Stamatopoulos Dimitrios

Key Words:boundaries, constitutional
belonging, immigration,
national identity, particularism

Dr., Department of Philosophy,
University of Lake Constance, Germany.

The “Return” of Religious and Historiographic Discourse:
Church and Civil Society in Southeastern Europe (19th – 20th centuries)


Abstract: In this paper, I began by examining national identity understood as cultural belonging. I tried to show that this kind of belonging fails to give a justifiable account of the pluralistic reality found in modern states. I then proceeded to examine the idea of belonging to a polity. My claim is that this sense of belonging is more suitable for nation-states that have multicultural societies and consider this plurality as a vital part of their national identity. If the arguments presented here are convincing, we will have to stop thinking of national belonging as belonging to a cultural group, and pay more attention to belonging to a polity and all that that entails.

The dynamic re-emergence of religious phenomena within the circumstances of cultural and economic globalization, such as those shaped after the decline of state socialism (a harsh version Rousseau's “civil religion”[1]), has reformulated the conditions of production and orientation of historiographical discourse in relation to the past decades. Whether in the case of analysis of religious fundamentalism in the periphery and semi-periphery[2], or of theoretical approaches that treat the religious sphere as an inseparable, integral part of “civil society” in the post-industrial Western countries, the reexamination of the role of religion in relation to the construction of the social field (and to its history) seems imperative.

What will mainly occupy us are the historiographical elaborations as far as they concern the role not of the religious phenomenon in general but of the priesthoods

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in relation to the question of the emergence of public sphere in Southeastern Europe[3].

There are two presuppositions of the formation of historiographical discourse concerning religion that were primarily shaped during the decade of the 1990's:

a)the revision of the classical thesis concerning secularism[4]. The concept of secularism according to the advocates of revisionism does not necessarily include the marginalization of the religious field as a necessary presupposition for the emergence of an autonomous public sphere.  On the contrary, it considers the religious element as a component of the constitution of civil society; whether because representatives of religion can participate in supporting political and social rights against the state - obviously in the case where the religious institutions and the state are separate - or because the presence of the religious element functions to preserve a vanishing spirituality, but also one endangered, by the generalized commercialization of the social structure.

b)the progressive domination of the discussion around the issue of the civil society. The discussion about the revision is especially linked to the Anglo-Saxon domain (and here we would like to draw attention to the important role played by the translation of the classic work of Jürgen Habermas[5] and to recall his discussion with Reinhart Koselleck in the1960's) with the issue of the emergence of the public sphere in the civil society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This discussion is directly associated with the dynamic return of the concept of civil society, which was expurgated for the most part from the remnants of the works of Marx[6] and Gramsi[7]. It came back and established to the scene with Ernest Gellner’s later work[8], where the analysis of the concept counterpoised with that of Umma, the Islamic community of the faithful, very clearly shows the alternatives of distinction or subjugation between the two spheres: political and religious.

These two poles (the revised position concerning secularism and the domination of the discussion about the limits of formation of civil society) facilitated the development of a series of historiographical approaches that particularly touched on the areas of Eastern and Southeastern Europe’s history. Here we are concerned with three central cases of historiographic discourse’s production, as indicators of the dominant “paradigm” ’s change: the first concerns the role of the Russian church in the pre-Revolutionary period; the second, the issue of secularization and its relations with Islam in the Ottoman Empire; and finally the third, the problem of internal fragmentation of the Orthodox millet with the establishment of Greek autocephalus Church in 1833 and later that of Bulgarian Exarchate[9]. These new approaches were intended to solve various long-standing problems and for the most part resulted in solutions within existing opposites of historiographical schools of thought.

In the case of Russia, the discussion about civil society became prominent primarily during the post-Soviet period in the 1990’s. Essentially, however, this discussion had already been prepared by historians of the Anglo-Saxon domain[10] during the 1980’s in relation to

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the assessment of the role of the Russian church in the pre-Revolutionary period. The traditional view of the church as anti-Revolutionary, an organ of the czarist regime, was progressively substituted with an image of ultimately subversive institution of this regime, especially when the aristocracy attempted to use or better yet to intensify its legislative role which it had already undertaken, especially during the reign of Nicolas II. Gregory Freeze supports this contention in several of his works, mainly concerning the attitude of the lower clergy[11].

In the case of Turkey, the discussion was basically carried out about the collision between secularized version of Islam proposed and supported by Kemalist regime, and radical-fundamentalist Islam mainly represented by the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) during the 90’s.  In this case the correlation between a radical version of the religion and the emergence of civil society, which assented to the lessening of the authoritarian characteristics of the Kemalist military regime[12], posed the problem at a much more advanced stage than in the Russian case, although the denunciations of fundamentalist political stream represented by Erbakan's version usually revealed this dissent in international news reports. Did it, however, has some type of impact on historiographical discourse? In my opinion, Deringil's book, “The Well-protected Domains” is a characteristic example. His basic argument is that, during the reign of Abdul Hamid with pan-Islamism as the well-known dominant and prevailing ideological scheme, the modernizing process was not discontinued, but on the contrary, the effect of bureaucratic reformation of the Tanzimat period continued unbroken (this is the “tacit knowledge”[13] of a service elite, who promote reforms nonetheless under the mantle of “religious vocabulary”).

It is obviously a question of a reproduction of the paradigm of “permanent reformation”. This was supplied in the interim by Serif Mardin’s work and his attempt essentially to preserve the paradigm formulated by Niyazi Berkes concerning the process of secularization of the Ottoman State [14]. This secularism not only steadily failed to reject Islam but actually incorporated it into the modernizing process[15], the characteristic example of which is Namik Kemal and the Young Turks. For the most part this school of thought has identified the reformation process with this secularism (i.e. the religious language of the elite in order to impose secularist reformations), while progressively incorporating into the paradigm what Mardin calls a “dream” of Western society: “the dream of civil society”[16].

The case of the fragmentation of the Orthodox millet was studied in fact by P. Kitromilides based on the revision of a plan of Modern Greek (Neo-Hellenist) “Enlightenment”[17]. This resulted not only in the elevation of the Balkan dimension of the phenomenon but also in a new denominator entering the analysis: that of considering the juxtaposition between Orthodoxy and nationalism[18], a position which in reality consists of the abstract authentication of the central plan of Greek historiography in the 1980’s, which contrasted nineteenth century Athens (the national center) with Constantinople (the de facto center of the empire)[19]. This transference to the level of structural juxtaposition

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of religion and nationalism led to a standardized authentication of relations of Greek autocephalus Church in relation to the Patriarchate of Constantinople: the first appearance of the classic example of state classification of the church within the adaptation of the scheme of national ideology (the state on the side of political protection while the church sanctifies the nation by identifying it with the chosen people).

On the other hand, the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople is considered as the protector of ecumenical ideology since it opposes the dissolution of Christian ecumenism, the representation of which it assumed after the fall of the Byzantine Empire. These two versions of Orthodoxy are juxtaposed in order to show that one is more acceptable to the dictates of civil society, which is fundamentally opposed to the reconstruction of the past through nationalist discourse.

And in these three cases the political consequences of the reconciliation between religion and the statutory conditions of the public sphere’s emergence, in exchange for the former withdrawal from the procedures of sanctification of the national body, are evident in a world where the issues of national dominance are brought up for discussion. Moreover, religions, especially monotheistic ones, have always been more suited to an imperial environment. However, this approach wants to show religions or various versions of them as resistant to state paternalism, and portrays the subjugation of religious institutions as the beginning of a distorted process of secularism. Apart from this approach being preferred on a political level as a canonical example of separation of church and state, it avoids investigating or rather cannot investigate the relations which the church developed with the civil society precisely during the period of its state subjugation.

Let’s take the very interesting example of the fragmentation of the Orthodox millet in the Ottoman Empire. It is very interesting that the ideological-political stream of Neo-Orthodoxy in Greece during the last decades, movement which condemns the declaration of Greek autocephalus Church as a version of state classification of the church, is identified with the supposed counter view which considers Orthodoxy incompatible with nationalism (that is incompatible with its classification within the nation state)[20]: the two views do not see that there is a repetition of structural classification which was also repeated in the case of the Ecumenical  Patriarchate and the Ottoman authority (deriving legitimacy) and this likening on the part of those who support Greek autocephalus Church, mainly for reasons arising from Russian influence. If in fact the statutory conditions of the Greek autocephalus’ creation were of Western origin (Catholic or Protestant), as the basic argument of the Neo-Orthodoxy’s supporters had proposed, then the separation of church and state would come naturally or the canonical method of organization of Lutheranism and in particular Calvinism, would appear in relation to the church and the society in the Greek case also[21] - the fact of delay in this process cannot be investigated by these two schools of thought.

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The method of employment of the declaration of Greek autocephalus by these two schools came into dominance in actual fact with the result that neither could evaluate the quality of the secularism that it caused: as far as secularism is concerned, the state classification of the church (even as a distortion) and not the expulsion/incorporation of the church into civil society with the characteristics of individual/citizen. And this does not happen because the church must exercise not only a legislative role with the orientations of the state, participating not only in the determination of internal or of external enemies but primarily in the process of social hegemony (this limit could incorporate notions such as making normative behavior, shaping civil morals, organizing social relations). State classification is only one side of the coin: the other is that which takes place amidst the contribution of the church in the control of “civil society.” This phenomenon must be interpreted on the historians’ part: what are the reasons that led to the selection of the church, in East and Southeastern Europe, as the central mechanism of social production of normative discourse and exercise of social control?

Here we can certainly make use of the ideas of Serif Mardin concerning the church’s role in the context of a traditional pro-modernist society, although the observation refers primarily to the workings of Islam within this context [22]. According to Mardin, religion and its representatives, play the role of middlemen, the intermediary between the individual and the state. And in fact, particularly in the case of Islam, which is characterized by the lack of a classical priesthood, as is the case of the Christian church, the capacity of the ulema is enmeshed as law makers/legislators of secular authority, of the teacher, of the judge,  - legality, knowledge of the law, and education are under the jurisdiction of the same body known for its sacred knowledge. The intermediary function was adopted by the Orthodox clergy mainly for the obvious reason of representing the Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire and is concerned with the entire extent of so-called “privilege” (much has been said about the latter in recent years): control of the educational process, legal transactions, tax collecting responsibilities, civil domain (marriage, divorce, inheritance), the domain of civil representation before the Court remain vital for the exercise of ecclesiastical authority.

Consequently, the domain that religion occupies - and this perhaps can constitute a general observation for the whole of Eastern and Southeastern Europe - is in fact the intermediate social domain, in which the intermediary functions of the clergy are engaged. The intermediate social domain, in which the limits of public and private[23] are found and thus form the conditions for the emergence of an autonomous public sphere (and at the same time the formation of an independent economic domain) are simultaneously the realm which traditionally claims the clergy in order to propagate its authority.

Because of this we see that the clergy does not refrain from but, on the contrary, recognizes and contributes

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to the process of collective organization of the social civil domain: from the moment that it cannot have complete control as in the case of pro-modernist social formations, it attempts to secure its vast presence in this sphere. When possible the church invades these social formations (for example groups that cannot exclude the influence of the church) and its collaboration creates hybrid conditions.  This same church creates organizations, or tolerates their function, while taking a critical stance when bourgeois (civil) collectivity becomes exclusive, as in the case of the Masonic orders (if in fact it is excluded from these). [24]

In particular we must closely consider the second case because it concerns the function of all the para-ecclesiastical organizations, which according to Neo-Orthodox criticism are the result of Protestant influence. In fact especially in this case, we can diagnose a main device in the control of the “intermediary” social domain and it would be interesting to see what the criteria of distinction are between a club or society and a para-ecclesiastical organization with philanthropic aims. What are the limits of and the requirements for the development of a civil morality within these organizations?

The criticism employed by the Neo-Orthodox viewpoint is precisely that their corporate organization, which is derived from the domain of social autonomy set up through an civil legal framework, cancels the pastoral relationship with the bishop. Christos Giannaras, for example, considers these organizations as outside - and not para-ecclesiastical[25]. Their existence calls into question the intermediary role of the clergy in organizing the relations between God and the faithful in order to replace it. The Protestant inspiration diffusion of the priesthood to the faithful, however, can only result in the organization of the social domain with a canonical model (discipline, work ethic, etc.). But does this argument hold?

The disorganization of the role of the clergy as intermediary between God and the faithful is the condition in order for the ecclesiastical discourse as civil morality to reign in the intermediate social domain, in which it intercedes between the state and the citizen. And in this process the official church not only substitutes but also contributes enormously.

In our opinion, we have nothing to do with a dominance of the Protestant model within Orthodoxy, but on the contrary with a reorganization of the sovereign discourse of the church as preferential ally of the state within the borrowed version of the Protestant example. The element of corporate organization is borrowed from one in order to cater to executive personnel as a reservoir of the faithful, while simultaneously in any case never calling into question the role of the clergy as intermediary. And it is not abandoned exactly because it cannot abandon the process of regulating society.

This is the reason why the church does not place itself naturally in the civil society - something which the school of Neo-Orthodoxy suppresses. While it permits the church to participate in the formation of civil morality, at the same time it exclusively controls the domain of the religious market.

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And if in fact it had been threshed out from the Protestant ethic, it should be receptive to multi-fragmentation and individualization and above all abandon its exclusive position in the market of religious conscience[26] - but for such a basic condition the critical role of the priesthood must be called into question.

The relation between these organizations and the official church, far from being a direct juxtaposition, can be characterized as follows: for the entire twentieth century there was in reality an exchange of powerful executives between these organizations and the clergy, without ever challenging the intermediary role of the priesthood between the faithful and God. The existence of these organizations was enough to make the area of civil morality autonomous.

The likening of the church to the state in the Ottoman Empire as much in the case of reformers as in the case of a section of the clergy, the repetition and its formation as representation catalytically shapes the relations of religion to the state. It is typical that whenever necessary the representatives of the clergy support the authenticity of the Holy Laws alongside the constitutionality of the General Regulations (the constitutional text which was derived from the Great Mixed (cleric-laic) Assembly in Istanbul between the years 1858-1860), it being more necessary to act adaptable to theories of the nation state. When the Holy Laws became an object of invocation, their legislative element was not theological authenticity but the fact that they represented that version of the Christian religion most well suited to the nation state model of constitutional monarchy. On the contrary, the General Regulations as the most important expression of the reformation (“secularism”) movement in the Orthodox millet should have been only to the degree that they did not provoke imbalances in the model of the “innate” constitutionality of Orthodoxy[27].

It seems then as if the reformations in the Orthodox millet, considered as its process of secularism, joined the state and the church in a relation not of classification but of reflection and mirage. The state does not classify religion - we could further say that it undermines the traditional ruling force. On the other hand, however, what is also of interest is that the religious attempt to propagate within through the adoption of the state models. In order to settle the issues of social and political hegemony within the millet, the representatives of the juxtaposed wing invoked a superior ideology - a symbolic reality - that organic relation between Orthodoxy and the constitutional model, precisely to legalize the defense of their proportional interests. This invocation, however, would contribute to the blurring of the boundaries between the two camps - religious and political - one of the most important peculiarities in the Balkan region that the nineteenth century bequeathed to the twentieth.

This return to Augustine, however, the likening, that is, of the religious and the political, one could call common to both the Catholic and Orthodox church at the end of the nineteenth century--a return that did not

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simply want to recall the distinction between the City of God and that of Man,[28] but to organize the latter according to the adopted, inviolable principles of the former--did it have the wider aim of settling inter-communal clashes? In my opinion, the problem is connected to the emergence of that which we would call “civil society.”

We began with the solution given by N. Berkes to the problem of secularism with the shift of the separation of church and state in itself to that of government from religion in the context of the transition of a traditional to a modern society. In reality, however, the appeal of the constitutional scheme, which has been analyzed in the case of Greek Orthodox community, undermines the framework of application of the theory of secularism. The common representational position—Orthodoxy as the archetypal version of the constitutional monarchy—is formed as a result of internal clashes in the community and not as a generalized acceptance of a transition from a traditional to a modern society. The solution could probably be found by confronting the internal clashes in the Patriarchate as well as in the wider domain of the Orthodox millet in the Ottoman Empire (especially within the development of Literary Societies) as one version of the emergence of civil society,[29] and always in the context of a state that promotes the separation of the political from the religious in order to vest exclusive administration in the former. In my opinion, three complementary interpretations could be developed as a solution to this:

a)Invocation of constitutionality while giving to the “organic intellectuals” of both sides the power to resolve the issue of political and religious relations within the millet, allowing them simultaneously to speak for the ideal manner of organization of the state. Their response becomes the organic core of the state. This argument has special significance since constitutionality comprises the common characteristic of the restructured millet on the one hand and the state on the other, making “superfluous” the absorption of the politicians responsible.

b)Invocation of constitutionality also allows them all to speak. There are analogous consequences with the role of the early use of “constitutional liberalism” in the Greek State. Consequently, it comprises the condition for the development of political discourse within the Greek Orthodox community in the name of different politicians, secular-clerical groups, and general interest groups.

c)If we accept the solution to Berkes’ offered by Serif Mardin,[30] in other words, that religion not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in the Middle East plays the role that should be played by the absent intermediary institutions between the community (or individual) and the state,[31] that is, it dominates the communal space within which what is called civil society emerged in the West, then the issue of the separation of the political and the religious field becomes more complex. The likening of religion to the state, from the perspective of the representatives of the Orthodox millet, does not only occur in order to confront the problem posed by their

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separation or distinction of the political from the spiritual sphere inside the millet, but also to further a modification of the intermediary realm under its hegemony. This realm was threatened with extinction by institutions whether “societies of citizens” (politicians, economists, and educators) or the “public sphere” in Habermas’ version.[32] For this reason, it was not a game of representation but a fierce competition between interest groups for the imposition of a hegemonic discourse that would impede the autonomy of the emerging public sphere at the same time that the millet was defended by the regime of hetero-determination that the Ottoman state wanted to impose on it.

The constitutional model did not prevail because the reformers proposed it as a transitional restructuring of the millet, but rather because the clergy espoused and developed a version promoting constitutional monarchy. Their target was not only to impede the dominance of the secular within the various transformations, but to avoid the formation of a public sphere without their knowledge, which one way or another in Eastern and Southeastern Europe was inherent in the emergence of an ethnic discourse.[33]

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, religion did not contribute to the emergence of the public sphere in the manner of the radical democratization brought by the spread of Protestantism in Western Europe.[34] On the contrary, if the representatives of the church had wanted to preserve their own welfare they would have followed the familiar path of state classification (either in the version of nation-building or in the prospective preservation of the imperial model with whose ecumenical profile it certainly agreed), in order to avoid as much as possible its withdrawal from the intermediary social sphere which it controlled, a sphere which was as threatened by centralizing tendencies of the Ottoman State as by the emerging civil community. Finally the Church in the East was allied with the State (either the ethnic state or the imperial state) in order to impede as much as possible the formation of a public sphere in a social realm to which it once legitimately belonged. It did not, however, necessarily take the character of prohibitive and restrictive measures. The form of constitutionality allowed the members of the different persuasions that clashed in the Patriarchy to contribute to the restructuring of the intermediary sphere, to propagate the likening of the religious to the political at the same time that they were struggling for hegemonic presence at the center of the emerging institutions of “civil society” (the attempt to control the collective organization of the millet), caring simultaneously to maintain as far as possible the relative untouched autonomy of the millet against the Ottoman political power (the Privileged).

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[1] Jean – Jacques Rousseau, The social contract and other later political writings, edited and translated by Victor Courevitch, Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

[2] Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic fundamentalism, Boston, MA : Twayne, 1990, Ahmad S. Moussalli (ed.), “Islamic fundamentalism : myths and realities”, Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, c1998.

[3] Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century” Craig Calhoun (επιμ.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts-London 1992, σ. 289-339.

[4] Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism” in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.) Secularism and its Critics, Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 31-53.

[5] Jürgen Habermas , The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, c1989) [Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit : Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft] .Neuwied, Berlin : Luchterhand, 1962.

[6] Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's “Philosophy of right” [Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts], translated from German by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley. Edited with an introd. and notes by Joseph O'Malley, Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1970.

[7] Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Gramsi and marxist theory, London ; Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.

[8] Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: The Civil Society and its Rivals, London : Hamish Hamilton, 1994.

[9] See for example, P. Kitromilides, "‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans"; in P. Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe, Hampshire 1994, chs. 11, 12, and most recently, Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, Reform and Secularization: towards a reconstruction of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19th century, Athens: Alexandreia 2003 (in Greek).

[10] See the Gregory Freeze’s article and the bibliography which was cited there, Gregory L. Freeze, “Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia”, The Journal of Modern History, 68:2 (1996) 308-350.

[11] It's important here to recall that Selim Deringil pointed out that the authoritarian clerical regime at the end of the 19th century was common in the Ottoman Empire of Abdul Hamid, in Russia under Nicolas I and Alexander III and in the Japan of Mitsuhito of the Meiji Dynasty. See Selim Deringil, The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909, London; New York:  I.B. Tauris 1998, pp. 16-17.

[12] Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Policies: the Case of Turkey” Norton Augustus Richard (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. 2, (New York-Köln: E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1996) pp. 17-43.

[13]  Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, p.166-170.

[14] Niyazi Berkes, The development of secularism in Turkey, Routledge, Λονδίνο 1998² (1st edition Montreal 1964).

[15] Davison Andrew, Secularism and revivalism in Turkey: a hermeneutic reconsideration: Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998, p.153-154.

[16] Şerif Mardin, “Civil Society and Islam” John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) pp. 292-293. See also by the same author, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1971) pp. 197-211. For a similar “dream” on behalf of the great opponent of the Ottoman state in the North, see, Laura Engelstein, “The Dream of Civil Society in Tsarist Russia: Law, State, and Religion” στο Nancy Bermeo, Philip Nord (ed.), Civil Society before Democracy. Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham-Boulder-New York-Oxford 2000, σ.23-41

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[17] P. Kitromelides, Tradition, Enlightenment and Revolution: ideological change in eighteenth and nineteenth century Greece, Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1978 and, especially by the same author, The Enlightenment as social criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek culture in the eighteenth century, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1992.

[18] P. Kitromelides, Enlightenment, nationalism and orthodoxy: studies in the culture and political thought of South-Eastern Europe, Aldershot, Hampshire; Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1994.

[19] See the excellent analysis in E. Kofos,  “Patriarch Joachim III (1878-1884) and the irredentist policy of the Greek state”, JMGS, 4:2 (1986) 107-120.

[20] See for example G. Metallinos, Church and Polity in the Orthodox Tradition, Armos, Athens 2000 (in Greek).

[21] Ch. Giannaras, Orthodoxy and West in Modern Greece, Athens, 1992, p.278 (in Greek), and after for the cooperation of the supporters of Adamantios Korais, the well-known representative of Greek Enlightenment, with Western missionaries.

[22] Şerif Mardin, “Civil Society and Islam” p.293.

[23] Here one could investigate the historic lack of social radicalism in Orthodoxy in contrast to the practice of the Roman Catholic clergy in social movements, e.g. Latin America. Social radicalism requires the experience of distinguishing public from the private and the incorporation of the church in the latter even if this happens in the form of a self-regulating organization.

[24] Douglas Smith, Working the Rough Stone: Freemasonry and Society in Eighteenth-Century Russia. Russian Studies Series, No. 6. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1999. In a chapter on “The Russian Public; or, Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century” the author demonstrates exactly how Novikov's Freemasonry fit into the new “public sphere” created by the boom in publishing and social activity, which came to characterize the latter half of the reign of Catherine II.

[25] Ch. Giannaras, o.p., p.348-405.

[26] See for this important issue, R. Stark & W.S. Bainbridge, The future of religion. Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation, University of California Press, 1985, and A Theory of Religion, New York, 1987.

[27] Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, “Church as State: Representations of the Orthodox Millet and the Model of the Constitutional Monarchy”, Mnimon 23 (2002) p.40-76 (in Greek)

[28] Saint Augustine De Civitate Dei, XIV.28; XV.1 & 21, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, Λειψία 1928-1929.

[29] For a survey of the theoretical problem of “civil society” see Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).

[30] Şerif Mardin,  “Ideology and Religion”, pp. 204-207.

[31] This must be considered and the origin of the point developed by Sia Anagnostopoulou concerning the millet as “intermediary sphere”. See Sia Anagnostopoulou, Asia Minor: the Greek-Orthodox communities. Ellinika Grammata, Athens 1998, p. 278-279 (in Greek). The “intermediary spheres” preexist the reformation and certainly preexist as well official attribution of privilege on the part of the Ottoman State.

[32]In Habermas’ version, the “public sphere” (development of societal organizations of the civil class including clubs, societies, Masonic orders, etc.) is distinguished from “civil society” (which includes the sphere of commercial production, essentially the domain of private economic interests). The hypothesis and especially at the of the emergence of the “public sphere” in Southeastern Europe for a time (end of the nineteenth century), which according to Habermas simultaneously began to be eclipsed in Western Europe, remains provocative. See J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 5. The development of the press, the assessment of its role in the organization of political discourse in Constantinople at the end of the nineteenth century but also the corresponding spread of societal organization (educational, philanthropic, societies, etc) to which we have mentioned, can result in powerful indication of encouragement of this theoretical paradigm. For a criticism opposed to the distinction of the public from the private sphere in the work of Jürgen

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Habermas and Philippe Ariès (Α History of Private Life: Passions of the Renaissance, ed. Roger Chartier, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge Mass. 1989) based on the most recent work of Roger Chartier Joan Landes, see. Dena Goodman, “Public sphere and private life: toward a synthesis of current historiographical approaches to the Old Regime”, History and Theory, 31:1 (1992) pp. 1-20.

[33] Geoff Eley, op. cit., p. .296.

[34] See for example the role of religion in the emergence of the “public sphere” in eighteenth- century England, David Zaret, “Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century England” Craig Calhoon (επιμ.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1992, p. 212-235.

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