Abstract
The theoretical background of the analysis of the creatio ex nihilo syntagm is constituted by the requirements of the semantics of possible worlds. Here the philosophical and logical research is implicitly valued in the modal reconstruction of the ontological argument. In the relations between concept, language, and object, several changes which are controlled by universally valid methods are possible. These are the following:
1. The antinomy given as a mystery of the world's origin is reduced to a non-contradictory logical structure, to a concept. 2. It can be proved that to this concept - creatio ex nihilo - several things correspond. The idea of a possible world grants subject-object unity to nihil, as an absolute determination and ontological correlation of creatio, as a possible determination of the existence. 3. A system that grants possibility to the idea of creation has its basis in the dialectic game between ontological identity and difference.
1. Preliminary Aspects
2. Reference and Denomination
2.1. Divine Acts and the Question of Faith
2.2. The Denomination of Creatio ex nihilo
2.2.1. The Cultural - Linguistic Paradigm
2.2.2. On «Nothing» as a Possible World
3. Creatio ex nihilo and the Idea of «The Ontological Difference»
1. Preliminary Aspects
The question of the creatio ex nihilo syntagm may be preceded by the question: how can one understand the connection between a concept (nihil), which gives us
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the absolute non-determination, and another one (creatio), which gives us the absolute determination of the world in which I myself exist and I am the occurrence of this question? Motivated by the sentence credo sed intelligere volo, I do not overlook my subjectivity on the mystical idea. On the contrary, I consider that the analysis of the language bearing the Christian doctrine is an exercise meant to increase the degree of understanding of the crossing between faith and knowledge.
Creatio ex nihilo is part of a class of concepts, understood as «mystery». Many writers have concerned themselves with the creation of the world, but, if we remain at the level of these interpretations, we risk entering a redundant circuit controlled by argumentum ad hominem. I do no deny that each author had something to say about the question raised by creatio ex nihilo, but in this study I do not want to explain the words, therefore the reference to them is an implicit one and depends on a subjective motivation in exceeding some embarrassing disagreements. Vladimir Lossky, for example, considers that «the idea of creation ex nihilo is found in the Bible (Maccabees 7,28)» and illustrates this by the fragment "… you should know that God has created them out of nothing «1. In the Romanian version of the Bible (the issues of 1968 _ 1997), the same fragment is translated in the following way: "you should know that God has made them of something that has not been». When W. Tatarkiewics wrote the history of the concept of creation, he had in mind creatio ex nihilo and he made reference to the Second Book of Maccabees, and provided another translation of the same fragment, that is «ouk ex ónton» (not of something real)2. Almost the same meaning is rendered as Nothing by the theologian Dumitru Staniloae, who states that «Anything is not a real vacuum»3. The question : «Why is nothing the ontological correlative of creation?» cannot be avoided. The question requires two conditions: a) transition from description to explanation, from concept to analysis, and b) connecting the object which is studied to the epistemic object; an aspect that is inferred from the fact that the analyses of some variables (causes, reasons, religions, philosophical justification, and so on) are assumptions which are related to human existence. The human being uses concepts and principles, gives definitions, classifies; in other words, he mediates his relation to the surrounding world by means of a pattern which has epistemological and pragmatic alternatives (including religious ones), but not logical ones. The structure Subject _ Language _ Object is felt as a logical and ontological unit based on the presumed connection between the mystery of the existence of the world and its pattern accepted by Christianity (the patterns may be mythological, religious, philosophical, or scientific). I will build up analogies and reasons as premises for the concept of creatio ex nihilo. I have in view:
1) If the creation of the world is in the power of God's word, then ontology has its origin in meditation through language. This means that using logical, linguistic, and metaphorical _ symbolical structures, we describe and explain the exist-
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ence and the creation of the world; more precisely, we reveal the meanings which are built out of phrases and sentences.
2) If there is the word ,,NOTHING", and if any word from the group of categorematic terms is a sign for something, namely a concrete or abstract, a real, ideal or imaginary entity, then, it means that the word NOTHING is a sign for something. In this case, the unit given by the reference relation is of a cultural nature, which is understood in its general meaning and also considered in a particular meaning, that of the Christian theological aspect.
The reference made to language implies certain specifications. These are:
a) There are differences of essence between language as an external object, and the act of thinking of an object (definition or notion);
b) Wittgenstein has demonstrated that "language conceals thinking", and that the surrounding world becomes understandable only by means of a theoretical or symbolical reconstruction. It may be stated that: ,,sentences are patterns of reality in the way we imagine it"4
c) Defining the real of the logical _ linguistic or the metaphorical _ symbolical structures at the language level implies operating on the bases of the possible;
d) It is possible that at the language level, the logical isolation and the analyses of facts will provide information for identifying the Christian pattern of the world by universal methods of reasoning.
2. Reference and Denomination
The Creatio ex nihilo syntagm is a formula assigned by Christian theology for naming the way God has created the world through His Word. The acts of creation are described in the first two chapters of the Book of Creation, but there is not a single reference in the text to acknowledge that the world is made ex nihilo. So, we have to distinguish two aspects, namely:
1) The biblical description of the divine actions which begin with the sentence:,,Let there be light" (Genesis 1,3), also known as the first day of creation, and ending with the utterance ,,Then God said: And now I will make the human beings; they will be like us and will resemble us" (Genesis 1,26), known as the sixth day of creation.
2) The conceptual _ doctrinal abbreviation of the days of creation, that is, the creatio ex nihilo denomination given by the Christian theologians. This implies both faith and interpretation.It is difficult to notice the differences between the acts of God by which he has created the world, the biblical descriptions of the facts of Divine Creation which represent the beginning of the holy history, and the denomination given to creation and the creation description which is part of the Christian dogma, and connotes expression of faith.
In order to work systematically, it is necessary to make a brief analysis of the above-mentioned terms and the meanings they are conveying.
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2.1. The Divine Actions and Act of Faith
Usually, a divine action means something that happened in reality ( for example, the creation of man).
A logical meaning of the divine act means the content of a sentence uttered by God straightway, or out of a biblical sentence that describes a divine action, namely of the Bible inspired by God himself. The fact that God said ,,Let there be light" and there was light or Jesus Christ said: „I command you, get up, take your bed and go home!" (Luke 5,24), and the sick man was cured, stand as examples of divine acts.
With this in mind, one can notice that if we logically separate the first day of Creation (Creation 1, 3-5), we must consider a set of distinct facts, each of these reflecting something of the complex determinants which give distinctiveness to divine creation. I make reference to:
a) Imperative sentence: ,,Let there be light!" _ its content is the updating of God`s thoughts in a understandable linguistic assertion that makes reference to the light phenomenon. This section of the creation can be named ,,the creation of light" _ a phrase with a double meaning: the sentence meaning (bearing a word- symbol) and the existence of light. God`s thoughts are the incognoscible reference (we have in view the connections pointed out by the ,,semiotic triangle").
b) Reflection of word on itself in an axiological judgement to justify the meaning of the sentence ,,Let there be light" and the consequence of this meaning, namely ,,God was pleased with what He saw." The content of the axiological judgement is the act of a value-based identification of light by the adequate correspon
dence between the term "light" and the designated object. I will name this ,, acknowledgment of the light."
c) Choices of entities created in an appositional way, a fact rendered by the sentence ,,Then he separated light from darkness"- its content confirms an order ( a cosmic one) but one which presupposes several subjective meanings (the symbolism of light and darkness). I think that this divine operation may be named "classification of opposite genres."
d) Act of divine denomination, that is, the sentence "And He named the light Day and the darkness Night." This is an act that engenders a secondary correspondence through the referential relation between name as abbreviation of a definition and the denominated object. From a pragmatic perspective, one can define the act of divine denomination as the "designation of opposite genres".
e) The temporal delimitation of the actions of the creation ( actions named by the phrases: "creation of light," "acknowledgment light") using the formula "Evening passed and morning came _ that was the first day". The essence of this biblical pattern is the reality of creation as the constitution of the world that emerges from the divine utterance seen as a temporal passing within a period of time assumed by the divine awareness and, then, by the Christian consciousness. I
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consider that these acts governed by the reiteration of this pattern can be named ,,the act of growing aware of the creation," because it establishes the limits of the ontological levels. However, through a mimetic act, the man himself, Adam, ascribes a name for each thing in the world in the sixth day, thus, assigning a related identity to the signs ( words) of the natural language.
It is not necessary to extend the analytical exercise to the other "days" to point out an act of faith making use of several divine acts described. The names or descriptions ("definition of opposite genres", the act of being conscious of the creation, etc.) express the belief that the name renders the essence of the divine act. The name has not only the role of designating something objective, but it also gives the object a certain significance without which this cannot exist in the human beings' opinion. I may say that by denomination, the act of language operates on objects. We have the right to know the ineffable of creation.
In order to avoid confusion, I think that it is necessary to mention that due to the nature of this study, the hermeneutics of the letters prescribed by the Jewish Kabbala can`t be called upon as an example. Kabbala and its aim of recreating the act of Adam of naming and governing the world using the combination of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet and their corresponding numbers is restrained by a speculative mysticism which resides in the chimeras of the imaginary world. The resurrection of the "secret science" is unknown to us, and to "think as in a fairytale", as Eminescu said, is anachronic in the 21st century; nonetheless, should this century be a mystical one, according to Malraux, then, it would embody the mystical aspect of reason, including the Supreme reason, God`s reason.
My point of view partially covers the sphere of the "concept of justified faith" suggested by Risto Hilpinen in his epistemological analysis on faith, knowledge and the systems of reasoning. Provided that the act of faith should have a value similar to the theoretical act of knowledge, "the pieces of knowledge should satisfy a certain additional epistemic requirement", namely: ,,R`s belief that p is fully satisfactory ( R knows p) only if R is justified in believing that p 5.
Hilpinen`s formula has a logic of belief according to which the sentences that are specific to a faith system may be accepted, rejected or deferred, and in time, any of the three may be subjected to changes.
Evaluating only the situation of acceptance, one has to admit that a phrase or a sentence, which is taken out of a system ( in this case, see chapters 1 and 2 of the Book of Creation) must be analyzed according to the truth of the Christian faith, more exactly, to a function of absolute presumption _ Kant named it "postulate"- that is, the existence of God; an idea that gives coherence to the system and to the interpretations of the latter. Let's take again the example. ,,Let there be light!", we admit that its meaning is given by: a) God`s interest for presenting the idea of ,,light" and b) the faith of the devout Christian that the sen-
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tence presents the truth of faith. Considering these assumptions, here is the result:
1) Utterance of the sentence ,,Let there be light" causes the achievement of light phenomenon (Symbol OA ? B).
2) Belief of the devout Christian that the phrase ,,Let there be light" is the original sentence of creation (p), this is a real faith, if and only if the faith of the devout Christian that p originates in the free acceptance and conviction that p exists.
From the Christian perspective, a faith defined on empirical bases takes into account that man is free. A Kantian influence can be found in the above-mentioned sentences, that is, the faith in the rationale order of the world which is one of the fundamental conditions for a human thinking to become possibility. Whitehead _ a famous mathematician and philosopher of the 20th century _ also considered that the metaphysical ideas represent the general principles of Knowledge, namely, the belief "on which Knowledge is based on, is that of the rationality of the world, according to which the real is managed by logical laws and aesthetic harmonies. This belief emerges from the human being who comes into contact with the real aspect of the world."6
It seems that the truth of faith has its background in the absolute assumptions (existence of God, resurrection of Jesus Christ, etc), and in the logic of faith.
2.2 The Denomination Creatio ex nihilo
From paragraph 2.1., one can draw the conclusion that this denomination is both a manifestation of faith and an analysis of a cognizable outcome of a definition. If we accept that the characteristic of a religious pattern to make reference to something already given and expressed is also the core of its meaning, then, when analysing creatio ex nihilo, we have to take into account two complementary aspects. These are:
1) Creatio ex nihilo denominates the world created by God because the description creatio ex nihilo applies only to the
act of creation through God`s Word and to nothing else, regardless of the context.
2) Creatio ex nihilo is the mystical significance of language over the objects, because this denomination is only the faith which represents and legislates a Christian image of the world.
The utterance of the sentence : ,,Let there be light" may happen or it may not. This ability of rendering real or not the idea of light is also found at the logical level of the exclusive disjunction _ everything or nothing.
In the Book of Creation, the "days" of creation are chronologically described, and it is through the name of God that we explain the genesis of the world either theologically or dogmatically.
The profane world of the human beings is regarded as alienation from the original sacred state, and it becomes understandable by the mediation of the ontological categories of becoming: creation, possibility, necessity, occurrence, freedom, etc, that is, by an ontological outlook. Thus, it has been created as an ontological fact as a representation of language, bear-
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ing the linguistic competence and the discursive one which is considered in its pragmatic accomplishment. "A speaker- said Constantin Noica _ may express everything, a language, in its turn, as the generality of utterance includes in it all the possible assertions. But the difference here is the following: the determinants of the nature are contingent and belong to the real, while those which are general, are necessary and belong to the absolute thing"7. I think that the denomination of creatio ex nihilo renders in a fundamental way, the absolute totality _ the world- and the mystic of nothing which is an axiological integration: God _ language _ man (communicating in theological language).
2.2.1. Cultural linguistical paradigm
The decoding of the absolute totality, that is, the world and the mystic of nothing, implies reference to a cultural linguistic structure even if the cognizable volume is not so broad.
The pattern Creatio ex nihilo was not present in the Greek language for quite a long time:
a) For example, Parmenide's human being lived in a world where only imitation was possible. The word "creation" did not exist. The Greeks had the verb "to make" (poiein). This state of affairs is very well described by Plato in his "Republic". The philosopher provides arguments for the clear cut distinction between Idea, Thing and imitated thing.
b) Nothing is found in the original chaos, and in philosophy, namely, in the structure of non-existence _ existence, which is logically absurd. I want to discuss in brief the trilemma of Georgias, that is, the epistemological argument against nothing, as well as the inability to prove that it exists, that it can be recognized, and that one can put into words any informatinal details about it8.
If one knows the proper way of using these words and phrases in Latin, the following will be disclosed:
c) The word creation cannot accommodate the present meanings because it neither makes reference to gods and their activity, nor to any kind of creator, for example the poet. Its meaning is the choice of a magistrate or a tutor (creationis magistratum; creationis tutoris).
d) Nihil is a vague and chameleon-like word because its nucleus has concealed context-related senses. It is found when expressing existential, cognitive, moral, and pragmatic aspects. For example Cicero uses patterns ,,ex nihilo orini ( it is born of nothing) and "in nihilum occidere" (to end in nothing), Plinius writes about "nihil facere" ( not to estimate at all) and "nihili est suum qui officium facere immemor" ( he who forgets to do his duty, is a man who values nothing). Nihil can achieve different values when it is combined with the negation non. Therefore, we have: 1) non nihil ( something), which yields a partial, relative aspect, and the phrase ,,non nihil temporis," which refers to a certain unit of time; 2) nihil non (everything) signifies the whole, and the pattern "nihil non ad
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rationen dirigebal" makes reference to the way in which the whole was managed according to a calculus.
No matter how hard one is trying to discover the creatio ex nihilo pattern in the works of the Latin writers one will not find it.
Analyzing the Hebrew language, I want to point out the discussion of Andrei Cornea who distinguishes between Hebrew and Greek. (it was in the latter that the Holy Scripture (Septuagint) was written and transmitted to us). I will make use of the "semiotics triangle" of Richards and Odgeon in order to the study the two languages.
The Hebrew vocabulary records "dabar" which means "word", "utterance" and "thing"; the testamentary pattern "akarey haddebarim ha ele" may be translated: "after these words" "after these facts" or "after these things," but if dabar is accompanied by the negation, it no longer mean "no word" but only "nothing". The phenomenon of reifying the word can't be found in Greek as in this language, the word is related to the thought, and thus separated from the thing, or the object. A. Cornea shows the different ways the ,,semiotic triangle" is distorted. Comparing these languages we will obtain the following scheme9.
Figure 1
a)semiotic triangle b) distortion in Hebrew c)distortion in Greek
`Nothing' in Hebrew means absolute silence, the reality of the being as self or that of the hidden thought of the unseen and unknowable Yahveh. "Creatio" identifies with the divine utterance, the logos that makes the word "thing" be understood and perceptible; the pattern "Be light" can be heard and read, understood in agreement either with the definition of the mystical light or with the definition of the natural light.
2.2.2. On Nothing as a possible world
Creatio ex nihilo seems to be an antinomial structure. In fact, this "opinion" is reinforced by the practice of the Orthodox Christian theologians in opposition with the rationalism of Antiquity. John Meyendorff wrote that "The most evident and positive truth of the Christian experience has been expressed in such kind of antinomies, namely in sentences which, in a logical form, expel one another, without being irrational". Cultivating antinomy "reflects a dynamic and subjective understanding of God"10, in opposition to the world of ideas of Plato, to the rationalism of the Greek philosophy in general. If we separate the word "creatio" from the pattern, we will find ourselves in front of the individual things. John Meyendorff considers that the meaning of this term implies two aspects: a general form of things
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and their possibility, whereas, the word nothing seems to have no special correspondence in reality. But if we refer to reality as the contents of the present world in which we envision an effective existence, something in opposition with that which is possible, then nothing (nihil) can't be synonymous with nonexistence, but rather it names a possible existence or a formal, ideal existence. Of course, by these considerations I do not assert the substantiality of nothing or the existence of a mysterious matter of which God has created the world.
When we say that nothing bears as characteristic the possible, we have in view the fact that this notion expresses a certain state of God himself as the subject of creation, and as the unique being. It is impossible for this state of affairs to be described in the early years of Christianity, but it can be suggested by metaphorical terms such as "very bright dark," that is by antinomies as in Dionysus. God is the undetermined absolute. Speaking about God, Dionysius said: He is "not one, unity, divinity, kindness, spirit, as we know him". This state is neither empirically perceptible, nor understandable by means of philosophical categories. The divinity substance in itself cannot be determined because "there is no word for it, no name, no knowledge"11. We have to content ourselves to repeat the absolute presumption that God exists, He is "the One Who Is." It is in this way that one can explain the negations of Saint Dionysus when making any reference to God, reducing Him to the "the mystic of nothing" employing the apophatic method.
Let's return to the analytical analyses of nihil; we have mentioned that what is known, is not contradictory to any notion (for ex., Light), as a unique form, and it should be conceived independently from the word (for ex., the Romanian word for light is "luminã", and it is different from the forms existing in other languages: lux _ Latin, lumiere _ French, light _ English, etc.)
The utterance of the Divine order "Let there be light!" means founding the unity of the notion and the word. The words "luminã" or "lux" or "light" make reference to the thing "light" ( mystic or natural light) through the eternal LIGHT.
The fact that language is a good mediation between man and God is confirmed by the role of prayer in an accepted system of faith. The problem which now arises, is the possibility of describing the quality of the relation (ex), that is nihilo _ creatio and that of placing the famous intuitions of Dionysus in a logical up-to-date system.
If, according to Dionysus, we deny the created word and the qualities assigned to God, we do not deny His existence but only the determinants of the biblical and traditional writings, that is, the attribute by which He becomes understandable. But in this situation, as Kant argued, there is only one conclusion "if one thinks of existence only through the pure category (eliminating predication), there is no wonder that we cannot indicate any criterion to distinguish it out of a simple possibility"12.
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Using the idea of possible, contemporary philosophers and logicians have revealed a non-contradictory understandable world and thus, the antinomies are not necessary any more. Moreover, the metaphorical concept of the "possible world" of Leibnitz has become a technical instrument in solving the problem of validity in modal logic; it serves to formulate certain alternatives of the present world, which are not logically imposible.
In the analysed case we have:
a) The real world which, due to the fact that it exists, that means it is actual, therefore, it is also posible (w1 = actual world);
b) The world of God's thoughts (w0 = original world of the creation days.)
c) The relation of accessibility (R) from one world into another is given by language, namely the creation sentences, and from the point of view of the devout Christian this is rendered by the sentences of the faith system.
At a symbolical level, the relation between the two worlds is the following: W0 RW1 . This means that a true sentence in W0 is possible in W1.
In order to obtain an intuitional relation between actual truth _ possible truth, integral constituent _ ontological relation for W0 and W1, I need to make the following specifications:
1) In W0, the idea of light is the object of the Supreme Divine reason and God`s thinking is the ideal, eternal domain of existence.
In W0, the notion of light is tautologically "shut" in its own definition. The simple logical laws A = A or A ? A, shows that the sentences which express the identity of light in the ideal sphere of existence bears only the value of truth. It is in the omnipotence of God, that derives the fact that any idea may become possible, and the possibility of putting into practice the ideas always implies a true _expression or sentence. The false value of a sentence, and also the true one, is conditioned by the unattainable. Still, this property does not exist, as it is in opposition with the presupposition of the omnipotent characteristic.
The outcome is the achivement of a reality, of God's ideas which are the equial to the unlimited possibility or "the mystic of nothing" which is not the ontological equivalent of "nothingness" or of non-existence.
2) In W1, the notion of light can be understood by the word "light", and in accordance with the phenomenon of light (mystical light or natural light) as its referent. The notion of light may be found in the structure of certain sentences which have as value either the truth or the false.
The value of truth of the sentences in W1 is not defined by itself as it is in the case of W0. In W1 the reference of the logic principles is absolutely necessary, namely:
a) the principle of identity: a sentence has a sole value of truth, this value can only be either true or false;
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b) the principle of non-contradiction, in a sentence (p) and its negation (-p), only one is true ( either p or _p);
c) the principle of the excluded middle_ this means that either sentence (p) or its negation (-p) is true, the third possibility (that both are true) being excluded.
The prescriptions mentioned in (1) and (2) require a reply. Although there is the condition of the relation of accessibility, that is the true sentence in W0, it is possible in W1. This condition does not imply the identity between W0 and W1. As stated, W0 and W1, happen in different contexts. The distinction between the eternity of the world W0 and the temporal character, finite, of the world W1, is of major importance.
Augustin said that the world was not created in time, but within time. W1 may also be understood as multiple states which are achieved for each integral constituent element. Therefore, one may speak of a succession of different states of the one and the same referent. The world is a reference for states which are attained in different ways. From this are derived the following judgements:
(1) The World is a Creation of God.
(2) The World is not created.
Corresponding to the following states of affairs:
(1a) The state of the world being the contents of the sentences uttered by God.
(2a) The state of world being of uncreated matter.
Both states (1a) and ( 2a) are descriptions of the states of the present world W1. The state (1a) may be called the world of homo religiosus, and we will refer to it as Wh, The second state (2a) may be the profound world ( Wp). Wp includes many states which are determined by the contents: metaphysical worlds, imaginary worlds, positive worlds, and so on. If to the above-mentioned symbolical notations we add:
A = omnipotence of God (the unlimited possibility and, then, un-determination of the source of the ideas).
Cx = competence of a certain language given by the possibility in that language (Greek, Hebrew, Romanian) to build sentences.
Sc = the system of faith (Christian faith system presumes a world as it is envisaged in the Christian dogma).
Now, we may draft two schemes to describe this:
1) Creation of the world, or creatio ex nihilo
Figure 2.a
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2) Christian interpretation of the world created as creatio ex nihilo
Figure 2.b
Alvin Plantinga says that "a possible world is, then, a state of the possible things, this state is possible in an expanded logic meaning." But, for a state of things to create a possible world, it has to be complete. There is a definition "a state of "S" things is complete or maximum if for any of the state of things, S1, S includes S or S excludes S1." W1 (present world) certifies that "one and only one causes at least a possible world" and, also that "one and only one causes at the most one"13.
Creatio ex nihilo is the possibility of the relation of accessibility. W0 RW1, are also relations which are formed as: a) sentences of creatio ( for example: Let there be light!) and b) sentences of the Christian faith system ( for example "Light is creation of God").
3. Creatio ex nihilo and the idea of the "ontological difference"
In the Christian faith, the world and its creation through the divine verb, implies interpretative sequences. The interpretation of the divine act, for example the sentence ,,Let there be light" provides a certain significance, that is to reveal a certain contents of the sentence. But in the particular case of the sentences of the creation, we notice that they are a state of acts by themselves. These sentences are non-referential because the subject or God stands for himself, yet this does not mean that they are linked sentences. The creation sentences as states of the subject indicate:
a) The thinking of God as existence from which everything exists or does not;
b) The object of thinking or the object of faith for the devout Christian, of which we state something in accordance with a system of sentences justified as axioms.
Therefore, every sentence of Creation is the divine form of the world _ God is in the subject _ sentence, and we, the people, cannot be but outside of these sentences because we define ourselves as the subject _ sentence through faith.
This means that, in a judgement with reference to a Creation sentence, one states the logic _ grammar subject which is a sign of the real subject, outside the sentence, that is subject-sentence or God. Cãlin Candiescu explains this situation through an analogy.
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Making reference to the mechanism of predication and the relationship it implies, he builds a "predicate triangle". This scheme clearly shows that ,,the predication is not a direct relation between Paud Sp, but an indirect one, mediated by S"14.
Figure 3
Legend: S = logic _ grammar subject
Sp = subject of predication ( S real)
Rp = predication relationship
Rc = copulative relationship (inside the sentence context)
Rs = supposition relationship
The predication justified by the Christian faith and by the logic principles indirectly connotes something beyond the sentence of my utterance, namely the sentences uttered by God himself, that is the God`s state of being the subject, of being the word itself or "God was the word" _ as John the Evangelist says. It means that God is the presupposition of the logic subject, that is the real subject. Without the supposition of the existence of the real subject, the sentences have no meaning.
The sentences of the system of faith, although interpretations of the real subject, represent the additional sentence of an independent world which we called the world of homo religiosus ( Wh ) in paragraph 2.2.2., a world which is in a relation of accessibility with W0. Even if we analyze Wh only, we are aware that its background is W0. This aspect is a result of the scheme of the "predicational triangle".
Returning to the idea of the subject itself, I underline that the Creation sentences are non-referential, thus, they are undetermined, they are nothing in correlation with man`s own ability to produce an ontological speech which is understood as predication or assignment, namely a speech of something about something, or of W1 about Wh. Determinants are essential in a judgement or sentence. And the idea of "ontological difference" emerges from this. But the idea of "ontological difference" has a legitimacy which is immanent in the human world through the concept of creation". Creation is not only the logic location deriving from the crossing of existence and human being, but it is also a sui generis possibility of a relation as "ontological difference" between man and God _ so as Nikolai Berdiaev has explained: "the world has been made not only of creation but also creative. Within the former, one is in the image of the Creator, it means that there are creators among the created"15. Of course, the image of a world created
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which is opened to creation is contrary to the one described in the metaphysics of the ancient Greek. When Parmenides says that "it is the same thing to think and to be"16, he acknowledges the idea of the "ontological identity", justifying an ontology built on the logical relation of identity ( A = B ).
Paradoxically, in the early times of Greek philosophy, Anaximanders set àpeiron, a negative concept which represented a fundamental principle in ontology, was later modified by the formula of Parmenides. In poetic language, and also in philosophical language, àpeiron will receive the meaning _ as Gh. Vladuþescu says _ "of that which is undetermined in itself, and through itself". The concept provides "the well established condition" namely the ,,undetermined becomes the subject ( hypo _ keimenon) both in a linguistic sense and, by analogy, in an ontological aspect." Due to Anaximander, the physical vision of the Milesians opens towards metaphysics. This change does not happen "directly, from water as principle to the principle as principle, but through the mediation of àperion as principle"17.
Àperion seems to be something between fact and logic, something based on faith, that is the inner principle of things. The idea is underlined by Aristotle in his "Physics", where he quotes one of the few original fragments remaining from Anaximander, that is: "àpeiron is the divine. It is eternal and everlasting"18. In De Civitate Dei (VII, 2) Augustin also makes reference to the Greek philosopher describing his conception according to which any thing is generated by its own principles, principles that have an infinite nature.
At first sight, the ambiguity provoked by concept appears to indicate an equivalence between the notions àperion and nihil. But if one brings into discussion the substantiality of aperion, than it can be distinguished from nihil as an undetermined mystical state linked to creation as a contents to the creation sentences.
A religion of the Book _ to borrow a phrase of Mircea Eliade _ where the matter of Creation is the Word, has founded a world where creation has become its ontological base. The W1 has a meaning _ "sense of creation" says Berdiaev _ and is not an act of rendering it proper in the principle of agreement, but a reconstruction.
Giving sense to the world through a secondary creation of man also means re-signifying that which is given, so that the new significance becomes critic or the new cultural object (culture means, here, a new socio-human reality which is structured on different levels: religious, metaphysical, scientific). The "ontological differences" set by the formula W0 R W1 is promoted in the states of the present world W1. The idea is also sustained by Whitehead, who says: „creativity is the basic category of existence, in the sense that existence is transformed and organizes itself on each level through a creative advancer"19. In the context of the present world, the "difference" is - as Alexandru Boboc says _ a semantic one, and then an ontological one, in the same way as the correct meaning precedes
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and conditions the logical _ formal one, by means of which one enters.
That is what Kant named "the land of truth" and further on in understandability (possibility of human being as human being beyond the human being as being)"20.
The world is also the work of man. The hermeneutic circle ensures the technical objective condition of turning to good account.
Augustins concept of time is more precisely the present out of past and the present out of present. I find myself wandering at the history of the world, and the one who facilitates this miracle could be somebody who sometimes was named Socrates. It is possible that Socrates could be my contemporary; as in any of Socrates`s dialogues, one begins with the state of nothing, the axiom "I know that I know nothing" and reaches the state of truth as an uncreated state of the world.
It is the state of truth that stands for a link for Knowledge and faith.
Notes
1 Vladimir Lossky, Teologia misticã a Bisericii de Rãsãrit, Editura Anastasia, Bucuresti, pp. 121-122.
2 Wladyslaw Tatrkiewicz, Istoria celor sase notiuni, Editura Meridiane, Bucuresti, 1981, p. 361.
3 Dumitru Stãniloae, Chipul nemuritor al lui Dumnezeu, Editura Mitropoliei Olteniei, Craiova, 1987, p. 244.
4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Editura Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1991, propozitiile 4.002 si 4.01.
5 Risto Hilpinen: Belief Systems, Knowledge and Reasoning, Prelegeri sustinute la First Summer School for Theory of Knowledge, Warszawo-Madralin 1997, p. 36.
6 Cf. D. Botez, "Realism si relativism: problematicã actualã. Bibliogafie principalã (1925-1992)", în Realism si relativism în filosofia stiintei contemporane, Editura DAR, Bucuresti, 1993, p. V.
7 Constantin Noica, Devenirea întru fiintã, Editura Stiintificã si Enciclopedicã, Bucuresti, 1981, p. 254.
8 Gorgias, "Despre nonexistent si despre existent", în Filosofia greacã pînã la Platon, vol. II, partea a 2-a, Editura Stiintificã si Eciclopedicã, Bucuresti, 1984, pp. 461-465.
9 Andrei Cornea, Scriere si oralitate în cultura anticã, Editura Cartea Româneascã, Bucuresti, 1988, pp. 74-79.
10 John Meyendorff, Teologia bizantinã, Editura Institutului Biblic si de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, Bucuresti, 1996, p. 300.
11 Sfântul Dionisie Areopagitul, "Teologia misticã", în Opere complete, Editura Paideea, Bucuresti, 1996, p. 250.
12 Immanuel Kant, Critica ratiunii pure, Editura Stiintificã, Bucuresti, 1969, p. 480.
13 Alvin Platinga, Natura necesitãtii, Editura Trei, Bucuresti, 1998, pp. 115-116.
14 Cãlin Candiescu, "O interpretare logico-semanticã a predicatiei, descriptiilor si numelor proprii" în Probleme de logicã, vol. IX, Editura Academiei, 1986, p. 27.
15 Nikolai Berdiaev, Sensul creatiei, Editura Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1992, p. 129.
16 Parmenides, în Filosofia greacã pînã la Platon, vol I, partea a 2-a, Editura Stiintificã si Enciclopedicã, Bucuresti, 1979, p. 232.
17 Gheorghe Vlãdutescu, Deschideri cãtre o posibilã ontologie, Editura Stiintificã si Enciclopedicã, Bucuresti, 1987, p. 50.
18 * * * Filosofia greacã pânã la Platon, vol I, partea 1, Editura Stiintificã si Enciclopedicã, Bucuresti, 1979, p. 175.
19 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, The Free Press, New York, 1969, p. 25.
20 Alexandru Boboc, Hermeneuticã si ontologie, Editura Didacticã si Pedagogicã, Bucuresti, 1999, p. 62.
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