to the improvement of the life quality.”³⁸

Differently from that vision, the policy and strategy of the Ministry of Culture in the period 2001-2004 (PDSR/ PSD government) are explicitly set under the sign of the *national culture renaissance*, although there is an appeal to the “understanding of culture in the modern way as a development instrument which contributes to the raise of the general level of the life quality”. The accent is set on the “national dimension of culture”, on the “national identity” and on the “cultural heritage”, a priority being the strategy of stimulating the vernacular creation and protecting the traditional culture – as signs of communitarian identity. But this prior objective, formulated in heroic terms, actually hides a reaction of a national re-alignment in opposition to what, in the previous governance, had seemed an international opening, now qualified as a “national and international manifestation of some tendencies for minimizing the importance of the national identity”³⁹. Significantly for the horizon of the ones who administrated national culture in that period, settling the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affaires in the Village Museum is symbolically assumed as an “arrival to the core (“matca”) of the rural and originating (“aurorale”) civilization of the Romanians”⁴⁰. Similarly, in the discourse of president Iliescu at the National Cultural Forum in 2002, after resuming the thesis according to which “culture, as part of our national being, is meant to assert our national

identity within the globalized world of the future”, postulated that this identity would be generated especially by the “Romanian village [which] has always been the keeper of traditions, of the heritage of spiritual creation and of the national identity”.

Certainly, the identarian vision on culture is not to be blamed in itself. Nevertheless one should observe that an extension of the notion “national culture” that especially covers the traces of the past – heritage, vernacular and traditional culture –, risks to induce a tension between the *vernacular-traditional* and the *high-contemporary* forms of culture or even to disrupt the cultural landscape, the heritage and the contemporary creation, the handicraft and the cultural industries or the media culture, arriving at the point when they are opposite as the *genuine-native* and the *unauthentic-foreign*. On the other hand, the approach of the national culture in identarian-collective terms, just as in president Iliescu’s discourse at the *National Cultural Forum*, risks to revive a passé, outdated vision on culture, with idyllic and nationalist tints⁴¹. Besides, in the same frame, even the Prime Minister Adrian Năstase had warned that such a discourse can easily give up the temptation of a “certain sentimentalism lightly idyllic (*semănătorist*)”, and also implies the “risk of slipping in a nationalist paradigm of culture, a temptation which is often hard tried in the history of Romanian culture”⁴².

A patrimonial vision on culture: preserving the heritage versus supporting the creation. Besides the identarian vision and in tight connection to it, the principles, policies and strategies formulated by the Ministry of Culture (and Religious Affaires), as well as the budget structure and its actions, all stand as a witness for a predominantly *patrimonial vision* on culture, translated through the pre-eminence of the preservation of national heritage – understood as a factor of identity

and of historic legitimacy – on supporting the contemporary creation or “living culture”. We find this vision especially between the years 1992-1996 and 2001-2004 of the PDSR/PSD government (presumably social-democrat), but it actually transcends the political and ideological cleavages of “right” - “left” type.

Although, at the level of the cultural policy principles, the cultural administration in the period 1997-2000 had proclaimed the necessity of maintaining a balance between different elements of the cultural life – like creativity and heritage –, a marked discrepancy is *de facto* manifested. There stands witness the evolution of the budget of the Ministry of Culture, more exactly the weight of expenditures regarding the heritage: in 1996-1998, for protecting the heritage there was allocated the third part of the budget, representing a massive increase, 20 times more, in comparison to the previous years.⁴³ During the 2001-2004 governance, the function of funding culture was to be explicitly subordinated to the patrimonial function of the ministry, and as proclaimed priorities there were the heritage, the written culture, the institutions of spectacle and the churches. The “heritage priority” was translated both through the cultural policies and strategies, and also through the structure of the ministry, which was reorganized in 2001 as The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs: The Visual Arts Direction (founded in 1996) was to be merged with the Museum and Collections Direction, among a General Direction of the Heritage, the works were redefined as “mobile cultural heritage”, and the programmes for exhibition and acquisition of the works of art were set under the sign of the valorisation of heritage, within a National Programme for the Valorisation of Cultural Heritage⁴⁴. The fact that the acquisitions of contemporary fine art works and of public monuments in 2003 (in amount of

32 billions ROL, representing 52% of the total amount of the acquisitions at the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs) have as stated purpose “to endow the central administration”(!), is highly significant not only for the patrimonial vision which underlies the cultural policy during this period, but also for its orientation towards the self-promotion of the cultural bureaucracy. Similarly, the strategy project in the visual art area in 2004, mentions as priorities “to support and to promote the national events”, and the acquisition of valuable works of art in order to “*complete* [a.e.] the national heritage”, while the support of the contemporary creation disappears as a (explicitly) cultural policy objective. At the same time, in order to accomplish these strategic objectives, the budget project for 2004 foresaw an allocation of 10 billions ROL (only) for the “acquisition of *contemporary art* works with the aim of developing the heritage of the national and local institutions from this category”, while 30 billion ROL were generously allocated for the “application of the legal regulation for the protection and the assurance of the mobile national heritage within the *Thesaurus* category”⁴⁵.

The attention for the cultural heritage and its protection is, undoubtedly, a legitimate option of a society, in our case being urgently imposed because of its pronounced degradation and neglect in the communist period and even in the post-communist period. The problematic or disputable character of this cultural policy option is about, on one hand, the lack of transparency of decisions and financing and especially of their current inefficiency, signalled by all the successive evaluations made by the press or by the officials of the ministry themselves. But, on the other hand, one can formulate even a principle objection regarding the “heritage priority” within the general objectives of a cultural policy: in terms of cultural policy, a fundamental

direction should not be privileged in comparison to others, neither on the political plan, nor on the financial resources plan, but, as recommended by the report of the European experts group, they should be maintained in equilibrium⁴⁶.

A limited vision on culture: the pre-eminence of the *writing* on the *visual*. Another consideration which can be made concerning the public discourse in Romania, is that it constantly translates, in the entire period, a limited vision on culture, in the sense that the *writing / book* has always enjoyed an overwhelming pre-eminence in comparison to the other forms of cultural expression, especially the *visual* ones – fine arts and also dance (but not the theatre which has a written support). Thus, the access to culture is defined as “access to book, to education”, by this distinguishing, again restrictively, especially the literary forms (educational-canonical)⁴⁷.

Such a representation of culture does not miss practical implications in what concerns the modalities and mechanisms of the public support for culture. Due to this dominant vision, the written culture has special and exclusive programmes - *State subsidies* or *commissions* for editing books and magazines (especially literary), acquisitions for libraries etc. Between 2001-2004, for example, the funds for the visual arts represented only 2% from the total funding for cultural actions, while this financing had in its turn only 17-20% from the total expenditures of the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs. The discrimination against the visual, but in favour of the writing, and the ignorance of the real interest of the public, are more flagrant, if we compare the level of financing allocated to visual arts with the weight that the programmes in this area detained within the thematic programmes of the ministry and the County Directions for Culture (constantly situated within 11.2%-11.8% from the whole cultural programmes), as well as with the public's

expectations: on a scale from 1 (minimum) to 10 (maximum), the public's interest for the supply of representative cultural products within the county, is situated at 8 for the visual arts and at 7.78 for literature (average national grade)⁴⁸.

One can explain this vision or cultural policy option through the historic motives of the pre-eminence of the writer's figure in the Romanian culture, but can not justify it, because of the patent disproportion between the different areas of culture as the writing and the visual. Or, in the European space, we find today a larger and more balanced vision on culture, even if we were to refer just to the known examples grace to the action of the different cultural centres (French, German, English etc.) in Romania. The paradox of a limited vision of culture, like the one dominant in the Romanian cultural space, or what is to be accused in what concerns the orientation of the cultural policy mainly towards the written culture and the book production (but through bureaucratic mechanisms of the “State aid” type), is the evident lack of result at the cultural practices level or the cultural consumption of the Romanians: in spite of this orientation of the cultural policy, we are witnessing the constant decrease of the number of readers and not only of the number of spectators in theatres, museums or exhibitions⁴⁹.

2.2. Art: between traditional and contemporary, professional and amateur.

The public discourses or the reports on cultural policy do not explicitly offer (with one exception) a definition for the concept of “art” they use. Nevertheless, even a short review of the reports and the official discourses can offer us sufficient clues to outline the

prevalent vision, generally accepted, on visual arts, but which is not exempted of ambiguities or contradictions, of tensions or even ruptures.

Up to recently the public space in Romania was dominated by a *traditionalist conception on art*, seen as an activity separated from the society, which made the designed cultural strategies and policies to neglect the connection of art to other sectors of the social action and also the connection of the art with the public, and to limit themselves to its traditional areas or forms⁵⁰. An exception to this restrictive policy (but in a reversed sort of way) can be observed between 1997-2000, when the newly founded Direction of Visual Arts within the Ministry of Culture assumed the sustaining and promoting mainly of the “professional”, “contemporary visual discourse”⁵¹, but in the conditions of limited financial resources and with the lack of some institutional structures of exposing and consecrating the contemporary art (until the inauguration of the National Museum of Contemporary Art in October 2004, in Romania did not exist but a specialized Museum of Contemporary Art, in Galați). This strategy of supporting the contemporary creation, that aspires to “a redefinition of the national identity by pertaining to the actual occidental time”), was to be gradually marginalized and then abandoned with the coming back of the PDSR/PDS government at the end of 2000 and with the reforming of the cultural policy under the sign of the major desiderate of the “renaissance of the national culture”. But the way in which it was understood the “national culture” in that period, as seen above, only re-induct the ancient tension between *professional* and *amateur* (exploited before by the communist regime), moreover that the presidential discourse from the National Cultural Forum (2002) understands, by the assurance of the “access to culture”, rather the promotion of the “mass culture”, vernacular-amateur, while the area of the

visual arts is the only area in the invoked cultural ones, where the “peasant-creators” (*creatorii populari*) are mentioned aside and equal with the professional artists, as the “inexhaustible spring of the Romanian creativity”⁵².

On the other hand, when art is preponderantly defined in terms of *high culture*, they are coloured in different nuances, that go from multimedia to art works as “social laboratory”, but excluding this time the traditional media or forms. For example, the theoretical considerations from the *Cultural Policies and Strategies 1997-2000* report, on what contemporary art/creation is, define it as: “a cultural production where ‘the artistic object’ [...] eludes from form, becoming a contemporary language of communication, that appears on the basis of the passing from an art using traditional techniques, to an art that assumes high technologies”, and which “integrates the social and the political in its aim”⁵³. Accordingly, the Visual Art Direction states the priorities of its 2000-2001 strategy for supporting the contemporary creation as it follows: “*Financing conditions*. The initiatives of national interest are considered top priorities if they promote: original creation, creation with a contemporary perspective which rule out the neo-realist-socialist perspective and the obsolete academic perspective”. In what the selection and promotion principles are concerned, the prevalent ethos, necessarily implied by a definition of art in the high culture terms, is the *principle of excellence*. Nevertheless, besides the artistic quality criterion (“originality of the artistic work”), the *positive discrimination* also takes a place, in favour of some non-artistic categories, among the criteria for selecting the financed projects being the “participation of artists representing national minorities” and the “participation of female artists in the project”⁵⁴. Thus, in the “high”-“professional” art itself, a tension appears between the

traditional media or forms and the proclaimed contemporary ones, as the “creation with a contemporary perspective” is opposed not only to the “socialist-realism” and to the “academic” art, but (considering the assumed definition of contemporary art) also to the “modern tradition”, while at the level of selection and promotion principles there is a tension between the artistic criterion (the intrinsic value of art) and the social ones (belongingness to a national minority or a gender category).

Therefore, there are reasons to state that during the period 1997-2005 we are dealing with an art policy predominantly interventionist, but which oscillates in favour of one or other type of artistic practices, either the traditional ones (vernacular or “high”) or the vanguard-contemporary ones. This attitude of divergent, conflicting axiological involvement seems to be a constant trait of Romanian cultural policy: the new government PNL-PD-UDMR-PC, settled at the end of 2004, still hesitates between an interventionist policy and a neutral attitude, the strategic objectives of cultural policy oscillating between “favouring the new forms of expression and cultural practices”, as it is stated in the Governance program, and “maintaining an equilibrium between tradition and innovation”, as is stated in the strategy of the Ministry of Culture, afterwards presented in the Parliament by Mona Muscă, the (liberal) minister of culture⁵⁵.

Conclusions.

The analysis of the public discourse that accompanies the cultural policy reveals, on one hand, that the Romanian State has justified its intervention in the cultural field through different arguments – grandiloquent, pragmatic, ideological and *a priori* –, but

all of them connected to different roles attributed to culture and art: promoting the cultural or national identity, instrument of economic and social development, source of the human progress. Thus, the idea of culture as “carrier and generator of national identity” has been, especially between 2001-2004, at the basis of a grandiloquent justification for the “promotion of Romanian art and culture”, in terms of national interest and prestige. However, in comparison to its effects, this policy has quickly revealed its limits and endemic inefficiency. The commemorative and celebration frenzy, that characterizes the cultural policy set under this sign both on external and on internal directions, shows that this was wanted to be a “machine for producing consensus”, *i.e.* “national culture”. Actually, the cultural supply and implicitly the “national identity” thus proposed were conflicting, marked by a profound dis-equilibrium between the traditional-particularistic and modern-synchronic forms of culture, that reveals the remanence of the ancient conflict between social values such as conservatism, authoritarianism, equalitarianism, and the values of modernity. Moreover, the emphatic presence of the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs – which acted rather as a direct producer of culture, not as a mediator – has transformed the public action of “promoting Romanian culture and art” into an approach of status or self-representation, in other words, a status earning activity of the cultural administrators, rather than of the artists themselves.

Starting from the role of culture as an “instrument of the economic and social development”, to the argument of prestige was added a justification of the public support for culture formulated in terms of socio-economical benefits: “social cohesion and inclusion”, “satisfying the cultural needs of the public”, “general growth of the country” or “durable development”. This

pragmatic justification is not exempted of risks either, just as the overestimation of the social impact of the cultural act, followed by deceptions that can lead to questioning the public support itself in favour of culture, or the instrumentalization of art, public authorities tending to confound it with the “cultural animation”, and the artists with the “cultural animators”. Similarly, the ideological justification of the State’s intervention in the cultural field, formulated in terms of correcting the “inequities” of the market, risks also to produce contrary effects to the expected ones, such as the bureaucratisation of the artistic life and the reproduction of the former “artist of the State” or the production, instead, of “socially assisted” artists, and the creation of a protectionist system that can provoke distortions in the art world even in a democratic State, as the European experience has proved. Or the artists should not be seen neither as “socially assisted” nor as “social assistants” or “cultural animators”, but as that innovative, imaginative core without which the society itself would be poorer. This is why, a final justification of the public support for arts and artists can derive neither from the care of sparing them from the competition risks and the market “inequities” nor from their presumed capacity of producing “social cohesion” and eliminating the social inequalities, or their passive response to predetermined “cultural needs”, but exactly from what fundamentally defines them: innovating capacity, originality, non-conformism, even the “creative anarchy” – that the society itself needs. In the currently ideological conditions, fixed by Ph.Urfalino in the formula *l’après politique culturelle*, there remains a simpler and less exalting justification of the public action in favour of the artistic creation: *the very existence of an autonomous artistic life*. And this action should have as a directing line the ensuring of the economical pre-conditions of the artistic life. In the last analysis, the public support for

the artists cannot aim but for the safeguarding and the development of the pre-conditions, of the economical basis necessary for creating art freely.

On the other hand, the analysis of founding values of the cultural policy or of the prevalent representations of culture and art in the public space in Romania, has proven that the public action in the cultural field is submitted to some *constraints* that are not only of historical nature – the centralized tradition or even the totalitarian one in the case of the communist State (from where some ideological anti-market presupposition survive) – or economical (the insufficiency of the financial resources), but also of *conceptual order*. Thus, when the extension of the “national culture/identity” notions cover especially the traces of the past – heritage, vernacular and traditional culture –, the public policy founded on an identarian-collectivist vision on culture risks to induce a tension between the vernacular-traditional and the high-contemporary forms of culture, or even to break the cultural landscape into “genuine”-native and “unauthentic”-foreign figures of culture. At the same time, when the public policy is underlie by a patrimonial vision on culture, in the sense of a principled primacy of preserving the heritage over sustaining the “living culture” or contemporary creation, “the heritage priority” becomes a problematic, disputable option, moreover that it is accompanied by the lack of transparency of the decisions and public financing, and especially by a patent inefficiency. Lastly, a public policy founded on a limited vision on culture, understood especially as “written culture”, and then preponderantly orientated towards supporting the books production through bureaucratic methods (government subsidies and commissions), leads to favouring writing in comparison to other forms of cultural expression, especially the visual ones, but without noticeable results at the level of dynamics of

cultural consumption and practices of the public, because ignoring its real interest. In what art policy is concerned, the traditionalist conception of art that has been dominating up to recently the public space and discourse, according to which art seemed as an activity separated from society, leads to neglecting for a long time the connections of art with other sectors of social activities or with the public, and to limit itself to the areas or traditional forms of art. Such a representation of art, in connection with the predominant manner of understanding the “national culture”, has done nothing but to resettle the ancient tension between professionals and amateurs and to induce new tensions into the “high”-“professional” art itself, between the traditional and contemporary forms, the “creation with a contemporary perspective” being opposed not only to the “socialist realism” and the “academic art” but also to the “modern tradition”. Or, in order to reach its objectives, a responsible cultural policy has to overpass these limitations or *partis-pris* and to take into account the diversity of the cultural expression forms, the plurality of actors involved in artistic activities, particularly the different types of artists, the plurality of the artistic practices – traditional, modern, “contemporary” – which are competing one with each other, as well as the considerable mutations related to the emerging cultural industries.

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Notes:

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This study is a part of a more extensive research on Romanian cultural policy conducted in the framework of a 2004-2005 GE-NEC fellowship granted by NEW EUROPE COLLEGE Bucharest, Rector prof.dr.dr.h.c. Andrei Pleșu, Scientific Director prof.dr. Anca Oroveanu, to whom I express my gratitude. Obviously, the responsibility for the content of this study belongs entirely to the author.

¹ Policies for Culture on line Journal, October 2001: Cultural Policy in Romania; November 2002: Advocating for Culture in SEE; Winter 2003: Artists in SEE Cultural Policy Making; Insight. A Policies for Culture Analysis and Opinion Reporter, no.3/December 2004: Cultural Policy Research in the countries of South East Europe – setbacks and prospects, <http://www.policiesforculture.org>.

² Philippe URFALINO, *L'invention de la politique culturelle*, deuxième édition, Paris, Hachette, 2004, pp.385-386.

³ Ion CARAMITRU, „Cuvânt înainte” [Foreword], *Politici și strategii culturale 1997-2000* [Cultural policies and strategies], Institutul de Memorie Culturală cIMeC, Bucharest, 2000, p.5. As an example of the langue de bois in which the official discourse states the roles of art and culture, see the report of The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs (MCC), *Cultura și cultele 2002. Evaluări, perspective, strategii* [Culture and Religious Affairs 2002. Evaluations, perspectives, strategies], Bucharest, 2002, p.13.

⁴ Statutul creatorilor de artă și artiștilor interpreți în România. Declarație comună, [The Status of Art Creators and Performing Artists. Common Statement], Bucharest, Ministry of Culture and ANUC, 1998, p.5: „We, the undersigned, recognize the following principles: 1. Cultural creativity is an essential source of human progress. Cultural policies have to recognize the essential contribution of art creators and of performing artists to the improvement of the quality of life, and to promoting the identity and the cultural development of the society.”

⁵ Forumul Cultural Național [National Cultural Forum]: „Discursul președintelui României, Ion Iliescu”, pp.1,4, Bucharest, June 19th, 2002, <http://www.presidency.ro/discursuri/2002/mes-020619-ForumCult-Buc.htm>.

⁶ See „Discursul președintelui României, Ion Iliescu”, pp.2-3.

⁷ As a study on arts policy in Finland and Norway puts it, “the transformation of money into recognition is not possible if the criteria for distributing the financial support are based on economic and social considerations and not solely on artistic quality”. Merja HEIKKINEN, „Artist Policy in Finland and Norway. Considerations for comparing direct support for artists”, ICCPR Bergen, Norway, 1999, p.20.

⁸ A recent evaluation of the activity in the last few years (2003-2004) at the Romanian Cultural Institute (ICR), former Romanian Cultural Foundation, confirms this diagnostic: „Promovarea în străinătate a culturii române a însemnat, în anii din urmă, transferul patologiei instituționale și procedurale a sistemului public din România. Centrele (institutele) culturale românești din străinătate au fost doar ecoul servil al deficiențelor administrației culturale și, într-o oarecare măsură, ale corpului diplomatic post-comunist: lipsa de orizont strategic, politizarea sau personalizarea funcției publice, deruta axiologică, slăbiciunea pentru viziunile particulariste și închise ale culturii naționale, capacitatea limitată de comunicare și relaționare, recrutarea arbitrară a personalului, opacitatea la inițiativa privată, competența managerială echivocă sau simulată. Circulația ideilor, valorilor, a artefactelor sensibilității românești mai este încă blocată într-un ambuteiaj cronic, iar succesele externe nu sunt rezultatul unor politici cursive dublate de acțiuni eficiente, ci se datorează mai curând abnegației private sau accidentului.” *Strategia Institutului Cultural Român pentru perioada 2005-2008*, p.1, <http://www.icr.ro>, accesed 18.08.2005.

⁹ See the report of The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, *Cultura și cultele 2003. Evaluări, proiecte, strategii*, p.92.

¹⁰ Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, Report 2003-2004, point F, „Îmbunătățirea imaginii Ministerului. Relații publice”, pp.9-10 (www.ministerul-culturii.ro, accessed 15.12.2004). See also the MCC reports: *Cultura și cultele 2001*, sections „Relații bilaterale”, pp.23-24, „Centrele culturale românești în străinătate”, p.25; *Cultura și cultele 2002. Evaluări, proiecte, strategii*, „Relații bilaterale”, pp.19-21,34 (Sweden), 21 (Germany); *Cultura și cultele 2003. Evaluări, proiecte, strategii*, „Cuvânt înainte de Acad. Răzvan Theodorescu, Ministrul Culturii și Cultelor”, pp.5-6, and „Relații culturale internaționale”, pp.15-19, 44, „Principalele politici și strategii în domeniul culturii în anul 2004”, pp.84-85. See also

Strategia Institutului Cultural Român pentru perioada 2005-2008, p.2.

¹¹ Răzvan THEODORESCU, "Cuvânt înainte", *Cultura și cultele* 2002. Evaluări, proiecte, strategii, p.6; see also *Cultura și cultele* 2001, section „Punerea în valoare a patrimoniului cultural național”, pp.52-53, 58-59.

¹² We have to observe that such an identarian tactic is not specific to Romania but largely employed in other countries, such as France for example. See Emmanuel de WARESQUIEL (dir.), *Dictionnaire des politiques culturelles de la France depuis 1959*, Paris, CNRS/Larousse, 2001, art. „Commémorations”, pp.141-142.

¹³ Ministry of Culture, *Politici și strategii culturale 1997-2000*, „Introducere”, p.7. This formula is taken over as such from the Cultural strategy elaborated in the framework of the PHARE project financed by the European Union: „3. Mission statement. 3.1 Romania, taking as a starting point in heritage, traditions and cultural contributions from all social and ethnic groups as well as its infrastructure and monuments, will develop and support cultural life and creators of art and culture focusing in joining the EU in the context of a democratic and open society geared to a market-oriented economy. For this reason, culture is to be regarded not as a consumer of funds, but as a generator of economic sustainable development and social cohesion.” Cultural strategy. Final report Project RO9709-01, February 2000, p.6, <http://www.eurocult.ro/politici/prezentare.htm>.

¹⁴ Statutul creatorilor de artă și artiștilor interpreți în România. Declarație comună, pp.9-10.

¹⁵ „Discursul președintelui României, Ion Iliescu, la Forumul Cultural Național”, pp.2-3. The abandoning, after the general elections in November 2000, of the Cultural Strategy elaborated in the framework of the PHARE project (despite that it was finalized by a symposium at Cotroceni Palace in spring 2000), was followed by a change of accent of cultural policy on the identarian dimension of culture. We will approach again this topic below. On this issue, see also „Proiectul cultural RO 9709-01. O strategie culturală plătită și abandonată”, *Cuvântul*, no. 2, February 2005.

¹⁶ The pragmatic, socio-economic, justification of the public support for culture is re-installed in the foreground of the cultural policy after the general elections in December 2004, in the D.A. Alliance government. See *Programul de Guvernare. Capitolul 22 - Politică în domeniul culturii* [The Governance Program. Chapter 22- Policy in the field of culture], <http://www.gov.ro/obiective/afis-docdiverse-pg.php?iddoc=266> (accesat 9.03. 2005) and *Planul Național de Dezvoltare a României. Participarea sectorului culturii*

la dezvoltarea pe termen lung a României, Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, Bucharest, March 2005. This type of arguments was already formulated in the Report of an European group of experts (1999), where it is stated that, “apart from purely cultural considerations, there are three reasons to invest in culture. The first is the economy: culture is a factor in growth and job-creation, and investing in culture means investing in economy. The second is democracy: culture is part of the social ‘cement’ that binds people together, promoting dialogue between different groups and helping to develop an independent, active civil society. The third reason is Europe. A number of Romanian political figures emphasised their country’s wish to belong to Europe and stressed the importance of culture as a ‘passport’ in this connection. This implies making the necessary budgetary effort.” Cultural policy in Romania. Report of an European group of experts (compiled by Jacques RENARD), European Programme of National Cultural Policy Reviews, Council of Europe, CC-Cult (99)33B, Strasbourg, October 1999, p.6, <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural-Co-operation/Culture/Policies/Reviews/Romania.asp>.

¹⁷ Ph. URFALINO, *L’Invention de la politique culturelle*, p.394: „Pourquoi ne pas se résoudre à admettre que les différents avatars de l’esthétique romantique, que toutes les variantes du thème de la puissance sociale des arts sont de mauvaises bases pour penser l’action publique en direction des arts et de la culture ? Il faut se résoudre à admettre des choses simples. L’idée selon laquelle l’Etat peut transformer ou améliorer significativement la société en utilisant le levier des arts est fautive [...] Plus exactement, c’est l’idée même d’une causalité sociale reliant les arts comme cause à un état de la société comme effet qui est dépourvue de pertinence.” See also François CHAZEL, „Introduction”, in: *Pratiques culturelles et politiques de la culture*, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme de l’Aquitaine, 1987, p.13.

¹⁸ These expectations or effects can neither be separated from the degree/intensity of the cultural participation of the public. Or, the few estimations of the cultural consumption, as the first poll in this purpose realized in 1999 by IMAS (Alin Teodorescu), indicate a very low degree and, as general tendency, the decline of the cultural participation of the public. For example, visiting the exhibitions and museums counts only 2% from the time dedicated to culture by the Romanians. On this topic, see also the reports *Politici și strategii culturale 1997-2000*, pp.108-112; *La Politique culturelle en Roumanie. Rapport national, Programme Européen d’examen des Politiques Culturelles Nationales*, Conseil de l’Europe, CC-Cult (99)33A, Strasbourg, 1999, pp.3,138-139, <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural-Co-operation/Culture/Policies/Reviews/Romania.asp>.

www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural-Co-operation/Culture/Policies/Reviews/Romania.asp; Politica culturală în România. Raport al unui grup de experți europeni, p.9.

¹⁹ Corina RĂCEANU, intervention in the Debates market „De ce și cum finanțăm cultura. În România”, Bucharest, February 25th, 2005.

²⁰ The purpose of this first edition of the Debates market was that by the reunion of the main actors of the domain - artists, ONG, public institutions, cultural administration - to promote the dialogue between the public administration and the civil society about the reform of the system of financing culture.

²¹ Béla MARKO, intervention in the Debates market „Why and how is culture financed. In Romania”, Bucharest, February 25th, 2005.

²² Politica culturală în România. Raport al unui grup de experți europeni, 1999, p.7.

²³ Pierre-Michel MENGER, „L'Etat-Providence et la culture. Socialisation de la création, prosélytisme et relativisme dans la politique culturelle publique”, in: François Chazel (ed.), Pratiques culturelles et politiques de la culture, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme d'Aquitaine, 1987, p.30.

²⁴ Miklos HARASZTI, L'Artiste d'Etat. De la censure en pays socialistes, Paris, Fayard, 1983, cited by Magda CARNECI, Artele plastice în România 1945-1989, Bucharest, Ed.Meridiane, 2000, pp.181-183.

²⁵ P-M.MENGER, „L'Etat-Providence et la culture. Socialisation de la création, prosélytisme et relativisme dans la politique culturelle publique”, loc. cit., pp.29-52.

²⁶ Raymonde MOULIN, L'artiste, l'institution et le marché, Paris, Flammarion, 1997, p.88.

²⁷ Alain QUEMIN, L'Art contemporain international: entre les institutions et le marché (Le rapport disparu), Nîmes, Paris, Jacqueline Chambon/Artprice, 2002, „Introduction”, pp.10-13, „Le handicap lié à la faiblesse du marché français de l'art contemporain”, pp.183-191: „La faiblesse du marché privé en particulier – auquel doivent parfois se substituer les achats publics – fait suspecter la France de promouvoir un art officiel toujours soupçonné de médiocrité, en particulier dans un pays comme les Etats-Unis, attaché au libre jeu du marché.”

²⁸ Ph. URFALINO, „Postface”, L'Invention de la politique culturelle, p.401.

²⁹ Statutul creatorilor de artă și artiștilor interpreți, 1998, p.5; Strategia culturală. Raport final Proiect RO9709-01, 2000, p.3; Raport MCC Cultura și cultele 2002, pp.13-14.

³⁰ According to the legislation, “the maecenatus agreement is a gratuitous act through which a natural or a legal person, referred as the maecenas, transfers, without obligation to receive nothing in exchange, nor directly or indirectly, its ownership right over physical assets or financial means to a natural person, as philanthropic activity with humanitarian character, for the performance of some activities in the following areas: cultural, artistic, medico-sanitary or scientific fundamental or applied research” (art.1, par.3 of the Sponsorship Law). See Sponsorizarea în cultură. Atitudinea comunității de afaceri din România / Business attitudes on art sponsorship. In Romania, add Business chance on art, Bucharest, 2004, p.106.

³¹ Ph. URFALINO, „Postface”, L'Invention de la politique culturelle, pp.401-404; Léon TOLSTOI, Ecrits sur l'art, Paris, Gallimard, 1971, p.4.

³² Ph.URFALINO, „Postface”, L'Invention de la politique culturelle, p.406.

³³ Pierre-Michel MENGER, Portrait de l'artiste en travailleur. Métamorphoses du capitalisme, Paris, Éditions du Seuil et La République des Idées, 2002, pp.7-9.

³⁴ Politici culturale în România. Extras din Compendiumul “Politici Culturale în Europa”, The Ministry of Culture, Romania, European Council, September, 1999, p.8 (<http://www.eurocult.ro/politici/prezentare.htm>). Instead, two ideas of culture are formulated in this Compendium, that circumscribe „a general frame in an anthropologic perspective, of the totality of the intellectual aspects of a civilization; and a specialized area of the cultural activity, that forms the subject-matter for the Ministry of Culture [sic!] and of the cultural institutions from Romania and which consist of: literature, dance, theatre, film, the plastic arts, architecture, etc. (Loc. cit., p.8.)

³⁵ Corina ȘUTEU, Overview on cultural policy in central and eastern Europe between 1990-2003, Policy paper UNESCO 2003, p.11, <http://www.policiesforculture.org/articles&reports>.

³⁶ It is thus met in „Introduction” to the MC report Politici si strategii culturale 1997-2000, pp.7-8.

³⁷ La Politique culturelle en Roumanie. Rapport national, pp.12-14.

³⁸ *Politici si strategii culturale* 1997-2000, chapter „Strategia generală a Ministerului Culturii. Principii fundamentale” pp.17-20, and chapter „Susținerea, protejarea și conservarea culturii tradiționale”, pp.113-114. See also the Cultural Strategy. Final report Project RO 9709-01, 2000, p.3.

³⁹ See the report of Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, Cultura si cultele 2001, pp.15,43-44,129; Cultura si cultele 2003,

section „Principalele politici și strategii în domeniul culturii în anul 2004“, pp.91-92.

⁴⁰ Răzvan THEODORESCU, „Cuvânt înainte”, *Cultura și Cultele* 2003, p.5.

⁴¹ *The National Cultural Forum*: „Discursul președintelui României, Ion Iliescu”, p.4.

⁴² *The National Cultural Forum*: „Intervenția primului ministru al României, Adrian Năstase“, Bucharest, June 19th, 2002, p.1 (<http://www.ecumest.ro/arcult/stire07.30.htm>, updated 30.07.2002).

⁴³ *Politici și strategii culturale 1997-2000*, pp.45-47,52,71,170-171; *Politica culturală în România. Raportul unui grup de experți europeni*, 1999, p.17. For the budget allowances of the Ministry of Culture in the period 1990-1999, see *Politica culturală în România. Extras din Compendiumul „Politici culturale în Europa”*, pp.13-14.

⁴⁴ Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, *Cultura și Cultele* 2001, pp.8-11, 43; *Cultura și Cultele* 2002, pp.9-14,34-35; *Cultura și Cultele* 2003, p.36.

⁴⁵ Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, *Cultura și Cultele* 2003, chapter „Susținerea financiară“, pp.80-82, and section „Principalele politici și strategii în domeniul culturii în anul 2004“, pp.88, 91-92,100.

⁴⁶ *Politica culturală în România. Raportul unui grup de experți europeni*, 1999, pp. 8-9,17,28.

⁴⁷ *National Cultural Forum*: „Discursul președintelui României, Ion Iliescu“, pp.4-5. The very large weight which in the presidential discourse is held by the written culture, „the production and distribution of books“, compared with the other cultural areas mentioned – „theatre“, „national cinematography“, „musical school“, „choreography“, „fine arts“, „architecture“ –, is also relevant for the limited vision which dominates the cultural policies in Romania.

⁴⁸ *Piața culturii în România [Cultural Market in Romania]*, Concept Foundation, 2000 (http://www.concept.ro/index.php?filename=Piata_culturii_in_Romania). For the structure of budgetary funds for the Ministry of Culture – financed projects and acquisitions of contemporary fine arts works and public monuments –, and those of the thematic county programs, see the reports of the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, *Cultura și Cultele* 2001, chapter „Susținerea financiară“, p.102, p.123; *Cultura și Cultele* 2002, pp.70,79-82, p.80; *Cultura și Cultele* 2003, p.74, pp.79-82, 88-100.

⁴⁹ For quantifying the decline in cultural participation between 1990-1995, see *Politica culturală în România. Raportul unui grup de experți europeni*, p.9. For the negative dynamic of the consumption of culture between 1993-2000, the study on the

market of culture in Romania requested by the Concept Foundation contains in the third part („Consumul cultural al populației“) extremely relevant data: the percent of people who don't read books increases from 39% to 48%, those who do not go to theatre, opera, concerts, increases from 75% to 87%, etc. See *Piața culturii în România*, Concept Foundation, 2000 (http://www.concept.ro/index.php?filename=Piata_culturii_in_Romania). This decline of the consumption of culture continues visibly even after 2001, although there are no statistical estimation through polls.

⁵⁰ The report of the European experts (1999) underlines the ignoring of the phenomenon of the mass culture production and consumption, and the new or non-traditional artistic expressions, in a large part of the years analyzed (1992-1996). *Politica culturală în România. Raportul unui grup de experți europeni*, pp.7-8, 15-16. An evident change in tonality intervened in the artistic policy formulated between 1997 and 2000, and at the beginning of 2005.

⁵¹ Ministry of Culture, Direction for Visual Arts, *Strategy 2000-2001 (English version)*, Bucharest, 2000, p.1: “Main objectives: 1.Connection to the European cultural systems by stimulating private initiative to create, preserve and emphasize artistic works that integrate Romanian culture in to the world circuit of artistic values. 2.[Foundation of a] Contemporary Art Museum”. See also the strategy for financing contemporary creation in *Politici și strategii culturale 1997-2000*, pp.65-71.

⁵² *National Cultural Forum*: „Discursul președintelui României, Ion Iliescu“, pp.4, 7. See also the MCC report *Cultura și cultele* 2001, p.129.

⁵³ Ministry of Culture, *Politici și strategii culturale 1997-2000*, p.65.

⁵⁴ Direction for Visual Arts, *Strategy 2000-2001 (English version)* pp.8,13. See also *Politica culturală în România. Raportul unui grup de experți europeni*, p.24.

⁵⁵ *Programul de Guvernare. Capitolul 22 - Politica în domeniul culturii [The Governance Program. Chapter 22 -Policies in the field of culture]*, <http://www.gov.ro/obiective/afis-docdiverse-pg.php?iddoc=266> (accessed 9.03.2005); *Strategia Ministerului Culturii și Cultelor pentru perioada 2005-2008. Prezentare ținută de dna Ministru Mona Muscă în fața Comisiilor de Cultură din Camera Deputaților și din Senat în săptămîna 7-11 martie 2005 [The Strategy of The Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs for the period 2005-2008. Presentation held by Minister Mona Muscă in front of the Commissions for Culture of the Parliament in the week 7-11 March 2005]*, <http://www.cultura.ro/News.aspx?ID=514> (accessed 6.04.2005).



The Aristotelian Spirit and the Cultural Moulding of the Christian World

The study attempts to survey the way in which the rationalist spirit (especially Aristotle's philosophy) was assimilated by Christian thinking in the patristic and scholastic periods. This shows that the great schism is the outcome not only of dogmatic controversies, but also of accepting and promoting distinctive-argumentative methodologies to justify these dogmas. If in the West theory was viewed as contemplation and as method for conceptual construction, in the East the emphasis was laid exclusively on contemplation and revelation. Furthermore, the West accepted the autonomy of sciences by creating the "seven liberal arts" - an unacceptable concept for the Orthodox world, where logic was considered a mere organon, and philosophy, an ancilla theologiae. Among the main consequences detectable to this day are the varied cultural moulds that exist in the Christian world, as well as the scientific and civilizational lagging behind of the Orthodox East.

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1. Preliminary Aspects

The theme suggested by the title requires certain preliminary explanations. I suggest two possible perspectives for reflection: a metaphorical perspective, and a logical one.

a) The Metaphorical Perception. After the revolution in December 1989, Romanians had the conviction that the West embodies the charitable Samaritan who comes to the aid of the history-forsaken East. It was not long before some Romanians opened their eyes and understood that the Biblical parable has no applicability in political life, and that the "capitalist Samaritan" is a mere figment of their imagination. Today the "game" of European integration is well known and many clear-sighted Romanians have acquired a lucid perception of the West, which incessantly and mercilessly urges us to wake up and embrace the rhythm of history.

a.1) Commentary on the Metaphorical Perception. No sophisticated apparatus is required to perceive the difference between the realism of the West and the Romanians' (still present) naïve realism. Even Romanians know intuitively that they are living in a dream world of such naïve realism when they utter the

saying, “Please God, grant Romanians their last minute’s wisdom.” But, this thought appears *a posteriori*, being the conclusion of a painful life experience; unfortunately, proverbs are no more than an anecdotal embodiment of popular wisdom.

The difference between us and our Western peers is also highlighted by philosophical analysis. I have in mind Ion Petrovici’s commentary on Kant’s practical philosophy, where he puts in balance the *so-called* and the *authentic moral acts*. Thus, it becomes obvious that *good* cannot be the result of an incidental individual act, of a generous feeling or of pity; it can only come as a correlative of duty. A thinker who belonged to Orthodox Christianity must have found it hard to write that “*When people, who are indifferent and cold and devoid of all generous tendencies, succeed to do good without any sentimental urge, that act of good has a high moral value*”.¹ Under the influence of pietistic education, Kant considered that the value of religion has an ethic nature. For him, as Jean Beaufret suggests, “duty represents the truest kind of prayer”.² This explains Kant’s firm belief that God’s will is that man should manifest an active type of faith, a faith whose aim is to achieve fulfilment in one’s own self, as well as in one’s peer.


Therefore, it is our own duty to take action, just as it was the West’s duty at Yalta to show no mercy for our decades of aimless wanderings along an unconfirmed path of history.

b) The Logical Perspective. In Christian Europe two worlds co-exist. From the point of view of the organization of religious life, this division was officialised by the 1054 schism, by the Reform, and by other events. In parallel, history has placed its mark upon the cultural, political, economic, etc. moulding of European states, and the differences that exist today between the West and the East represent their distinctive features. If we

restrict our consideration to Orthodoxy and Catholicism exclusively, then the two factual conditions are the objective elements of a cognitive proposition that can be symbolised as *p* and *q*.

If the West and the East - as Christian worlds - have an ontological justification, then from a logical point of view *p* and *q* should describe them as possible worlds. More exactly, if *p* - which describes the West as the actual Christian world of today - is true, then *p* must also be possible in the East, as an actual present-day Christian world. Reciprocally, *q* enjoys the same logical status. Hence, both Christian worlds are conceivable as non-contradictory.

If we now consider the history of culture and civilisation as the framework in which faith and religious ideas play a central role for the human being, then Christianity (founded upon the Holy Scripture and the Holy Traditions) can be considered the founder of two possible worlds, i.e. the Orthodox world and the Catholic world. Using the symbols: *FRI* - for *the world of faiths and religious ideas*, *C* - for the world of *Christianity*, *CST* - for *the world of Christianity based on the complexity of the Holy Scripture and the Holy Tradition*, and *OC* and *CC* - for the *Orthodox*, and respectively, the *Catholic world*, we get:



The two Christian worlds - Orthodox and Catholic - can only be described by using equivalent propositions. These do not exist in the context given by the relations of identity for *p* and *q* cannot replace each other - they merely have the status of truths.

b.1) Commentary on the Logical Perspective. The logical possibility of coexistence of two possible Christian worlds does not involve the identity of the two statuses. Hence, we cannot derive logically the conclusion that Orthodoxy and Catholicism can be described by contradictory terms.

But the practice of religious life has led – by reciprocal excommunication - to two contradictory worlds, although God is One, the Bible has no variants, and logic shows clearly that these worlds are conceivable as non-contradictory. Conjoined ecclesiastic and political decisions - which imposed the schism and hence a relation of contradiction between the West and the East - presupposed a series of ingredients of political, economic, social, cultural and, obviously, doctrinal nature. Without indulging in analytical details, we can describe this status by using the logical square, according to which a universally affirmative proposition (*SaP*) is in contradiction with a particular negative proposition (*SoP*). For example, we can write,

(1) All those who are Christian recognise Apostle Peter as the stepping stone on which Christ built His Church, the first Pope of the Church of the entire world as such; consequently, all Popes have an apostolic legitimacy.

and the contradictory assertion,

(2) Some Christians do not recognise the relationship between Jesus Christ and Apostle Peter as transitive, and that every Pope has a privileged relationship with God.

If we analyse these statements carefully, we realise that both propositions are pragmatic - or rather, axiological - statements, whose logical status is different from that of cognitive statements. This is because they do not follow the rule “*two categorical propositions that are in a relation of contradiction cannot be true or false at the same time and within the same relation.*”

Consequently, the formulas *SaP* and *SoP* are chameleonic, i.e. they mime categorical propositions. More exactly, the verb “*recognise*” mimes the copulative function of “*is*”, masking in this way an *illogical* state, i.e. the subjection of the Christian multitude to a decision - a decision that is not in clear view but has taken on the impersonal face of tradition.

In his book *The Churches of the East and the West in the History of Church*, Ernst C. Suttner takes under rigorous scrutiny the situations of schism, presenting them as supposedly contradictory stances of communion with Jesus Christ, and not as contradictory positions of sister churches. Or, this shows unmistakably that - if the notion of communion is also an expression of Christianity’s religious identity - then the notion of schism denotes an estrangement from God. The author implies plainly the logical principle of non-contradiction when he says, “We can be certain that the gift of Jesus Christ - who did not come simultaneously as *yes* and *no* (see Corinthians: 1.19) - is given to all communities, to whom he offers himself as a Means of salvation, necessary for their redemption”.³

Consequently, the identity of the Christians must be perceived and moulded in relation with the person of Jesus Christ, as an instance of fully accomplished union between the human and the divine, and not as a function of one’s appurtenance to one church or another. At the same time, according to the supreme commands of the New Testament, the term “Christian” denotes only that human individual or community which lives in full communion, i.e. in love of both God and his peers. If the referent of the term “Christian” is describable as a contradictory state, then either the adjustment between the notion and the object is false, or the idea of “Christian” has been turned into a void notion of the square-circle type.

Therefore, the differences between the Christian West and the Christian East have neither logical nor theological consistency, but have been artificially generated by political, economic, and cultural elements.

2. Christianity and the Resurrection of the Aristotelian Spirit

The type of relationship with one's peers described in the parable of the charitable Samaritan, presupposes - apart from spiritual-religious aid - the satisfaction of a number of vital needs and interests among which those incessantly generated by culture and social practice. Briefly, it involves the promotion and justification of a certain type of relations between Christian theology and various scientific and philosophical disciplines. In the economy of this paper, my focus falls on the reception by Christians of Aristotle's work and of the rationalist spirit that derives from his philosophy. This reception had a powerful bearing on legitimising certain theoretical premises according to which the cultural moulding of the Christian world was accomplished along the centuries.

In Book III (B) of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle analyses the issue of founding a science of the being. In his characteristic style of sustaining his interrogation to the maximum, he identifies a fundamental distinction between what is eternal and what is transitory and ephemeral. Obviously, this existential division comes from Plato and - we must point out - was also taken up by Christianity, i.e. the distinction between the Creator and His creation. What does Aristotle say? His questions concern the One *per se* and the Being *per se*: "But if there *is* to a being-itself and a unity-itself, there is much

difficulty in seeing how there will be anything else besides these, - I mean, how things will be more than one in number. For what is different from being does not exist, so that it necessarily follows, according to the argument of Parmenides, that all things that are are one and this is being."⁴ Thus, if there is something beside One or Being, it cannot be but transitory, subject to change. There are some exceptions, i.e. the mathematical objects, which have a status apart from material elements. But precisely this determines us to affirm the following axiom: "the knowledge of anything is universal"⁵. In other words, science embraces as object of study something that transcends the multiplicity of things. The nature of the oneness of multiplicity is exclusively conceptual, and the nature of the object denoted by the term multiple is either material, or non-material, e.g. the multitude of mammals, or a multitude of geometrical figures.

In order to transcend multiplicity - e.g. multitudes of objects or mathematical objects - we have principles. "It is common, then, to all beginnings to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known..."⁶ What takes us by surprise in this definition is the specification of the functions of the principle - meaning the *ontic* and the *cognitive* reasons. We have here a triadic structure, i.e. *ratio-essendi* - the reason for being; *ratio-seminales* - the generative, creative function of the multiple; and *ratio-cognoscendi* - which makes knowledge possible.⁷ By these functions, the principle grants existence and gives us the possibility of reflecting upon what is revealed by the relationship thinking - Being.

Finally, Aristotle asserts the possibility of a science of the being as Being. Commenting upon this possibility, Pierre Aubenque discusses the "double project of an ontology and of a theology, respectively, what he calls

ontological the problem of union, and theological the issue of separation”.⁸

The paradoxical condition of theology as science, understood as first philosophy, is asserted by Aristotle straightforwardly. On the one hand, “it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek that is suited to him”, and, on the other, “God alone can have this privilege” “possesses such a science, or only He possesses it in its fullest measure.” At the same time, for man “All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better.”⁹

2.1. Aristotle and the Western Culture

The idea of theology as science of the divine was held at high esteem by Western Christianity, especially in the scholastic period, but also later on. Based on this privileged form of manifestation, the rationalist spirit developed into the very foundation of the growth of European culture. The phrase “Europe is based on Greek culture and Christian philosophy” shows clearly that this is a generally accepted truth.

The structure faith - reason, already put in conjunction by such early philosophers as Augustin, was later embraced as *credo ut intelligam*. After the scholastic period, the idea of a *Mathesis universalis* – a science legitimised by reference to God – stimulated the thinking of philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz.

Augustin’s philosophy is an exercise in which the search for God and rational understanding merge into one another. He considered that, in order not to fall prey to heresies, a Christian must have a clear understanding of his own condition. Of great interest is his confession concerning the reading of certain of Plato’s books and the acknowledging of their beneficial influence. He says, “To these books, I think, you wanted

me to rush before examining Your Scriptures, so that their overwhelming effect should be engraved in my mind, and later, when I would take a rest in Your books (...), I should be able to distinguish what is the difference between supposition and confession, between those who see which way they must go and those who do not see the way one must follow.” He makes explicit the relation with philosophy by the following reasoning: “Because, whereas at the beginning I would have been instructed in Your Holy Scriptures and would have taken comfort in their knowledge, had I come across those volumes only later, they may have abducted me from the foundations of faith, or, had I persevered in the feeling that I had so healthily absorbed, I may have considered that those books can also lead to something creative, for those who had only learned them”.¹⁰ The conclusion of this puzzling argumentation - i.e. that *philosophy is a philosophy of Christianity* - becomes obvious if we rewrite it in a symbolic formula:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{If S is P then S is Q, if S is R then S is Q} \\ \quad \quad \quad \underline{\text{S is P or S is R}} \\ \quad \quad \quad \text{S is Q} \end{array}$$

The scholastic period is, by excellence, a period of rationality. We might summarise its leading idea as follows: It is rational to believe in God. It is rational to believe that God makes Himself known to us through revelation and miracles. It is rational to believe that the Bible is revelation, etc. The work of Anselmus must also be analysed in this spirit. Thus, for example, *Monologion* is conceived as a model of meditation on certain truths of faith, just as the subsequent *Proslogion* - based on *unum argumentum*, or the ontological argumentation. *Why did God Turn into Man* falls under the same category. Subsequent works such as *On Truth* and *On Free Decision* are also viewed as philosophical. Without giving a full list of Anselmus’ works, we must point out that he dared - in the spirit of Aristotle, and also of

Augustin, of course - to employ a purely rational method to clarify certain aspects of revelation.

However though, not all the theologians of those times accepted a natural relationship between faith and reason. Peter Damiani, to take only an example, considered that philosophy is Satan's invention.

But let us return to *Proslogion* conceived as a direct dialog with a living God. It begins with a prayer addressed to Him and then continues with a logical investigation of human knowledge and ignorance. "The abstract dialectics carried out here – as Étienne Gilson says – goes from faith and reason and returns to the point of departure, reaching the conclusion that what faith offers is straightforwardly understandable".¹¹ Thus, Anselmus does not deny the existence of God, nor does he turn Him into a concept - as some voices mischievously suggested - on the contrary, Anselmus invokes Him and begs Him to grant "understanding to his faith". Methodologically, what is required is that "the mind should be challenged when contemplating God" (the title of the first chapter); but this methodology must be in close touch with prayer, so that it should simultaneously open a way towards God, and uplift man through prayer and through the rational search for God. In Anselmus' words, "Teach me how to search for You and reveal Yourself to the searcher: because I cannot search for You if You do not teach me, nor can I find you if You do not reveal Yourself to me".¹²

As the quotation shows, Anselmus' search for God is not uniquely the philosopher's doing, but also God's, i.e. it is a rational undertaking within the divine revelation. Or, this can be viewed as an adaptation to Christianity of Aristotle's definition of primary philosophy as theology (*Metaphysics* - I, A, 2, 982 b and 983 a).

By using a metaphor, we can say that Thomas of Aquino Christianised Aristotle, or even that, by studying the work of Aristotle, Thomas became the master metaphysician of the Christian dogma. The formula seems paradoxical if we do not make a clear distinction between faith and knowledge, or more exactly, if we do not understand the limits of the conjunction between man's two possible relationships with God. In *Summa Contra Gentiles* he writes that we have to make "a distinction between what is known in itself simply (*simpliciter*) and in what concerns us (*quand nos*). Because the existence of God is known in itself simply, as God is its own existence. But since our mind cannot conceive what God is, it remains unknown to us in what concerns us (*quand nos*)".¹³ It is obvious that the expression *simpliciter* targets the divine relationship, while the phrase *quand nos* refers to the limited possibilities of human reason, unable to operate in the field of transcendence.

In *Summa Theologie*, Thomas emphasises the nature of human knowledge as opposed to the nature of knowledge among angels. Angels "apprehend the truth of things directly and without resorting to reasoning"; conversely, humans get to know the intelligible truth only by reasoning. For reasoning, man "sets out from certain truths that he knows directly - i.e. the first principles - then he returns, by way of reasoning, to the first principles in the light of which he analyses what he has learned".¹⁴ But reasoning has a limited scope. Thus, if the "formal infinite that is God, is known in itself but is unknown to us this is due to the weakness of our intellect, which in its present status has a natural capability to grasp only material things", then "in our present status we can only know God through His material effects".¹⁵

In Thomas' argumentation - we must admit - Aristotle's logic can be retraced; but this *doctor angelicus* does not try to demonstrate that God exists, but merely that He is in the presence of man. Therefore, the five "paths" described in *Summa Theologica* are *a posteriori* possibilities and are all based on the principle of causality and on empirical knowledge.

Without insisting and considering other philosophers of the scholastic period, some ideas ought to be emphasised - ideas which implicitly reflect the influence of the Aristotelian spirit:

- 1) Western culture in the Middle Ages developed around church, which thus became an *ecclesia docens*.
- 2) Latin made possible the circulation of ideas and the unity of Western culture.
- 3) Philosophy becomes an *ancilla theologiae*, which soon became a privilege as it allowed scientific research to develop in an emancipated way.
- 4) By accepting the autonomy of sciences, learning benefited by the introduction of the seven liberal arts through a two-cycle program, i.e. *trivium*, or first cycle - consisting of *grammar*, *dialectics (logic)*, *rhetoric*; and *quadrivium*, or second cycle - with *arithmetic*, *geometry*, *astronomy* and *music*.

Promotion of the rationalist spirit and stimulation of research are premises for founding, in the 12th and 13th centuries, the universities of Bologna, Montpellier, Paris, Oxford, Salamanca, Cologne, Heidelberg, etc., - autonomous institutions with a well defined status. It was in these great universities that the seeds of the Renaissance were planted, and it was also here that, gradually and continuously, Western culture was moulded - a culture whose pragmatic-rationalistic creativity is in accordance with the typologies described by Ioan Biriş. "In this type of culture and civilisation, the cycles of becoming are oriented progressively", i.e. the "line of creativity" is oriented "principally towards the future".¹⁶

2.2. The East and the Destiny of Aristotelian Logic

The Christian world of the East was not entirely cut off from ancient thought and Aristotle's brilliant rationalist spirit although today it may seem so. The apparent departure is not due to the number of centuries that separate us from the period that precedes the schism, but to the sustained efforts of doctrinarian purging invested especially after the schism. In the East, philosophy was accepted only as servant of theology, and logic only as *organon*, i.e. an instrument for assessing whether a line of thinking was just or not - which means that philosophy and sciences were not granted autonomy. Besides, in 529, emperor Justinian closed the Academy in Athens, thus depriving the so-called "pagan world" from any kind of scientific manifestation.

During the first Christian centuries the situation was different. For example, Justin the Martyr and Philosopher wrote in his work *Dialogue against Jews* that "Philosophy is the greatest asset and worthiest of God. It alone can uplift us to God and bring us close to Him; and true saints are only those who have trained their minds in philosophy".¹⁷ Among the Cappadocians, a philosopher endowed with great speculative ability was Gregory of Nysse. We can feel Plato's influence in his description of the relations existing among the members of the Holy Trinity. Aristotle's thinking can be discovered in *Anthropological Explanations*, in the way in which he defines the attributes of God's face that exist in man, or in the dialectics of the face-similitude relation. Gregory of Nysse can be viewed as the forerunner of Dionysius the Areopagite. In this context, two aspects of Dionysius' contribution need to be emphasised: his work on the logical function of negation performed in the description of apophatic knowledge, and his proto-

nominalist position. The way in which he assimilated ancient thinking would later on influence the West, and especially the development of philosophy and logic. Besides, in the 9th century, his work was translated into Latin by John Scotus Erigena, a good logician of the times.

The Christian writer of the East whose work had, perhaps, the greatest influence upon scholastic logic, was John of Damascus. “His main work *Περὶ Ἐπιπέδα* - *The Source of Knowledge* -- begins with a philosophical introduction – μὴ ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς ἐπιπέδα – on Aristotelian logic. This introduction is based on the stoical idea according to which dialectics is called upon only to defend philosophical conceptions and to contradict false ones”.¹⁸ In a previous study, I pointed out that, in his *Dogmatics*, John of Damascus uses the laws of reasoning with great subtlety. “With impeccable logic, John of Damascus describes the relations between the hypostases and the divine being - *ousia*, accurately underlying the ontological identity and difference that exists between them.” Already in the titles of the chapters dedicated to the Son and the Holy Spirit, we encounter the syntagm “syllogistic demonstration”, and his argumentation can be “summarised under the third syllogistic figure”¹⁹, i.e.

MaP
MaS
 SaP

Although John of Damascus considers logic a mere “organon” (unlike Western philosophers, who viewed it as one of the seven liberal arts), this status was contested too after the great schism. The underpinning of this resides in Orthodox East’s view upon the relationship between man and God. Dumitru Stăniloaiie’s words are unequivocal: “The need for purifying oneself of passions for this knowledge, or for acutely feeling one’s sinfulness

and insufficiency, shows that this knowledge is not of a negative intellectual kind (i.e. a mere negation of rational assertions about God), the way the West perceives it. It is knowledge by experience. Besides, Eastern Fathers call this closeness to God union, rather than knowledge”.²⁰

To illustrate the basic difference between East and West we may bring to mind the Isyhastrian controversy which opposes Orthodox mysticism and scholastic rationalism. Or, Gregory Palama asserts plainly in the dispute the need for a mystical experience of God, for particular sciences are inefficient. These sciences are obviously condemned, for in their case - as Dumitru Stăniloaiie shows - truth is “forever arguable and mixed with lie”, whereas the truth “inherent in Godly inspiration is obvious ...”. “The truths of sciences is neither necessary, nor does it bring about redemption”. Admittedly, learning and “the knowledge inherent in sciences can contribute to clarifying the Scripture”, but this does not represent a sufficient condition; the undertaking becomes possible “only if we have the only available key to the Scripture, the gift of the Holy Ghost”.²¹

Such a conception about the role of the profane sciences has raised questions concerning the need for organising education, and it can explain - to a certain extent - the centuries of delay before the first Orthodox universities of the East appeared. Furthermore, Eastern culture has always had an atemporal dimension, and - as Traian Herseni puts it - rural Romania represented “a belated ethnographic society” until the end of the 19th century.

Notes:

- ¹ Ion Petrovici, *Kant. Viața și opera*, Eurosong Book, 1998, p.182;
- ² Jean Beaufret, *Lecții de filosofie. De la Platon la Heidegger*, vol. 2, Editura Amacord, Timișoara, 1999, p.66;
- ³ Ernst Christoph Suttner, *Bisericile Răsăritului și Apusului de-a lungul istoriei bisericești*, Editura Ars – Longa, Iași, 1998, p.14-17;
- ⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III B, 4, 1001a, Translated by W. D. Ross in *The Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 1, Edited by W. D. Ross, Reprinted in *Great Books of the Western World*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, Auckland, London, Madrid, Manila, Paris, Rome, Seoul, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, p. 520
- ⁵ Ibidem, III B, 6, 1003a, p. 522
- ⁶ Ibidem, V D, 1, 1013a, p. 533
- ⁷ Florea Lucaci, *Creație și ființare*, Editura Dacia, Cluj – Napoca, 2002, p.27 – 28;
- ⁸ Pierre Aubenque, *Problema ființei la Aristotel*, Editura Universitas – Teora, București, 1998, p.245;
- ⁹ Aristotel, *Op. cit.*, I A, 2, 983a, p. 501 and 500
- ¹⁰ Fericitul Augustin, *Mărturisiri*, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al B.O.R., București, 1985, p.165-166;
- ¹¹ Etienne Gilson, *Filosofia Evului Mediu*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1995, p.228-229;

- ¹² Anselm de Canterbury, *Proslogion*, Biblioteca Apostrof, Cluj – Napoca, 1996, p.12;
- ¹³ Sf. Toma din Aquino, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, în *Proslogion*, Ediția citată, p.102;
- ¹⁴ Toma din Aquino, *Summa Theologica*, în *Gândirea evului mediu*, Editura Minerva, București, 1984, p.102;
- ¹⁵ Ibidem, p.119,
- ¹⁶ Ioan Biriș, *Istorie și cultură*, Editura Dacia, Cluj – Napoca, 1996, p.80;
- ¹⁷ Justin Martirul și Filosoful, *Dialog contra iudeilor*, II, 1, apud, Anton I. Adămuț, *Literatură și Filozofie Creștină*, vol. 1, Editura Fides, Iași, 1997, p.83;
- ¹⁸ Anton Dumitriu, *Istoria logicii*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1975, p.303;
- ¹⁹ Florea Lucaci, *Considerații logico – epistemologice asupra cunoașterii raționale a divinității*, în *Teologia*, Anul VII, nr. 3-4/2003, p.149-165;
- ²⁰ Dumitru Stăniloae, *Teologia dogmatică ortodoxă*, vol. 1, Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al BOR, București, 1996, p.85-86,
- ²¹ Dumitru Stăniloae, *Viața și învățătura Sfântului Grigorie Palama*, Editura Scripta, București, 1993, p.27.



Mircea Flonta, Hans-Klaus Keul și Jorn Rusen (coord.), Religia și societatea civilă

Ed. Paralela 45, Pitești, 2005.

Actualitatea dezbaterilor asupra fenomenului religios nu necesită lămuriri suplimentare, cumva, *sine qua non*. Adică, la rigoare, și forțând ușor lucrurile, religia se pare că nu înțelege datul epistemic al societății contemporane. Ea „uită” societatea seculară, specific occidentală în care trăiește; „uită” că Dumnezeu a murit; „uită” că *sensul* nu e original, ci, cu bunăvoință, poate original, dar numai ca efect istoric; „uită” că maeștrii suspiciunii i-au demonstrat neadevărul; „uită” că credința, ca una din axiomele sale fundamentale, e discutabilă în raport cu rațiunea. Toate aceste probleme sunt regăsite în volumul colectiv al întâlnirii de la Sibiu consacrată relațiilor complexe presupuse de relația dintre religie și societatea civilă. Autorii prezenți în volum încearcă, fiecare, să dea o soluție relativ la aceste „uitări”.

Aducând în discuție crizele de sens cu care societatea occidentală se confruntă, Jorn Rusen propune drept soluție recursul la religie (cu referință specială la religiile avramice). Instituind ca regulă universală „transcendența și mântuirea”, proprie tuturor celor trei religii, se poate spera într-o reglare a atitudinilor care depășesc *prea mecanicele* principii specifice democrațiilor, adică egalitatea și imperativul toleranței. Soluția pare simplă atâta vreme cât, ca și alt exemplu, esteticul stă drept mărturie a acestei reușite. Identitatea pare salvată, diferențele de-asemena, nu mai rămâne decât să începem dialogul având drept principiu, ne spune Jorn Rusen, înțelegerea ca și posibilitate de recunoaștere atât a diferențelor cât și a elementelor comune.

Un loc de cinste îl ocupă, în acest ansamblu de texte, destul de omogene, raportul atât de discutat dintre credință și rațiune. Accentul pus pe atât de forjatul raport credință/rațiune se bazează pe necesitatea construcției unei societăți civile capabile să facă față excesului materialității, excesului civilizației, crizei morale, etc. O posibilă soluție, ne spune Gheroghița Geoană, nu poate sta decât sub necesitatea restaurării sacrului, într-o manieră oarecum eliadeană, cu toate funcțiile pe care acesta le poartă cu sine. Spre pildă, funcția integrativă atât de necesară fiecărei comunități nu o poate da decât apelul la sacru. Însă, această zbatere perpetuă între *dianoia* și *nous*, ne avertizează Mihail Radu Solcan, scindează comunitățile creând, pe de o parte societăți deschise, și pe de alta societăți tradiționale. Societatea deschisă acceptă mai ușor ceea ce modernitatea aduce cu sine. Cea de a doua este, însă, păstrătoarea tradiției. Această posibilitate de lectură a societăților tradiționale ne este propusă de Mircea Flonta, care analizează mentalitățile religioase populare specific românești. Cheia de lectură apare ca fiind morala kantiană care ar trebui să regleze raporturile

Key words:

religion, civil society,
Mircea Flonta, Jorn
Rusen, Hans-Klaus Keul,
religious community

dintre „trăire” și „practica religioasă”, pentru că „această mentalitate religioasă nu constituie nucleul religiozității”, mai mult, acest „spirit accentuat gregar” nu lasă loc „pentru poziții și inițiative personale”. Nu știm dacă Mircea Flonta adoptă aici poziția lui Max Weber, nici măcar dacă acceptă teoria lui Huntington, ci doar că mentalitatea țaranului român este una profund retrogradă. Două precizări sînt necesare în acest caz. Moralitatea kantiană sucombă fără religie, și nu în sensul necesității ideii de Dumnezeu ca principiu regulativ, ci, la nivelul celei mai banale practici, unde actul moral pur, ca și fenomen, nu-și suportă singurătatea avînd mereu nevoie de un soi de recunoaștere divină care să-l facă posibil. Apoi, în al doilea rînd, vorba lui Țuțea „nu mi-aș dori să trăiesc în lumea lui Kant”.

Religia și moralitatea (dacă acceptăm că pot fi scindate total) pot fi elemente constitutive ale societății civile, desigur, salvardate de rațiune. Însă, se pare că avem nevoie de o propedeutică pentru a putea reglementa un raport funcționabil între cele trei. Adică, cât mai simplu cu putință, avem nevoie de maestrul spiritual, ne spune Laura Gheorghiu. În acest sens registrul suportă puține mărturii. Cine sunt într-o

societate de consum, o societate de masă, o societate în care lipsesc cu desăvîrșire ierarhiile, maestrul? Punînd toate aceste întrebări, și fără a da un răspuns, Laura Gheorghiu ne sugerează cum ar trebui să arate un maestru spiritual: „Maestrul nu e un profesor care să te învețe ceva, care să dea note. E un individ care și-a găsit propria definiție. Cel mult îți oferă un semn că drumul, căutarea propriei identități merită efortul, o mărturie că se poate, că lucrurile au sens”. Să presupunem că am înțeles. Adică, la limită, șansa societății civile, ca bun garant al funcționării democrației stă în modelele pe care ar trebui să le urmăm. Deși acestea sunt de negăsit în arealul societății contemporane, masificate, avem datoria de a le căuta.

Soluțiile propuse în acest volum vin să dea un răspuns construcției unei societăți civile atât de necesară în contemporaneitate. Religia apare ca fiind un element definitoriu și decisiv. În acest sens, spre exemplu, Ioan Vasile Leb vede în societatea civilă analogul comunității religioase, care trebuie să facă obiectul unei analize atente în aceeași măsură în care analizăm moralitatea sau raționalitatea.

Șerban Leoca, Purtători de adevăr

Napoca Star, Cluj-Napoca;
Galaxia Gutemberg, Tg. Lăpuș, 2005

Sunt rare aparițiile editoriale din peisajul filosofic românesc actual care pot fi catalogate ca inedite sub raportul stilului și modalității de abordare a problematicei asumate sau chiar prin problematica asumată. Printre acestea poate fi inclusă și cartea lui Șerban Leoca intitulată *Purtători de adevăr*, apărută în vara anului 2005 prin efortul conjugat al Editurii Napoca Star, Cluj-Napoca cu cel al Galaxiei Gutemberg din Târgu Lăpuș. Ea este prima lucrare din literatura filosofică românească dedicată exclusiv monografierii purtătorilor de adevăr, înscriindu-se astfel printre încercările de racordare ale acestei literaturi la un limbaj și o problematică aflate sistematic în centrul dezbaterilor filosofiei analitice contemporane.

Tema purtătorilor de adevăr se dorește a fi cercetată “ cel puțin ca intenție “ din perspectiva conexiunii teoriilor de adevăr cu problematica purtătorilor de adevăr. Pentru a-și realiza obiectivul, autorul analizează câteva instanțieri ale purtătorilor de adevăr în istoria

filosofiei, pe care le consideră relevante, dar fără a-și mai justifica în mod detaliat opțiunile pentru un gânditor sau altul. De aceea, uneori demersul apare abrupt în teoretizările pe care le face, iar metodologic se bazează pe *flash-uri* și „tăieturi” conceptuale de circumscriere a problematicei investigate. Astfel, cercetarea întreprinsă nu mai poate fi apreciată ca una propriu-zis istorică, cum ar lăsa să se înțeleagă periplul printre autorii investigați, deși are loc printr-un survol conceptual al istoriei problematicei adevărului și purtătorilor de adevăr.

În sistematizările pe care le face, cartea se ghidează în principal după două lucrări cu autoritate (una privind istoria logicii “ Kneale, M. & Kneale, W., *The Development of Logic*, alta referitoare la teoriile de adevăr, în special cele elaborate din perspectiva filosofiei analitice “ Kirkham, R. L., *Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction*), dar și de opțiuni personale justificate prin importanța filosofică a gânditorilor analizați (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Habermas, Brandon) sau nu întotdeauna bine explicitate (de pildă, pentru teoria mistică ortodoxă sau pentru autori precum Franz Rosenzweig). Dacă e să caracterizăm pe scurt demersul autorului acestei cărți, el se dorește unul situat la intersecția „excursului istoric” cu „excursul sistematic”, dar având o tentă numai ușor monografistă din moment ce se axează doar pe câteva dintre tematizările privind adevărul și purtătorii de adevăr.

Organizându-și cartea în acest fel, Șerban Leoca reușește o trecere pertinentă în revistă a pozițiilor autorilor selectați, reproducând corect punctul de vedere al fiecăruia. În plus, ajunge la o investigare reușită și la zi a cel puțin câtorva dintre spinoasele probleme pe care le conexează direct sau indirect cu problematica purtătorilor de adevăr (adevărul, semnificația, conceptul, gândurile, satisfiabilitatea, holismul, superveniența, desemnarea, consensul,

Key words:

analytic philosophy, truth carriers, Frege, Quine, Kneale, Brandom

inferențialitatea). Excelează din acest punct de vedere îndeosebi în capitolele și subcapitolele dedicate lui Frege, Quine, Kneale, White, Habermas și Brandom, axându-se de obicei doar pe câte o lucrare a autorului studiat, considerată relevantă și fiind de regulă chiar relevantă pentru poziția autorului respectiv.

Întâmpină însă dificultăți nu atât în raportarea soluțiilor date de autorii cercetați în problema purtătorilor de adevăr la concepțiile lor despre adevăr, ci în raportarea acestor concepții la teoriile despre adevăr conturate în literatura de specialitate. E însă neapărată nevoie de această din urmă raportare? Răspunsul ce vine numaidecât dinspre literatura dedicată problemei e categoric: da!

Modul cum a fost tematizată problematica purtătorilor de adevăr presupune efortul de a distinge și caracteriza principalele teorii asupra adevărului conturate în lucrările de specialitate (teoria corespondenței, teoria coerenței, teoria pragmatistă) sau variantele acestora (teoria semantică, teoria redundanței, teoria pragmatică), pentru a nu mai vorbi de noile resistemizări teoretice în care problematica purtătorilor de adevăr este direct vizată (teoria identității, teoria revizuirii, teoria postmodernă sau teoriile propriu-zis deflaționiste, cum ar fi teoria redundanței, teoria performativă și așa-numita teorie „prosentențială”). Atât abordările analitice tradiționale, cât și noile resistemizări teoretice consideră purtătorii de adevăr ca fiind acele entități despre care putem spune că sunt adevărate sau false, deci că au valoare de adevăr.

Lucrarea lui Șerban Leoca nici nu face total abstracție de aceste distincții, dar nici nu le acordă o atenție specială, considerându-le ca fiind subînțelese, neproblematic teoretic și operaționale metodologic. Se mulțumește doar cu constatarea că placa turnantă spre noile abordări a oferit-o Frege prin studiul dedicat gândurilor, după care purcede la prezentarea

conținutului acestui studiu, fără să sesizeze că % pornind de la Frege % adevărul va fi atribuit purtătorilor fie ca obiect (cazul paradigmatic al „adevărului la purtător”, în care accentul cade pe valorile de adevăr), fie ca proprietate (cazul propriu-zis al „purtătorilor de adevăr”, în care accentul cade pe candidații la adevăr sau fals). Procedând astfel, opțiunea modest asumată încă de la început (de a prezenta conexiunea dintre teoriile adevărului și problematica purtătorilor de adevăr) lasă locul ambiției de a umbla fie în caleașca „purtătorilor de adevăr”, fie cu „adevărul la purtător” prin „istoria” și „sistematica” filosofiei.

Practic, efectul nedorit al schimbării modului de investigare se manifestă nu atât în conturarea stadiului actual al cercetărilor din domeniul purtătorilor de adevăr, cât în delimitarea principalelor tendințe de evoluție din cadrul acestuia din urmă. Exemplificând, autorul neglijează cu bună știință contribuțiile substanțiale avute în tematizarea purtătorilor de adevăr de autori „deflaționiști” precum Russell, Ramsey, Ayer, Carnap, Austin, Strawson, Williams, Rorty, Cohen, Horwich, Grover sau Gupta, cu toate că unii dintre ei își încep considerațiile despre adevăr exact cu problematica purtătorilor de adevăr (fie că doresc să o clarifice și să o dezvolte, fie că doresc să se distanțeze de ea, în extremis considerând-o superfluă).

Șerban Leoca își motivează această atitudine într-o singură frază, printr-un argument preluat necritic de la Kirkham: autori precum Ramsey, Strawson și Williams nu sunt lași în seamă deoarece ei „contestă sensul sau existența purtătorilor de adevăr [...] ca o consecință a contestării rostului termenului «adevărat» și a pretensei vacuități a ceea ce acest termen desemnează”. Ori, această preluare necritică ar fi putut fi evitată dacă ar fi fost consultate unele lucrări antologice de referință pe problema adevărului (precum cea editată de Paul Horwich, *Theories of Truth* sau cea editată de către

Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons, *Truth*), lipsind însă “ ca și altele “ în mod surprinzător și impardonabil din bibliografia cărții.

Ca o paranteză aici: neconsultarea directă a câtorva dintre lucrările invocate are loc și pentru unii autori clasici (de pildă, neanunțată în cazul lui Platon, netrecut probabil din această cauză la bibliografie, sau anunțată în cazul stoicilor), fiind preferate preluările după lucrarea soților Kneale, mai sus amintită (astfel, din concepția lui Platon este neglijat rolul jucat de existență în raport cu adevărul și opinia, foarte important pentru evoluția ulterioară a problematicii purtătorilor de adevăr spre tematica presupuzițiilor).

Un alt efect al schimbării tacite, din mers, a opțiunii inițiale, adoptate programatic, îl constituie neglijarea unora dintre diferitele teoretizări date purtătorilor de adevăr în literatura de specialitate. Aceste teoretizări sunt strâns legate de teoria despre adevăr asumată de fiecare gânditor, cele mai multe aparținând adeptilor teoriei adevărului-corespondență. Ele vizează mai cu seamă natura și clasificarea entităților purtătoare de adevăr: propoziții, fraze (expresii propoziționale tip și ocurente), enunțuri, aserțiuni, acte de limbaj, rostiri, exprimări scrise sau gestuale, teorii, doctrine, fapte, indivizi, credințe, opinii etc.

Principala problematizare privind natura amintitelor entități candidate la adevăr a mers în literatura de specialitate pe direcția conectării naturii lor abstracte (de exemplu, propozițiile “ ca și conținut propozițional) sau materiale (tot doar ca exemplu, frazele “ ca și expresii propoziționale) cu diferitele instanțieri ale adevărului (adevărul logic, adevărul factual). Clasificarea purtătorilor de adevăr a urmat calea diferitelor modalități în care ei dobândesc și își transmit valoarea de adevăr (primar, secundar, terțiar), fiind însoțită de analize aplicate la fiecare dintre ei.

O altă problematizare a purtătorilor de adevăr, în strânsă legătură cu cea precedentă, urmărește să contureze principalele atitudini față de aceștia (o atitudine pro, o atitudine tolerantă și una contra), care se regăsesc însă indistinct distribuite în raport cu aria manifestării lor (lume, limbaj, cunoaștere, acțiune). În fine, dar nu în ultimul rând, problematizarea purtătorilor de adevăr a suscitată numeroase discuții și cu privire la terminologia utilizată pentru a-i desemna, putându-se chiar susține că de la aceste discuții s-a ajuns la primele tematizări în domeniu.

Am trecut în revistă aceste tematizări nu cu gândul de a-i reproșa lui Șerban Leoca faptul că nu a zăbovit asupra lor, ci cu acela de a evidenția că le-a utilizat tacit pe parcursul întregii lucrări sau explicit atunci când analizele o cereau (de pildă, privitor la concepția Frege, Cartwright, Kneale sau Habermas). Dacă le-ar fi reluat, ar fi mers pe un drum bătătorit și bine reprezentat în literatura de specialitate, așa însă demersul său rămâne unul inedit, cu evidentă tentă de originalitate. Totuși, din utilizarea lor pripită câte o dată (cazul lui Cartwright), apar unele neajunsuri legate în special de fluctuațiile terminologice.

Exemplificând din nou fugitiv: termeni precum „aserțiune” (*assertion*) sau „enunț” (*statement*) sunt utilizați indistinct, cu înțelesul de „afirmație” sau „afirmare”, când de obicei în logică prin „aserțiune” se înțelege atât „afirmație” („afirmare”), cât și „negație” („negare”), iar prin „enunț” (*statement*) îndeosebi „exprimare” (rostită, scrisă, gestuală) sau câte o dată chiar „actul de limbaj” al enunțării (asertiv, interogativ, imperativ etc.). Faptul că se face confuzie între acești termeni anulează mare parte din efortul și efectul prezentării originale a concepției lui Cartwright.

O situație similară apare și în cazul lui Habermas, dar mai redusă ca proporție, chiar dacă alți termeni sunt

utilizați corect: „propoziție” (*proposition*) pentru conținutul propozițional, „expresie propozițională” (*sentence*) pentru frază sau expresie (ocurentă sau tip), „rostire” (*utterance*) pentru exprimare ș.c.l. Ca o circumstanță atenuantă pentru neajunsul semnalat stă faptul că fluctuațiile terminologice amintite mai sus apar în majoritatea lucrărilor de specialitate privind purtătorii de adevăr, ținând parțial de lexicul limbilor naturale utilizate (engleză, germană, etc.), parțial de întrebuițările primite la fiecare autor.

Odată sesizate, „încurcăturile” terminologice de acest fel nu afectează decisiv calitatea și claritatea exprimării, Șerban Leoca dovedind un îndelung exercițiu în frecventarea filosofiei analitice și o bună cunoaștere a acestei filosofii. Tot aici, de precizat mai e faptul că, pentru a-și atinge obiectivul propus, autorul folosește bibliografie de specialitate adusă la zi, cu excepțiile deja semnalate, fructificând lucrările fundamentale din domeniu, dar și unele oportunități de informare oferite de Internet.

Prin această lucrare, filosofia academică românească se îmbogățește nu numai cu terminologia și problematica purtătorilor de adevăr sau cu perspective teoretice puțin frecventate la noi (Rosenzweig, White, Cartwright, dar mai ales Brandom), cât mai ales printr-un spirit inedit de apropiere de/ și pătrundere în/ filosofie.

Laura Herța Gongola

Sergiu Mișcoiu Le Front National et ses répercussions sur l'échiquier politique français 1972-2002

Cluj-Napoca, EFES, 2005, 123 p.

Out of the numerous academic works concerning extremist parties, Sergiu Mișcoiu's *National Front...* strikes us from the very introduction by the self-assumed effort to accomplish a 'well-rounded' analysis of the issue rather than to refer to some particular details of it. Does the author succeed in this challenging mission? In order to answer this question, one must acknowledge the defining nature that the author attributes to the Front National – that of a political phenomenon. In Mișcoiu's understanding, the Front National is a political phenomenon by three basic characteristics – the mechanisms of its explosive growing, its duality (as “a synthesis of both various traditions and the contemporary anti-system currents”, p. 4), and the unpredictability of the consequences that it generates.

Key words:

extremist parties, Front National, political systems, French politics

Keeping in mind this founding definition, Mişcoiu approaches the Front in a rather well-inspired three-part structure. The first part (“Conditions”) begins with a long (maybe even too long) chapter in which the author broadly describes what the French literature defines as the “conditions de possibilité” (“the conditions of possibility”) that allowed the explosion of the National Front (FN) in the middle of the 1980s. The scrupulous description of the social and economic environment leads us to the author’s conclusion that the crises that took place in the 1970s were socially acknowledged by the French society only in the middle of the 1980s (pp. 7-20). This engendered a number of particular popular expectations, most especially that of restoring the Welfare State of the 1950s-1960s. The political shift from the right wing to the left in 1981 (analysed in the second chapter), seen by the “people” as a major step towards this restoration, proved to be a false promise. At the same time, as the author indicates, the French political parties undertook a process of “re-orientation”, meaning that, in an effort to enlarge their electoral base, they “slowly abandoned their extremes” (pp. 24-25). A keen reader could find here the key to understanding the Front’s political outburst as a correlation between the step-by-step opening of a left-right two-sided political space (demonstrated by the analysis of the evolution of the four main parties, pp. 24-37) and the realisation of the long-lasting nature of the social and economic crisis, as described in the previous chapter.

If the ideological and electoral space are prepared, it remains to be seen whether a new political party can gain sufficient strength in order to conquer it. The “phenomenological story” of the National Front is thus dissected by the author in the next 61 pages of the second part (suggestively called “Décryptages”). The schematic but comprehensive “Radiography” (the third chapter of the book) of the Front is composed of a

critical history of its origins and evolution and of an analysis of National Front’s themes and ideology. Mişcoiu puts forward a sociological explanation of FN’s programmatic positions, as the Front has always followed its authoritarian but charismatic leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, rather than an orthodox political line. Moreover, Mişcoiu shows that the entire programmatic scheme of the party is built around this leader’s personal capacity to make inspired and unchallengeable changes in the public discourse of the Front (pp. 53-63). But the part in which the author succeeds the most in demonstrating the rightness of the phenomenological definition of the FN is to be found in the fourth chapter (pp. 64-74). The Front is depicted as a “sophisticated synthesis” of the traditions of what was commonly described as being the extremist right wing; the Front is thus a political building with the unique capacity to gather, in a heteroclitic but paradoxically coherent melting-pot, the traditionalist, the fascist, the nationalist and the national-socialist currents. In Mişcoiu’s view, the various post-war predecessors of the Front (analysed in the last part of this chapter, pp. 70-73) have failed precisely because they were unable to benefit from the experience of the anti-establishment parties of the past.

The fifth chapter, dealing with the Front’s electoral dynamics, is trying to illustrate this assumption by separating the political history of the FN into two periods – the “pre-electoral” period and the electoral period (pp. 75-82 and 82-99). The conclusion is that the Front became able to benefit from the general societal crisis (presented in the first part) only from the moment when it became capable of using to a large extent its synthesising capacities. The pinnacle of FN’s success is, without any doubt, the 2002 presidential election, when Jean-Marie Le Pen was able to participate in the second round. But Mişcoiu does not deal with the “2002 momentum” as with something peculiar for the FN, but

integrates it in the general evolutionary trend that he has analysed in the whole book, as “a response of the people to the societal crisis and the political and civic demission”.

If the reader is not convinced yet, the author deepens the analysis in the third and last part called “Confluences”. Its two chapters (“The National Front – neither Right Wing nor Left Wing?” pp. 100-109, and “The Left Wing and the Right Wing Facing the Front”, pp. 110-119) present the reactions and the counter-reactions of the French political parties who suddenly found themselves confronted by a “political phenomenon”. The French noun *bouleversement* seems to describe in the best manner the evolutions of the political spectrum of the 1990s: the decay of the Communist Party, the vacillations and the dismembering of the centre-right wing Union for the French Democracy, the oscillation and the hesitations of the Socialists (which finally proved to be fatal for the former Prime Minister and presidential candidate in 2002, Lionel Jospin), and the Pyrrhic victory of Jacques Chirac in the same troubled year are all circumscribed to a scheme-play in which the Front seems to be, at the same time, an arbitrator and a butcher.

Finally, I have to draw attention to the most original element of Mişcoiu’s analysis – the logical and step-by-step demonstration of the existence of the “two Fronts” (pp. 102-107). There is an imaginary one, which occupies only the far right wing of the electoral spectrum; it served for the left wing as a fascist enemy and a scapegoat for nearly two decades but proved to be equally dangerous for it as for the “collaborationist” right wing. And there is a real Front, anticipated, in the early 1990s, by only a few scholars and NGO activists and endowed with the power to collect votes and to support the popular discontent from the very extreme left to the very extreme right of the political spectrum. Mişcoiu thus succeeds in showing that the Front is, once more, rather a phenomenon than a party with a regular evolution, who, in the author’s words, “does not cease to teach us precious lectures” about the vulnerable character of the contemporary political systems.



Raluca Ciurcanu

Jacob Neusner Iudaismul în timpurile moderne

Hasefer, București, 2004.

În contextul studiului religiei, „epoca modernă” este înțeleasă prin prisma situației în care religia, în speță creștinismul, de pe poziția de formator dominant și recunoscut al civilizației, și-a pierdut statutul de adevăr de la sine înțeles. Aceste condiții au influențat și iudaismul.

Odată cu secolul 18 concepția despre lume și modul de viață religios, biblic a intrat în rivalitate cu modul de gândire secular, iar creștinismul s-a confruntat cu alte moduri de gândire și cercetare, situație ce a determinat iudaismul să se exteriorizeze și să se adreseze lumii dincolo de propriile sale limite comunitare.

„Iudaismul în timpurile moderne” oferă o cheie de lectură a răspunsurilor generate de două întrebări ale lumii iudaice: „Cum să trăim printre ne-evrei?” și „Este posibil să trăim printre ne-evrei?”. „Timpurile moderne” reprezintă în contextul cărții secolele 19 și 20, când evreii din Europa și Statele Unite au căutat să răspundă unor întrebări la care, timp de o mie cinci sute de ani nu

au avut motiv să se gândească, în condițiile în care religia pe care o primiseră de la înaintași le oferea o explicație a identității lor din perspectiva eternității. Totodată, acest sistem de înțelegere le spunea mult mai puține despre cine sunt ceilalți, cei din afara comunității, și cum să evalueze valoarea celor care sunt deosebiți de ei; prin urmare au trebuit să afle singuri cum să trăiască nu printre, ci împreună cu străinii.

Lucrarea este structurată în două părți: fiecare secol analizat este reprezentat prin câte o parte și tratat în același mod: o introducere, ce oferă date generale despre sistemele iudaice apărute în respectiva perioadă de timp, apoi o prezentare detaliată a sistemelor studiate. Prezentarea este urmată de fragmente din texte de referință ce se constituie într-o perspectivă diferită asupra aceluiași subiect.

O diferență notabilă în ce privește modul de înțelegere al celor două secole discutate aici și a mișcărilor intelectuale îndreptate spre înțelegerea diferenței și căutarea integrării și nu a segregării în raportul cu ceilalți, este dată de percepția și reacția la evenimentele ce au caracterizat acest interval temporal: în secolul 19 celălalt era privit ca o ființă benignă, în timp ce în secolul 20 cel din afară a devenit malign; astfel, pe lângă întrebarea cum trebuie să trăiești cu lumea, societatea evreiască s-a confruntat cu o altă întrebare, anume cum să supraviețuiești într-o lume care neagă dreptul la viață și dorește să îl distrugă.

Astfel, „modernitatea” epocii este dată de caracterul fără precedent al problematicii: cum să interacționezi și să relaționezi cu cel care înainte fusese ignorat și cum să găsești o soluție finală la problema urii manifestate de celălalt, o ură tratată înainte ca un lucru fără însemnătate, dat fiind faptul că anterior acestei epoci, în care evreii au început să se compare cu cei din afara comunității lor, ei îl considerau pe celălalt ca fiind străin, iar pe ei înșiși ca fiind autonomi.

Key words:

Judaism, modern period, Jewish community, Jewish identity

O dată cu elaborarea Constituției Statelor Unite, a Cartei Drepturilor Omului și a Declarației Drepturilor omului, comunitatea evreiască a ridicat întrebarea: cum putem fi și „Israel” și altceva, acest altceva fiind definit ca cetățeni nu doar ai unei comunități supranaturale a credinței ci și ai unei națiuni aparținând lumii acesteia. În această ordine de idei, lucrarea de față se ocupă de două grupuri de evrei: în primul rând, de evreii care au continuat să practice religia iudaică, care găsesc în tradiție răspunsuri la întrebări ridicate de propria lor situație; în al doilea rând, de evreii care constituie sisteme iudaice (“iudaismele”) deosebiți de cei care se călăuzeau după tradiția moștenită.

Prima categorie de evrei se întreba cum puteau fi și “Israel”, și altceva, trăind nu numai printre ci și împreună cu ne-evreii. Prima categorie se adresa situației secolului 19, cu speranțe și promisiuni pentru întreaga omenire, iar a doua, secolului 20, epoca războiului, experiența Holocaustului. Iudaismele secolului 19 vroiau să știe cum să trăiască, evrei fiind, în lumea ne-evreilor; cele din secolul 20 se întrebau cum este posibil să trăiască în aceeași lume. Prima categorie și-a constituit sistemele în secolul 19, având o pondere considerabilă în Statele Unite ale secolului 20. Aceste sisteme sunt ale iudaismului reformat, primul dintre iudaisme care a răspuns întrebării privind integrarea, cel al iudaismului ortodox, o reacție la iudaismul reformat, care considera integrarea și segregarea ca fiind cele două extreme asupra cărora trebuia meditat și cel al iudaismului conservator, cu o poziție de mediere între cele două menționate mai sus.

A doua categorie și-a conceput sistemele într-un cadru etnic și politic, nu religios. Primul răspuns a fost dat de sionism, ce îi considera pe evrei o entitate politică ce trebuia să se constituie în „statul lui Israel”. Sionismul răspundea negativ întrebării dacă se poate trai printre ne-evrei. A început ca mișcare organizată în 1897,

atingându-și scopul în 1948, odată cu recunoașterea în plan mondial a dreptului poporului evreu de a întemeia statul Israel.

Al doilea răspuns a venit din partea evreilor care doreau să transforme întreaga omenire într-o singură comunitate, în numele unirii muncitorilor din întreaga lume, iar acest fapt a fost formulat de socialismul iudaic, organizat în Uniunea muncitorilor evrei „Bund”, în 1897. Scopul său era de a crea o lume în care evreii să poată supraviețui, în condiții egale cu ale tuturor celorlalți cetățeni.

Al treilea răspuns este cel al iudaismului Holocaustului și al Mântuirii, care face apel la propriul său sistem de credințe pentru a exprima viața comunității evreilor. Aceste șase sisteme iudaice, trei din secolul 19 și trei din secolul 20 au căpătat contur în contextul epocii moderne și fiecare este un răspuns la întrebarea esențială a epocii respective. Continuând sistemul moștenit al Torei, aceste noi iudaisme s-au rupt în cele din urmă de el deoarece au abordat o problemă critică, aflată în afara sferei de preocupări a iudaismului moștenit. Astfel, preocuparea esențială a fost, pe de o parte, definirea și justificarea schimbării, iar pe de alta, găsirea acelor posibilități de a nu mai duce o existență distinctă de a ne-evreilor, ci integrate acesteia.

Timp de două sute de ani, toate iudaismele noi au debutat prin a defini caracterul și sensul despărțirii de vechiul iudaism moștenit. Problema pe care o înfrunța fiecare nou sistem iudaic era aceea a poziției și statutului secular al evreilor, luați ca indivizi și (cel puțin în sens ideal), ca cetățeni asemenea tuturor celorlalți. Apariția statului-națiune, care nu recunoștea comunitățile (celor credincioși) ci doar indivizii, a dat naștere unei categorii pe care religia moștenită nu o cunoștea: evreul individual.



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În secolul 19, referindu-se la condiția de secularizare, prin care evreii sperau să își poată găsi un loc în cadrul statului-națiune, cele trei iudaisme, ca și continuatoarele ale Torei, au adoptat premisa conform căreia secularul se diferențiază net de religios și au stabilit clar că iudaismul este și a fost întotdeauna o religie. Pe fondul evenimentelor secolului 20, ce au culminat cu experiența Holocaustului, o importanță majoră au avut-o sionismul și socialismul evreiesc. În plan politic, sionismul oferea singurul răspuns valabil pentru cei religioși și anume faptul că evreii constituiau un singur popor și că trebuiau să pună bazele statului evreu. La problema economică, socialismul evreiesc propunea soluția formării unei uniuni a evreilor care să treacă la acțiune ca sector evreiesc al clasei muncitoare mondiale.

Al treilea iudaism al secolului 20 este așa-numitul iudaism American, în fapt iudaismul Holocaustului și Mântuirii, a cărui întrebare se referă la sensul existenței evreiești după asasinarea sistematică a majorității evreilor din Europa, iar răspunsul său este afirmația conform căreia mântuirea reprezentată de crearea statului Israel este de fapt cealaltă jumătate a tuturor celor întâmplate. Concepția sa este aceea că evreii sunt asediați, nu au opțiuni și nici alianțe, sunt confrunțați cu o lume permanent ostilă, pe care, totuși, prin acțiuni politice, o pot schimba.

Mihaela Frunză

Liliana Popescu *Politica sexelor*

Maiko, București, 2004

Acum 25 de ani, Kate Millet publica faimoasa lucrare „Sexual Politics” – lucrare care a consacrat, în discursul feminist, folosirea sintagmei „patriarhat” ca sistem al autorității masculine prezent în istorie. Cartea pe care ne-o propune Liliana Popescu – „Politica sexelor” – ne oferă posibilitatea de a avea un echivalent autohton (ce valorează infinit mai mult decât orice traducere) al „Politicii sexuale” de peste Ocean. Dincolo de asemănarea din titlu, volumul Lilianei Popescu aduce și altceva: o actualizare „la zi” a tematicii abordate, o prezentare accesibilă a ideilor și ideologiei feministe și o aplicare absolut punctuală pe cazul democrației „made in Romania”.

Dacă ar fi să căutăm un termen de comparație mai apropiat din punct de vedere geografic pentru volumul de față, probabil că lucrarea care se apropie cel mai mult de intențiile sale este „Ultima inegalitate” a lui Vladimir Pasti. Totuși, dacă în acel volum autorul nu făcea decât să exploreze un concept consacrat al terminologiei feministe, cel de patriarhat, găsindu-i corespondențele în

Key words:

feminism, ideology, democracy, gender equality, sexual politics.

realitatea românească, cartea Liliane Popescu propune un punct de vedere original și pe alocuri „îndrăzneț” – e vorba de un calificativ propus de Laura Grunberg, autoarea prefeței – și anume, acela că democrația românească este „mai democratică” pentru bărbați decât pentru femei. Formula pare paradoxală, dar rimează perfect cu contextul românesc atât post cât și predecembrist, în care, nu-i așa, aveam de-a face cu o societate de oameni „egali”, dar în care unii erau „mai egali decât alții”.

Analiza Liliane Popescu este deosebit de cuprinzătoare și convingătoare, acoperind atât un aparat teoretic foarte bine fundamentat – vezi în special ultima parte – *Guvernare și democrație* – cât și pasaje aplicate pe contextul românesc – în special capitolele referitoare la prostituție și pornografie, după știința mea printre cele mai documentate și mai complete analize de până acum din literatura feminismului românesc. Lucrarea sa circumscrie atât prezentări de tip istoric-documentar asupra mișcărilor de femei și feminismelor, cât și analize aplicate asupra unor concepte din vocabularul teoriei politice feministe. Este, de altfel, o caracteristică recurentă a volumelor de acest gen apărute în România de după anii '90, explicabilă de altfel în contextul cantității reduse de surse de informare a publicului (chiar a celui relativ cunoscător) în acest domeniu.

În același timp, *Politica sexelor* propune spre discuție teme mai puțin dezbătute în România. De un interes aparte sînt și capitolele despre mișcarea de bărbați și domeniul recent „men and masculinities”, destul de rar abordat la noi. De asemenea, capitolele despre identitățile de gen alternative oferă prilejul unor sintetizări necesare în contextul unei lipse cronice de astfel de teoretizări în spațiul românesc. Ca o notă inedită, volumul cuprinde și prezentări documentate ale unor inițiative de tip activist, unul din exemple fiind o prezentare de tip *insider* a scandalului *Playboy* și a

protestelor declanșate în jurul lui, la care autoarea a participat, atât ca martoră cât și ca organizatoare. Așa cum comentează Laura Grunberg, în acest mod „această carte are și o valoare de document, lăsînd urme scrise”, ceea ce completează multitudinea de aspecte și fațete ale volumului.

Feminism academic, analize practice, exemple activiste – cum încap toate acestea între copertile aceluiași volum? Cine o cunoaște pe Liliana Popescu nu va avea dificultăți să înțeleagă și chiar să admire acest *cocktail*, altminteri derutant în apropiere. La fel cum autoarea reușește, în viața cotidiană, să îmbine competențe dintre cele mai diverse – de la coordonarea de programe în cadrul UNDP și pînă la profesarea în cadrul SNSPA, trecînd prin experiența coordonării proiectului Civic Education Project Romania – la fel, acest volum adună laolaltă experiențe teoretice și experiențe trăite, într-o complementaritate fericită.

Volumul Liliane Popescu este simultan o carte academică bine contruită și o lucrare cu potențialități de *best-seller*, în cazul în care va beneficia de o publicitate pe măsura conținutului său. Dincolo de discursul teoretic, ea reușește să-și provoace cititorii și cititoarele, prin modalitatea de tematizare și prin informațiile sistematizate. În acest fel, unul din miturile livești propuse de un Roland Barthes, cel al întâlnirii dintre *scriitura în plăcere* și *lectura în plăcere* devine realitate, prin parcurgerea, pagină cu pagină, a volumului propus de Liliana Popescu.

Cătălin Vasile Bobb

Ovidiu Pecican România și Uniunea Europeană

Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2003

Colecția de texte publicate de Ovidiu Pecican în diferite reviste culturale apare acum sub forma unui volum care încearcă să creioneze problemele actuale ale societății românești, aflate în pragul unei iminente și atât de necesare integrări europene. Acest subiect intens dezbătut de toate figurile politice și culturale contemporane este adus de către Ovidiu Pecican înspre origini printr-o tipologizare istorică a chestiunii în discuție.

Ovidiu Pecican face din recursul la istorie o posibilă cheie interpretativă a situației actuale a Uniunii Europene. Premisa autorului este că totul poate fi explicat prin analogie cu un fapt îndepărtat al trecutului nostru, întrucât reminiscențele dau seama de situarea actuală. Nimic nu scapă reculului îndepărtat al istoriei. Pe acest palier, Pecican recrează drumul destul de sinuos al construcției Uniunii Europene, diferențiind între est (care s-ar caracteriza prin crize istorice, răbufniri colective, violențe și excese) și vest

(caracterizabil prin valorile rațiunii, libertății și democrației). Însă autorul găsește modalitatea cuvenită pentru a sparge dihotomiile tari, forjând o mediere elastică între cele două. Punând în perspectivă relațiile destul de tensionate dintre cele două părți ale Europei, Pecican analizează cu subtilitate diferențele dintre imaginarul american și cel european. Chestiunea este mai degrabă sensibilă, întrucât noua ordine mondială pare să fie stabilită de SUA și nu de bătrânul continent; ceea ce pentru noi, totuși europeni, pare greu de suportat. Astfel că și analizele lui Pecican rămân tributare manierei europocentriste de analiză a lucrurilor: „Europa a instituit o regulă a jocului diplomatic pe care, în linii mari, omenirea o mai urmează și astăzi”. Apoi, în aceeași manieră, prin defolierea straturilor istoriei, autorul analizează relațiile pe care România interbelică le-a avut cu Europa, și care ar fi putut continua dacă perioada comunistă nu le-ar fi obstrucționat temporar.

Această necesitate care se impune României, respectiv afilierea la Uniunea Europeană, este privită de Pecican când cu umor, în cazurile mărturisirilor de jurnal, când cu maximă seriozitate, atunci când vorbește de necesitatea racordării constituției României la constituția Europeană, sau când vorbește despre viața politică ezitantă, contradictorie a liderilor României, sau despre prăbușirea economică caracteristică situației actuale. Aceste opinii aparent divergente privitoare la Europa ar putea contraria cititorul. Totuși, se pot constata două direcții majore ale discursului: prima, în care Uniunea Europeană reprezintă viitorul necesar al unei României tot mai strâmbe și o a doua, în care predispoziția spre trecut basculează un sentiment de superioritate/ inferioritate greu de descifrat. Pecican pendulează în ambele direcții, restabilind, cu instrumentele sale de istoric, posibilul adevăr, și investind un soi de încredere specifică intelectualilor „ținuți” sub cortina roșie.



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Key words:

history, European Union, integration, Romania, cultural heritage, Ovidiu Pecican

Este necesar, ne spune Ovidiu Pecican, să restabilim un echilibru între trecut și viitor, dat fiind că ambele sînt importante în discuție cu aspectele lor economice, în primul rând, dar și cu cele politice și culturale. În acest context, Europa reprezintă o garanție, dar una care funcționează în dublu sens. Adică, promisiunea prosperității economice vine în același timp cu cerința de respectare a principiilor europene. Ovidiu Pecican consideră că nu doar economicul decide, ci și moștenirea culturală care caracterizează acest spațiu geografic. Această moștenire culturală aduce cu sine un palier aparte al discuției; anume religia. Nu se poate nega rolul central jucat de creștinism în istoria europeană, iar în acest context, aderarea Turciei devine problematică. Regăsim aici o idee ce poate fi întîlnită și la alți intelectuali români, cum ar fi Patapievici, Paleologu, Djuvara etc.

Regăsirea unui echilibru în care să coexiste atât autenticul cât și noul (străinul) presupune strategii gestionabile în care fiecare parte să-și regăsească autenticitatea. Invocarea moștenirii creștine poate funcționa în acest caz ca un liant necesar. În același registru, al coeziunii, trebuie privite și apelul la miturile fondatoare, întrucât „binele social vine în opoziție cu drepturile individuale, iar libertatea e contrazisă de control. Europa ar putea fi [...] și istoria imaginării, alcătuirii, dezvoltării și instituționalizării anumitor mitologii istorice.” Această nevoie/dorință de creare a Uniunii Europene poate fi regăsită și în marile mituri ale lumii monoteiste. Arca lui Noe cât și Turnul Babel nu fac decât să stea mărturie pentru această necesitate actuală.

Trebuie realizată radiografierea tuturor elementelor care alcătuiesc posibilitatea construcției unei Uniuni Europene. Orice detaliu trebuie luat în considerare, ca o bucată dintr-un puzzle, și repus în locul în care desăvârșește întregul ansamblu. Analiza istorică reușește, probabil, cel mai bine acest lucru. Însă, de cele mai

multe ori, istoria păcătuiește prin lipsă de flexibilitate: ea poate funcționa ca motor explicativ al unei cauze, însă nu poate propune soluții. Totuși, Ovidiu Pecican depășește maniera de reflecție specifică istoricilor de modă veche, îmbinînd în chip fericit speculațiile filosofice cu datele istorice și reușind astfel o survolare a mentalului colectiv actual.

Ceea ce face însă savoarea volumului este actualitatea lui. Ovidiu Pecican pare mereu prezent acolo unde se întîmplă lucrurile; el stă drept mărturie generațiilor următoare care vor dori să înțeleagă acest moment al aderării României la Uniunea Europeană, și să fie martori la frămîntarea unui intelectual român prins între autohtonismul său sănătos și nevoia unei afiliieri la lumea din afară, la lumea Occidentală.

